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Abstract

Racial profiling remains a controversial societal issue due in part to difficulties in
determining its prevalence. Some analysts have proposed that criminological theories
should be used to explain racial profiling. Using the minority group threat hypothesis,
this dissertation analyzes the effects of Black population increases on race-based
pretextual stops in 113 Missouri municipalities with sizable Black populations. The
research also analyzes the effects of the growth and size of the Black population on
traffic stop outcomes, including searches, contraband found, arrests, and citations. Other
variables that might explain pretextual stops and traffic stop outcomes, including violent
crime rates and socioeconomic differences between the Black and White populations, are
assessed. The study finds support for the minority group threat hypothesis in explaining
racial profiling based on the relative growth and size of the Black population. The
hypothesis is refined by results showing the thresholds in the relative size of the Black
population at which racially disparate stop rates and outcomes emerge and recede.
Community accountability theory also helps to explain the effects of municipal
government structure on race differences in traffic stops and outcomes. Although
policies that affect population growth would be questionable, policy makers and police
organizations should make genuine efforts to reduce profiling by scrutinizing pretextual
stops more closely, revising racial profiling forms to reflect more explicit police activity,
taking away the ability for officers to make easy outstanding warrant and traffic violation
arrests, and requiring documentation of departmental responses to disproportionate stop
rates to accompany yearly racial profiling reports to the Attorney General.
Key Words: racial profiling, pretextual stop, minority threat, population ratio,
disproportionate searches, disproportionate arrests for outstanding warrants, contraband,
traffic violations, and citations issued
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: HISTORICAL REVIEW

When people are asked about whether racism still exists in America, they almost
unanimously confirm its presence and view it repulsively (Quillian, 2006). Some believe
that while it is not as conspicuous as in the past, it could be more dangerous today as
some hide their hatred to avoid violating political correctness. This is not to assume that
racism only reflects an individual‟s conscious prejudices toward others. It can also be
subconsciously triggered by the presence or mention of a minority group (Quillian,
2006). This subconscious activation may come from “stereotypical beliefs associated
with a racial category” and could subsequently influence an individual‟s or group‟s
actions (Quillian, 2006: 314-15). Although racism is prevalent in the eyes of many, few
seem to confess their true feelings. Many even justify its existence by making the claim
that everyone is “prejudiced” to some extent. Yet the majority maintains that they have
never mistreated another or used the “n” word because the use of that word was not
allowed in their homes (Walker et al., 2004).
It is difficult to deny that individuals learn behaviors mostly from what their parents
have taught (Siegel, 2005). Going back to days of slavery in the United States, children
were taught that Blacks were inferior to Whites, which kept slaves in subservient
positions. African captives were treated as animals by many civilians and government
officials. In fact, Africans were only considered three-fifths of a person during early
United States history. This principle was simply the sign of the times. As things
changed, American born Africans gained more freedoms, but not without resistance.
Historically, Blacks maintained a subordinate position in American society,
3

economically, educationally, politically, and even within the criminal justice system.
Blacks received the death penalty under conditions that would not have elicited capital
punishment if the perpetrators were White (Walker et al., 2004). Historical accounts
from the early 1900s until the early 1960s show how White children accompanied their
parents to witness and celebrate hangings of Blacks.
It causes one to wonder whether today‟s corporate CEO‟s might have been in these
audiences and now teach or have taught their sons and daughters the traditions they
learned growing up. Additionally, today‟s religious leaders may have stood in these
crowds and currently may hold views similar to their parents. Furthermore, politicians
who learned from past experiences may now teach their children these perspectives.
There could also be law enforcement officials who maintain racial prejudices taught by
their mothers and fathers. This racist past is not very distant, and the vestiges may still be
present.
After Civil Rights laws were put in place in the mid 1960s, attitudes did not
necessarily change, but tactics did (Quillian, 2006). Those who remained opposed to
allowing racial equality continued to hood themselves to hide their identities as they
terrorized Black communities. These individuals most likely passed down their ideas and
attitudes to subsequent generations who now continue this trend, but in different ways
(Quillian, 2006).
In reality, individuals will maintain their own beliefs and attitudes toward other
groups. Authorities will only need to deal with these convictions as they become
pertinent to the welfare of other individuals. For that matter, it becomes more alarming
when agents of trust act on these sentiments passed down from previous generations.

4

While there are those who belong to groups that proudly tout their superiority over
others, few admit having racist postures (Quillian, 2006). In some instances racist
attitudes are only revealed because of an unfortunate slip of the tongue that exposes a
person‟s true character. These clandestine positions make it difficult for scientific
research to prove to what magnitude racism exists in the minds of agents of trust. Yet
history has shown that Blacks have been put to death at higher rates than Whites,
sentenced more harshly, arrested at higher rates, and are several times more likely than
Whites to come under the control of the criminal justice system (Walker et al., 2004).
While many acknowledge that racism is still prevalent in America, no matter whether one
is a politician, minister, or an agent of the criminal justice system, some believe that
Black overrepresentation in the criminal justice system has more to do with crime
patterns than racism (Walker et al., 2004). Some are even more reluctant to believe that
police, whom we trust to protect our daily quality of living, act in racist ways that would
affect an entire population. Since the police are in a powerful position to make life
changing decisions, the importance of analyzing police behaviors is paramount in
administering criminal justice equally.
Criminological research consistently reports that police treat Blacks and Hispanics
more harshly than Whites in most contacts. Police arrest and use lethal and non-lethal
force more often against Blacks and Hispanics than Whites.1 The FBI‟s Uniform Crime
Report arrest statistics indicate that minorities are disproportionately more involved in
criminal activity than Whites, which may partially explain the differential treatment by

1

(Binder and Scharf, 1982; Fyfe, 1982; Sparger and Giacopossi, 1992; Sorensen et al., 1993; Jacobs and
O‟Brien, 1998; Crawford, 2000; Smith and Petrocelli, 2001; Terrill and Reisig, 2003)

5

police.2 However, arrest statistics do not tell the entire story when other data collection
methods, such as victimization and self report surveys, are taken into account (Walker et
al., 2004).
Victimization and self report studies indicate that the frequency by which Blacks and
Hispanics engage in criminal activity is not as high as arrest statistics suggest. Aside
from serious felonies, Blacks and Hispanics violate the law approximately at the same
rate as Whites (Hindelang et al., 1979; Powell, 1990; Tonry, 1995; Donohue and Levitt,
2001; Eitle et al., 2005). In fact, when it comes to traffic stops, some research suggests
that Whites violate traffic laws at higher rates than Blacks and Hispanics (Lamberth,
1996). Nevertheless, most studies reveal that Blacks and Hispanics are still more likely
than Whites to be stopped and searched by the police.
While debates on differential treatment of Blacks and Hispanics versus Whites
continue, traffic stop data and the circumstances surrounding police stops have gained
more attention. As a supplement to the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), a
2002 national study on citizen contacts with police indicates that Blacks and Hispanics
were no more likely than Whites to be subjected to traffic stops. However, Blacks were
significantly less likely to feel the stops were legitimate (Durose et al., 2005). The study
acknowledges methodological concerns with the study results. For instance, respondents
to the NCVS might use selective memory, misinterpret, or simply forget circumstances
(Siegel, 2005). There is also growing debate that involves the denominator used to
measure minority overrepresentation in traffic stops (Durose et al., 2005). Nevertheless,
the national study displayed results that cannot be ignored.

2

(Hindelang et al., 1979; Moyer, 1982; Smith et al., 1984; Powell, 1990; Sealock and Sampson, 1998;
Avakame et al., 1999; Crawford, 2000; Avakame and Fyfe, 2001; Walker, 2001; Stolzenberg et al., 2004)
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Given these results, this dissertation provides a descriptive analysis of municipalities
in the State of Missouri with populations of 90 or more Black residents. This study
further used explicit theoretical assessments of police differential treatment of minorities
in Missouri traffic stops and particularly the outcomes of those stops. One might
speculate that as the minority population increases, police use aggressive law
enforcement tactics, such as traffic stops, more often against minorities than Whites. The
circumstances surrounding these traffic encounters may provide a more in-depth look at
whether there is differential treatment of minorities, whether these differences are a
function of some legal factor that puts minorities at a higher risk of police scrutiny than
Whites, or whether the complexities of this issue simply hinder any concrete evidence of
racial profiling. To that end, traffic stop outcomes are examined. Additionally,
extralegal factors such as poverty, unemployment, household income, and property
values are assessed to test the extent that minority population increases contribute to
differential treatment.

LITERATURE REVIEW ON DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT
Differential police treatment between minorities and White citizens is examined in
studies that address various police activities.3 While extralegal factors may play a role in
some police behavior, it is not clear whether race is the exclusive explanation of why
Blacks and Hispanics are treated more harshly than Whites. This section will examine
3

(Correll et al., 2002; Hindelang et al., 1979; Binder and Scharf, 1982; Fyfe, 1982; Moyer, 1982; Erez,
1984; Smith et al., 1984; Bursik, 1986; Schuerman and Kobrin, 1986; Powell, 1990; Sparger and
Giacopossi, 1992; Sorensen et al., 1993; Doerner and Ho Tai ping, 1994; Tonry, 1995; Klinger, 1996,
1997; Jacobs and O‟Brien, 1998; Levin and Alexander, 1997; Sealock and Sampson, 1998; Avakame et al.,
1999; Mastrofski et al., 2000; Rogers and Johnson, 2000; Avakame and Fyfe, 2001; Brandl et al., 2001;
Donohue and Levitt, 2001; Garner et al., 2002; Smith and Holmes, 2003; Terrill and Reisig, 2003; Schuck,
2004; Stolzenberg et al., 2004; Eitle et al., 2005)
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the effects of race on lethal and non-lethal use of force, arrests for serious and minor
offenses, and traffic stops. When it comes to the use of force, some studies have found
no evidence that suggests that race plays a role in police actions (Brandl et al., 2001; Eitle
et al., 2005). However, if we get more specific by examining deadly force, there might
be indications that race, indeed, influences police decisions to shoot.

Lethal Force
Some studies reveal that police kill Blacks overwhelmingly more often than they do
Whites.4 Fyfe (1982) conducted a study of the Memphis, Tennessee, Police Department
and found that even in less threatening situations, Blacks are shot more often than
Whites. While studies acknowledge that the police subject Blacks to lethal force more
often than Whites, it is still not clear to what extent race of the offender plays a major
role in police decisions to use lethal force (Doerner and Ho Tai ping, 1994; Correll et al.,
2002).
Police shootings were more likely to occur in situations when officers felt that
suspects posed a high risk of danger. Since Blacks and Hispanics make up a
disproportionately large number of individuals who participate in high risk activity
(Smith et al., 1984; Walker et al., 2004), it follows that they will become victims of
police shootings more often. Does this complicate the issue and possibly explain police
shootings as a function of situational factors rather than racial discrimination? In
response to this rhetorical question, Michael Donohue (1983) showed that Black officers
are disproportionately more likely than White officers to shoot Black suspects. Donohue

4

(Binder and Scharf 1982; Fyfe, 1982; Sparger and Giacopossi, 1992; Sorensen et al., 1993; Jacobs and
O‟Brien, 1998; Smith and Petrocelli, 2001; Terrill and Reisig, 2003)
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noted that Black officers are often assigned to predominantly disadvantaged minority
areas. This might suggest that Black police have a tendency to be tougher than White
police on Black suspects. Furthermore, studies that use Firearm Training Systems
simulating field situations to safely analyze an officer‟s decision to shoot armed versus
unarmed subjects show that White officers are no more likely to use deadly force than
Black officers (Doerner and Ho Tai ping, 1994; Ho Tai ping, 1994; Correll et al., 2002).
If nothing else, maybe neighborhood characteristics, such as the high general rate of
violence in inner cities, mediate police use of deadly force against minorities. It might
not be that minorities are shot at different rates solely because of race (Binder and Scharf,
1982; Terrill and Reisig, 2003). Studies that analyze the use of police non-deadly force
might provide a clearer depiction of police action as it pertains to race and neighborhood
characteristics.

Non-lethal Force
Police use of deadly force is a rare event (Garner et al., 2002) and generally occurs as
a result of an officer perceiving a threat. However, the justifications for using non-deadly
force are not as transparent when analyzing physical confrontations between police and
citizens. Police use of non-lethal force ranges from physical altercations to the use of
pepper sprays, stun guns, and other control techniques. While some studies claim there is
no evidence that race plays a role in police use of physical force (Rogers and Johnson,
2000; Brandl et al., 2001), other studies suggests that race is very relevant (Erez, 1984;
Levin and Thomas, 1997; Smith and Petrocelli, 2001; Schuck, 2004). As physical force
comes from a wide range of activities that may or may not officially be documented in
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police reports, research data may be limited when seeking to determine whether police
use more physical force on Blacks and Hispanics than Whites. However, when arrests
are made, there is considerable research that covers various circumstances surrounding
the disparate arrest rates between minority and White individuals.

Arrests for Serious Felonies
While the literature is scant on arrest statistics for Hispanics, studies have shown that
Blacks and Hispanics are generally arrested more often than Whites, and these
differences vary between arrests for serious crimes as opposed to minor offenses.5
Moreover, the ratio of Black-to-White Americans arrested for serious crimes is much
greater than the ratio between the same groups for arrests for less serious crimes
(Hindelang et al., 1979; Smith et al., 1984; Smith and Petrocelli, 2001; Stolzenberg et al.,
2004). However, “controlling for the amount of race-specific crime reported to the
police, Black citizens actually have a lower probability of arrest than Whites in cities
with relatively large Black populations” (Stolzenberg et al., 2004: 673). Furthermore,
Blacks were found to be less likely to be arrested in cities where segregation is more
pronounced, except for crimes involving a White victim and Black offender (Avakame
and Fyfe, 2001; Stolzenberg et al., 2004). Thus, it appears that the racial makeup of the
population and perhaps the local police department may have some influence on arrest
rates.
The results are varied in studies that report the influences of the racial makeup of
police departments as it relates to arrest rates. While Whites are more likely to be

5

(Hindelang et al., 1979; Moyer, 1982; Smith et al., 1984; Powell, 1990; Sealock and Sampson, 1998;
Avakame et al., 1999; Avakame and Fyfe, 2001; Walker, 2001; Stolzenberg et al., 2004)
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arrested for assaults than Blacks and Hispanics regardless of the racial composition of the
police department, the probability that Whites are arrested is even greater in cities with
relatively more minority officers. In fact, increases in the number of minority police are
positively associated with White arrests while increases of White officers result in more
minority arrests, particularly for minor offenses (Donohue and Levitt, 2001; Eitle et al.,
2005). Having evidence that Blacks are arrested for serious crimes more often than
Whites, self report and victimization surveys confirm data from official statistics that
indicate that Blacks commit more serious offenses than Whites (Hindelang et al., 1979;
Tonry, 1995; Walker et al., 2004). Therefore, it appears that there is justification for the
higher Black arrest rates for serious crimes. Based on such data, one must question
whether the justifications for higher Black and Hispanic arrests are as salient when
analyzing arrests for minor offenses.

Arrests for Minor Offenses
As stated earlier, while Blacks are arrested more often than Whites for serious crime,
they are also arrested more for non-serious crime (Hindelang et al., 1979; Smith et al.,
1984; Powell, 1990; Crawford, 2000; Stolzenberg et al., 2004). Conversely, unlike the
patterns of criminal behavior reported for serious offenses, the ratio of offending between
Blacks and Whites is not as pronounced when studying minor offenses. In fact, many
self report and victimization surveys show that crime rates between Blacks and Whites
are similar for minor offenses; thus, discrimination may appear to play a larger role in
these arrest statistics (Hindelang et al., 1979; Powell, 1990; Tonry, 1995; Donohue and
Levitt, 2001; Eitle et al., 2005). Alfred Blumstein (1982) conducted a study of racial
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differences in arrest vulnerability. He found that as the seriousness of the offense
decreased, Blacks became disproportionately represented in arrests. He acknowledges
that police patrol neighborhoods that are more crime prone which accounts for some of
the disparities, but the differences in arrest rates are more pronounced for minor
violations of the law, which allows for more police discretion and the potential for bias
activity.
However, there are studies that claim that race either has no significant correlation to
or little impact on police decisions to arrest (Moyer, 1982; Klinger, 1996, 1997; Chamlin
and Brandl, 1998; Mastrofski et al., 2000). Chamlin and Brandl (1998) report results
from a Milwaukee study by analyzing populations from 1930 to 1972. They found that
as the percentage of the Black population rose, the arrest rates for vagrancy decreased,
which contradicts the notion that Blacks are substantially more often arrested for minor
offenses. Klinger (1997) even espoused that in areas where crime rates are high, which is
usually in Black neighborhoods, arrests for minor offenses are less frequent than in areas
with lower crime rates. He concluded that the conduct did not violate the threshold that
would warrant an arrest in these types of neighborhoods. On the other hand, other studies
report that in neighborhoods where there is less informal control, there is a need for more
official social control or police intervention (Bursik, 1986; Schuerman and Kobrin,
1986). More interestingly, Smith et al. (1984) show that in lower status neighborhoods,
police are more punitive in their arrest practices when there are no complainants and less
punitive if there is a Black victim. These actions perpetuate what Smith et al. (1984) call
a “systematic denial of legal protection for blacks” (p. 249).

12

Traffic Stops
Police treatment of minorities during traffic stops has become a controversial issue in
recent years. While criminological research on traffic stops is limited, much of it focuses
on how minorities are racially profiled (Smith and Petrocelli, 2001; Cox, 2002). The
definition of racial profiling has varied around the notion of police stopping an individual
based solely on the driver‟s skin color.6 Given the problem with determining whether an
officer‟s motivation to stop an individual was truly based on skin color, the definition is
difficult to use as an accurate measurement for analyzing race-based traffic stops.
Nevertheless, research consistently reports that minorities are stopped by police at
disproportionately higher rates than Whites, which at least provokes the need to examine
whether some form of racial profiling exists. The problem might be, as Batton and
Kadleck (2004: 31) assert, that “the defining characteristics of racial profiling incidents
have yet to be identified.” That is, the circumstances surrounding a traffic stop must be
examined more closely to determine whether racial profiling is taking place.
The concept of racial profiling became controversial in the 1980s as Operation
Pipeline, a tool used by the United States Drug Enforcement Administration to profile
drug couriers, was initiated. Blacks and Hispanics were explicitly identified as drivers
that fit the profile of drug traffickers.7 The facts surrounding these implications have
been questioned as Engel et al. (2002) point out that Black drivers stopped for traffic
violations do not produce more arrests or drug seizures than White drivers. Racial
profiling gained national attention in a 1993 incident when a Black attorney (Robert
6

(Walker, 2001; Barlow and Barlow, 2002; Buerger and Farrell, 2002; Engel et al., 2002; Farrell et al.,
2002; Meeham and Ponder, 2002; Batton and Kadleck, 2004; Novak, 2004)
7
(Harris, 1997; Crawford, 2000; Hemmens and Levin, 2000; Buerger, 2002; Buerger and Farrell, 2002;
Engel et al., 2002; Farrell et al., 2002; Batton and Kadleck, 2004; Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 2004; Walker
et al., 2004)
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Wilkins) accused Maryland State Police of stopping him simply because of his color
(Lamberth, 1996; Novak, 2004). Since then, the attention on racial profiling has caused
many to question its magnitude. Racial profiling studies are mixed when analyzing
differential treatment of Whites as compared to minorities. Most criminological studies
reveal that minorities are either significantly or moderately more likely than Whites to be
stopped by the police.8 Other studies, while fewer, reveal that Blacks and Hispanics are
no more likely than Whites to be stopped by the police (Meeham and Ponder, 2002;
Scmitt et al., 2002; Durose et al., 2005). It is no surprise that minorities are more likely
than Whites to believe that racial profiling exists in traffic stops (Novak, 2004; Walker et
al., 2004). Minorities have consistently reported, more often than Whites, having a
negative perception toward police.9 However, a larger problem is determining whether
these minority beliefs accurately depict unfair treatment by police or legitimate police
actions are justified by the circumstances surrounding the stop and the perpetrators just
happen to be minorities.

POST TRAFFIC STOPS

Post Stop Review
Several methods have been used to analyze traffic stop data; however, assessing racial
profiling remains enormously challenging (Ridgeway, 2006). Which method is best

8

(Lamberth, 1996; Harris, 1997; Fagan and Davies, 2000; Hemmens and Levin, 2000; Langan et al., 2001;
Smith and Petrocelli, 2001; Walker, 2001; Buerger, 2002; Batton and Kadleck, 2004; Meeham and Ponder,
2002; Novak, 2004; Rojek et al., 2004; Walker et al., 2004)
9
(Jacob, 1971; Peek et al., 1981; Hagan and Albonetti, 1982; Polivka, 1984; Welch, 1989; Murty et al.,
1990; Oramas, 1994; Frank et al., 1996; Priest and Carter, 1999; Henderson et al., 1997; Sampson and
Bartusch, 1998; Chandek, 1999; Weitzer, 1999, 2000; Son et al., 2000; Hurst et al., 2000)
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remains a controversial issue in criminological studies (Walker, 2001; Novak, 2004;
Rojek et al., 2004; Durose et al., 2005). Studies have used a specified racial/ethnic
group‟s number of stops within a given location divided by that racial/ethnic group‟s total
residential population in the location to determine the likelihood of being stopped
(Petrocelli et al., 2003; Withrow, 2004). Other studies have used the number of stops
divided by the total residential driving age population within a municipality to measure
the likelihood of being stopped.10 Police chiefs argue that minority stops are not simply a
function of their populations within a location but have more to do with the number of
minority drivers that travel through a given area (Rojek et al., 2004). The implication is
that non-resident minorities travel from surrounding municipalities, which increases their
likelihood of being stopped. This may distort results in studies that use residential
populations as the denominator to calculate stop rates. Thus, studies have used direct
observations to determine the racial make-up of driving populations along with spatial
weighting to assure that drivers in surrounding areas are accounted for in the denominator
(Rojek et al., 2004). While the Rojek et al. (2004) study appears to be a better measure in
providing a benchmark for comparing racial differences in stop rates, it still does not
confirm that racial disparities in stop rates are the result of officer bias.
It could be that police disproportionately stop minority motorists because they violate
the more serious traffic laws, such as speeding, at higher rates than Whites. If police are
justified in their actions and since speeding motivates most stops (Langan et al., 2001;
Durose et al., 2005), it is expected that minority stop rates for serious traffic violations
should be significantly higher than White rates. Similarly, minority motorists might be

10

(Harris, 1999; Smith and Petrocelli, 2001; Langan et al., 2001; Zingraff et al., 2000; Nixon, 2003; Durose
et al., 2005)
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more likely to violate minor traffic ordinances as well, which may prompt police stops.
These minor traffic stops, which are generally at the heart of racial profiling complaints,
are the result of the “pretextual” stop (Crawford, 2000; Novak, 2004). The pretextual
stop is a strategy originally used by officers as part of the war on drugs to stop a vehicle
for minor infractions even though the officer‟s intentions might be to discover other
illegal activity (Harris, 1997; Crawford, 2000; Novak, 2004). Additionally, pretextual
stops have been used widely in the police profession and have been recently ruled
constitutional by the United States Supreme Court (Crawford, 2000; Novak, 2004).
Pretextual stops could further cloud the ability to determine racial motives. While this
issue remains complex, an attempt to isolate patterns that show disparities might be a
useful strategy to continue to understand the existence of conditions that might permit
racist motives to remain inconspicuous.
This study examines the relationship between pretextual stops and the likelihood of
disproportionate stops of Black drivers over White drivers. While the argument can be
made that minorities; operate more vehicles with equipment violations or improper
registration, these stops are still considered minor traffic violations. With this being the
case, minority drivers may become suspicious of police intent, which might set off the
racial profiling accusations.
Would it be wrong for officers to stop vehicles for minor violations? What drives
minorities toward allegations of racial profiling? Since there are no statistical methods
available to efficiently measure individual officer discrimination, analyzing what occurs
after the stop might be a better way to examine racial profiling than simply looking at
disparities in stop rates alone (Engel and Johnson, 2006).

16

Researchers have recently started taking a closer look at what occurs after the stop to
assess the existence of racial profiling (Rosenfeld et al., forthcoming). Some utilize
outcome tests (Ridgeway, 2006; Engel et al., 2006; Engel, 2008, Perisco and Todd,
2008), which employ statistical comparisons of search success rates, for instance, the
number of searches that result in the discovery of contraband divided by the number of
total searches. These rates are then compared across racial/ethnic groups. These
comparisons, according to some economists who first generated the outcome tests, can be
used to discern between officer bias and statistical discrimination (Engel, 2008).
Statistical discrimination is described as a large dissimilarity in results between groups
which leads to a disparate impact on one group, albeit these outcomes were not
intentional (Engel, 2008). An example would be the likelihood that minorities are
stopped at much higher rates than Whites which might be due to race based deployment
in crime prone neighborhoods, generally minority, to be saturated with police. Such
extention in law enforcement results in more police/citizen encounters (Engel, 2008).
Minority motorists are more likely than White motorists to violate minor traffic laws
(Langan et al., 2001; Crawford, 2000; Novak, 2004; Durose et al., 2005). Thus, officers
are given greater opportunity to make stops and further investigate minority motorists
through vehicle searches. If officers are finding that the search rate is generally
successful, then officers may be more inclined to use the pretextual stop on minority
drivers. However, there could be other variables that drive an officer‟s desire to stop a
vehicle for further investigation.
The number of arrests is central to the measurement of police efficiency, which might
be a key motivating factor behind law enforcement practices (Walsh, 1986).
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Interestingly, there is research that studied officer use of mobile data terminals that
reveals that minorities are queried by police at higher rates than Whites (Meehan and
Ponder, 2002). These data imply that while police are in the privacy of patrol vehicles
equipped with car computers, without any provocation they randomly run record checks
on the license plates of vehicles driven by Blacks and Hispanics. The queries could
reveal results that include expired license plates, improper registrations, and wanted
persons. The results of the inquiries seemingly give police probable cause to make a
pretextual traffic stop.
Since most research clearly indicates that Blacks are stopped at higher rates than
Whites, it follows that Blacks will receive traffic citations at higher rates as well. As a
result, Blacks are more likely to have outstanding warrants because they are less likely to
afford paying fines (Walker et al., 2004). While officers are aware that the number of
arrests is a key measurement of individual and department efficiency (Fisk, 1974; Walsh,
1986; Gaines and Miller, 2006) and assuming that police are mindful that Blacks are
more likely than Whites to be wanted (Langan et al., 2001; Durose et al., 2005), the
chance of making an arrest after stopping Black drivers becomes greater. For these
reasons, outstanding traffic warrants might partly explain why police use the pretextual
stop to detain Black motorists disproportionately to White motorists. While some argue
that these stops exhibit good police work (Walsh, 1986), others may argue that this
practice is still racially driven.
Studies have shown that Blacks spend time in local jails at higher rates than Whites,
which may be attributed to more warrant arrests (Walker et al., 2004). Additionally,
spending more time in jail can affect job opportunities, which results in higher
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unemployment rates (Siegel, 2005; Walker et al., 2004). Furthermore, these effects are
associated with higher crime rates (Walker et al., 2004; Siegel, 2005). Increased
incarcerations produce a cycle that puts minorities at a considerable disadvantage within
the criminal justice system. These circumstances may be the result of statistical
discrimination because Blacks are simply at a higher risk for police contact. On the other
hand, if there are no other explanations why Blacks are at risk for police contacts more
than Whites, but are still searched, arrested, and given citations at much higher rates, such
disparities could be the result of officer bias, particularly if search success rates are lower
for Blacks (Ridgeway, 2006; Engel et al., 2006; Engel, 2008, Perisco and Todd, 2008).
These factors seriously complicate any research looking to explain racial profiling. This
study will examine factors after the stop, including searches, arrests for contraband,
arrests for outstanding warrants, arrests for traffic violations, and citations issued to
provide a better understanding of the pretextual stop and the likelihood that racial
profiling is in operation.

Stop and Search
While studies reveal that Blacks and Hispanics are stopped by the police at higher
rates than Whites, Blacks and Hispanics are even more likely than Whites to be searched
during a traffic stop.11 On the other hand, again to a lesser extent, some studies
demonstrate that Whites are searched more often than minorities, particularly when it
comes to consent searches (Smith and Petrocelli, 2001; Novak, 2004).

11

(Lamberth, 1996; Knowles et al., 2001; Langan et al., 2001; Buerger, 2002; Buerger and Farrell, 2002;
Scmitt et al., 2002; Rojek et al., 2004; Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 2004; Durose et al., 2005; Steward and
Totman, 2005)
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Knowles et al. (2001) claim that searches of Black drivers are justified because Blacks
are arrested more often for various charges, and the searches are part of the search
incident to the arrest, which this study will discuss later. Steward and Totman (2005), to
the contrary, state that Blacks and Latinos consent to searches at higher rates, which
might suggest that searches are not necessarily due to arrest factors. Rosenfeld et al.,
(forthcoming) examined searches that were purely discretionary and excluded searches
incident to the arrest and outstanding warrants. While Rosenfeld et al. (forthcoming)
found that searches varied with age of driver, residence, and time of day, young Black
males were subjected to discretionary and non-discretionary searches at higher rates than
young White males. On the other hand, when observing discretionary searches, which
mostly included consent searches, older White males were more likely searched than
older Black males. The results held for searches conducted by both Black and White
officers.

Traffic Arrests
Mixed results emerge on the likelihood of being arrested after a traffic stop. Although
they exist, few studies show that Whites are more likely than minorities to be arrested
after a traffic stop (Smith and Petrocelli, 2001) while other studies show that minorities
are more likely than Whites to be arrested after being stopped (Crawford, 2000; Engel,
2003; Rojek et al., 2004; Smith et al., 2006). Smith et al. (2006) furthermore claim that
there is a link between suspicion and arrests. That is, individuals who are perceived by
the police as being suspicious have a higher probability of being stopped and perhaps
arrested. Since police perceive Blacks more often than Whites to be questionable, the
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probability of Blacks arrested after a traffic stop becomes higher than the likelihood for
Whites (Smith et al. 2006). In other words, although the stop may or may not appear
legitimate, the occurrences during the stop result in an arrest for Blacks at higher rates
than for Whites. It has even been reported that excessive noise complaints, such as
driving with loud music, has been used as a pretextual stop, which results in Black arrests
at higher rates than White arrests (Crawford, 2000).
After using race of the officer as an indicator, Smith and Petrocelli (2001) found that
White officers were no more likely than Black officers to arrest minority drivers. In fact,
both White and Black police officers have been reported as treating people of color
differently than White citizens during traffic stops (Buerger and Farrell, 2002). This
certainly makes the issue more complex but does not eliminate the possibility that the
motivation for traffic stops is based on race. While it remains difficult to determine why
officers make the decision to arrest, most researchers report Blacks arrested at higher
rates than Whites after traffic stops. Why minorities are arrested at higher rates becomes
the question. It would be appropriate to examine the research on traffic stops that result
in arrests after discovery of contraband, for outstanding warrants, and even for the traffic
violation itself.

Contraband Justifies the Arrest and Search. The research on contraband reveals that
illicit drugs are found in cars driven by Blacks at rates lower than for Whites.12 Even
some self reports reveal that White drivers report possessing illegal substances in their
vehicles at higher rates than minorities (Geiger and Phillips, 2003). However, larger

12

(Zingraff et al., 2000; Buerger, 2002; Engel et al., 2002; Gross and Barnes, 2002; Institute on Race and
Poverty, 2003; Engel and Calnon, 2004; Steward and Totman, 2005; Smith et al., 2006)
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quantities of drugs may be found on Blacks and Hispanics more often than on Whites
(Gross and Barnes, 2002). Again, few studies find that Whites are less likely than Blacks
to possess contraband although Knowles et al. (2001) report that Blacks do possess illicit
drugs at higher rates than Whites. If minorities are indeed less likely to be found with
contraband during a traffic stop, then the justification for searches incident to an arrest of
minorities should likely result from factors other than contraband findings.

Outstanding Warrants Justify the Arrest and Search. Indications that minorities are
arrested more often than Whites might explain why minorities are searched more often
since officers are usually required to search after an arrest (Hernandez and Knowles,
2004). While the criminological research on warrants is scant, Stewart and Totman
(2005) state that high minority search rates are particularly evident in the area of consent
searches that cannot be explained by outside factors such as probable cause or
outstanding warrants. On the other hand, if minorities are arrested on outstanding
warrants more often than Whites, searching minorities at higher rates due to searches
incident to arrest would be justified, assuming the arrest is legitimate.

Traffic Citations
When examining traffic citations issued by police, the studies have mixed results.
Some reveal that Black drivers are no more likely than non-Black drivers to be issued
traffic citations (Ridgeway, 2006); Engel et al., 2006). Others conclude that when other
extra-legal and legal factors are controlled, Blacks are more likely to be issued traffic
citations (Engel and Calnon, 2004; Mosher et al., 2008). These circumstances that occur
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after a stop are plagued with confounding issues that prevent researchers from
determining the extent to which race is involved in an officer‟s decision to initially
conduct a pretextual stop which leads to a search, citations, or arrests. Nevertheless,
patterns of police conduct must continue to be studied to get to the root of racial profiling
allegations. More importantly, a clear and explicit criminological theory should
accompany these explanations of differential treatment.
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CHAPTER 2
MINORITY GROUP THREAT

To analyze police behavior, Engel et al. (2002) state that “theoretical models must
guide future data collection efforts” (p. 249) and must be more explicitly stated as
explanatory variables in determining racial profiling. With evidence that minorities
commit more serious crime at higher rates than Whites (Smith and Petrocelli, 2001;
Walker, 2001; Walker et al., 2004), it follows that law enforcement efforts, which include
traffic stops, might increase, particularly for Blacks and Hispanics because of a perceived
threat. In other words, the greater the minority population, the higher the likelihood of
formal law enforcement intervention (Bursik, 1986). This is especially true when officers
who patrol predominantly White neighborhoods view minorities as being suspicious
(Walker, 2001).
From a criminological perspective, the minority group threat hypothesis proposes that
as the minority population or population ratio to Whites increases, citizen fear of crime
increases. As a result, White citizens pressure political authorities, which motivate more
police crime control tactics against minorities (Blalock, 1967; Jackson, 1989; Jacobs and
Carmichael, 2001; Baumer et al., 2003; Kane, 2003; Smith and Holmes, 2003; Ruddell
and Urbina, 2004; Stolzenberg et al., 2004, Kent and Jacobs, 2005). Thus, minorities are
stopped and searched by police at higher rates than Whites. Do these stops constitute
racial profiling and discrimination or is there a more complex question? To explain
differential treatment of minorities as it relates to their relative populations requires an
examination of the sociological roots of the minority group threat hypothesis.
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In his attempt to develop a systematic theory that explains minority-group relations,
Hubert Blalock grounded the minority group threat hypothesis in socio-psychological
perspectives (Blalock, 1967). He criticizes theories that focus on single factors that
explain race relations, but points out that an attempt to combine variables, such as
sociological, ideological, and status factors, does not require one to be forced to give
equal explanatory power to each. Furthermore, Blalock adds that it would be more
appropriate to specify the conditions when one or the other causal factor or factors are
more important. He explains that there are various interrelated studies that emphasize 1)
status factors; 2) competition; and 3) power relationships that attempt to explain minority
relationships with Whites. Few of these studies present explicitly stated theoretical
propositions. Nevertheless, these are important factors that Blalock (1967) uses to build
the minority group threat theory.

STATUS FACTORS
Some theorists believe that prejudice stems from a deliberate attempt by economic
elites to preserve dominance over the less fortunate (Blalock, 1967; Quillian, 2006).
While some theories minimize the role that economic factors play in discrimination and
favor personality traits derived from early childhood, Blalock (1967) insists that status
factors cannot be ignored. When the dominant group aspires to certain goals to maintain
a preeminent status and minorities are in direct competition for these same goals, various
forms of exploitation and discrimination may occur to block minority advancement. For
instance, Whites will avoid minorities because socialization with such an underprivileged
group might jeopardize an elite status; therefore, minorities are excluded from various
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activities. Also political power may be obtained through manipulation of prejudice, as
direct aggression against minorities may satisfy certain psychic needs produced by
frustration of a social system that calls for equality (Blalock, 1967). These premises
imply that discrimination will increase as the minority population increases. However,
other variables will need to be introduced to determine to what extent minority presence
produces economic competition and frustration that garner a particular level of racial
prejudice (Blalock, 1967).

COMPETITION
Measuring the degree of inter-group competition that might account for discrimination
is a difficult task (Blalock, 1967). Factors to consider are the intensity of goals and the
value of rewards for which competition exists. It would then make sense to measure the
number of competitors relative to the number of rewards. Additionally, it is appropriate
to measure the manner by which rewards are distributed and the degree to which
resources are to be allocated among competitors (Blalock, 1967).
For instance, in the 1940‟s, The Ford Motor Company in Detroit hired over half of all
the Black males living in Detroit and approximately 14% of its White males. Black
males could not find employment elsewhere while White males had numerous
employment opportunities. There was no serious competition for the Ford jobs;
therefore, discrimination appeared nonexistent in hiring practices at Ford. However,
Black employee wages were considerably lower than White Ford employee wages
(Maloney and Whatley, 1995). Since many Whites had no desire to work at Ford
(Maloney and Whatley, 1995), why were Black wages lower? Why were Blacks not
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hired by other companies in Detroit? Were they not qualified? To what degree do these
conditions represent inter-group conflict or competition? One would assume that White
employers formed subtle coalitions that maintained the status quo to block Black
opportunities, which will be difficult to conceptualize (Blalock, 1967). Nevertheless,
Blalock says that inter-group competition must still be assessed at least as a general
descriptive term.
Alternatives to measuring the degree of inter-group competition would be to analyze
the legitimate means, such as how individuals develop their own resources and hard work
that allow them to reach their goals without blocking others (Blalock, 1967). On the
other hand, one could analyze how alliances are formed with some competitors to place
obstacles in front of other rivals. Researchers can additionally examine how potential
competitors, including minorities, might join together to assure an equitable division of
rewards or increase total rewards by means of regulating contenders (Blalock, 1967). To
further illustrate the complexities of this theory, Blalock introduces class and educational
factors that could further cloud the extent to which competition incites discrimination.
For instance, he posits that competition between Whites and Blacks might be stronger in
the lower classes, where resources are closer to equal. Frustration and resentment may
mount as lower class Whites do not possess the resources that will allow them to
automatically benefit from their racial status (1967). However, researchers note that it
must still be determined at what point this resentment influences a person to act out
frustrations with racist behavior (Blalock, 1967; Quillian, 2006).
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POWER AND DISCRIMINATION
To act out racist behavior, one must have the ability to do so. Blalock (1967)
describes power as the total resources one has and the degree to which these resources are
mobilized. By resources he refers to features such as money, property, prestige,
authority, and natural and supernatural resources of an individual or group that provide
the potential to exercise power. The exertion of these resources depends on the
motivations and goals of those whom power is exercised over. In other words, if
minorities aspire to achieve goals that challenge or threaten White status, power is put
into action to control minority behavior, thus allowing Whites to maintain their position
(Blalock, 1967).
Blalock (1967) conceptualizes mobilization as the potential or ability to apply power
and the total resources that are actually used or expended to achieve a certain goal or
objective. The sources of power take on various forms, categorized as legitimate,
referent, expert, reward, and punishment power. Legitimate power is “a generalization of
the notion of authority” in which definite role relationships need not be involved, such as
a personal promise made from one person to another. Referent power is “a generalization
of the notion of charisma” by which one individual identifies with another and wishes to
do as the other person requests even though that person has no special personality or
charismatic traits that encourages the other to do as he/she says. Expert power comes
from a person‟s special skills or knowledge that makes him/her valuable to the
subordinate; therefore, the subordinate yields power to that person (Blalock, 1967: 117).
However, reward and punishment power comes from instances when resources, such as
economic status, police, and the like are consciously mobilized to affect change in
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another person (Blalock, 1967). In modern times, legitimate, referent, and expert powers
are not as significant as they were in the past, as minorities now question the dominance
and expertise that Whites previously possessed (Blalock, 1967). Therefore, it is more
appropriate to explain race relations from perspectives that relate to reward and
punishment power (Blalock, 1967). This is where criminologists have expanded on the
minority group threat hypothesis, particularly punishment power.
An example of reward power is evident when minority resources produce economic
opportunities that allow them to afford relocating to better neighborhoods, which are
usually predominantly White (Blalock, 1967). Unfortunately, they are not always
welcomed as Whites mobilize their resources to change minority behavior to push them
out of, or prevent further migration to, mostly White neighborhoods. The latter is an
example of punishment power, which includes coercive functions by police (Blalock,
1967; Quillian; 2006). According to Blalock (1967), three factors of discrimination occur
under punishment power: 1) political discrimination; 2) symbolic discrimination; and 3) a
threat oriented ideological system. While political and symbolic discrimination are
important factors to consider, the threat oriented ideological system will be the central
concept in this writing.
The threat oriented ideological system is a belief system that contributes to group
functioning that calls for immediate mobilization of resources to attack the perceived
threat of a numerically large minority population (Blalock, 1967). According to Blalock,
Whites fear that an influx of Blacks will threaten White existence as Blacks are
stereotyped as oversexed, overaggressive, and criminally inclined (Blalock, 1967). Since
Blalock‟s writing, there have been changes to the Southern White stereotypes that
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perceive Black males as oversexed rapists who need to be controlled. This is evident in
the United States Supreme Court‟s decision in Furman v Georgia that made government
sponsored executions for rape charges unconstitutional (Walker et al., 2004).
Nevertheless, these exaggerated fears of the violent Negro male are said to justify violent
or extreme forms of social control over this potentially harmful group (Blalock, 1967).
This fear is the cornerstone to criminological and sociological explanations of Blalock‟s
minority group threat hypothesis as it relates to social control (Jackson, 1989; Jacobs and
Carmichael, 2001; Baumer et al., 2003; Parker et al., 2004).

MINORITY POPULATION AND SOCIAL CONTROL
Finding a connection between percentage of Blacks in cities and fear of crime, Kent et
al. (2005) point out how these potentially hostile views that Whites have about large
minority populations promote White anxiety and resentment. Whites will then pressure
political authorities to make greater efforts to control street crime. Others have studied
how minority population increases affect the various instances of social control, such as
arrest rates, incarceration rates, and capital punishment (Jackson, 1989; Jacobs and
Carmichael, 2001; Baumer et al., 2003). Some researchers have found an opposite effect
on minority population and arrest rates than Blalock proposed. For instance, Jackson
(1989) and Parker et al. (2004) claim that law enforcement becomes less sensitive to the
needs of the minority community and do not investigate cases with the same vigor that
would be evident in White communities. Therefore, as the benign neglect hypothesis
would argue some aspects of social control, particularly arrests rates, decrease as the
minority population increases (Stolzenberg, 2004).
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While studies suggest that more social control is due to an increased minority
population as a result of discrimination, other studies posit that the social context of
certain neighborhood characteristics, such as crime rates, generate fear, which legitimizes
more formal control (Jackson, 1989l; Weitzer, 1999; Weitzer and Tuch, 1999; Weitzer,
2000). For instance, the turbulence felt after the 1960s urban disorders resulted in a steep
rise in crime rates in areas heavily populated by Blacks (Siegel, 2005). In turn, police
strength increased, which resulted in more coercive use of force against minorities to
calm the disorders (Jackson, 1989). However, further research showed no real
connection to or deterrent effect of police strength on crime rate decreases (Jackson,
1989). This finding led to further investigations of social control and its relationship to
social class, race, and ethnicity (Jackson, 1989).
Other factors that play a role in the extent to which Whites feel threatened by an
increasing or existing large minority population may depend on region, time period, or
even the size of cities (Jackson, 1989). Historically, Whites in the South were generally
more sensitive to race issues and reacted in a more punitive manner against minorities
than Whites in other regions (Blalock, 1967; Taylor, 1998; Walker et al., 2004). There
are also findings that show a connection between education and the motivation to
discriminate (Blalock, 1967). As this may be the case, the collective results of social
control as it relates to minority populations will need to be studied across regions and
perhaps communities. There should be caution in relying upon cross sectional studies
that do not weigh the attitudes and biases reflected in members of the social system, such
as the police, who are responsible for crime control. In the absence of assertive crime
control tactics or collective methods to control minorities, a distinction between
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individual and macro levels of discrimination will need to be examined, which makes
studies of race relations even more complex (Jackson, 1989).

Macro vs. Individual Level Explanations
Attempting to interpret back and forth between macro and micro level explanations
has plagued research efforts for years (Blalock, 1967). From a macro level perspective,
one might make assumptions about individual motivations to develop meaningful
theories that pertain to groups (Blalock, 1967). For instance, to say that Whites become
threatened and demand more police action against minorities, as the minority population
increases one might assume that the motivation behind this demand is individual
discrimination turned collectively. One would also have to determine whether the
collective results from police practices stem from each individual officer‟s reaction to the
demands of citizens or his or her own biases. One would be required to understand the
underlying values, motivations, and other issues that are more appropriately studied in
psychology (Blalock, 1967). Therefore, it is imperative that sociologists and
criminologists continue to attempt to integrate psychological and sociological factors into
race related studies.
Lincoln Quillian (2006) explains how overt expressions of discrimination have
sharply declined and now prejudice and discrimination have taken on new and more
subtle forms. He elaborates on how subtle, hidden, and sometimes unintentional biases
could create methodological problems in understanding prejudice. He uses the term
“new racism” and distinguishes four types: 1) symbolic racism; 2) modern racism; 3)
ideological refinement; and 4) laissez-faire racism. Symbolic racism refers to the deep
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seated hostility that Whites feel toward minorities learned from childhood with the idea
that Black Americans are violating the values of American society. Modern racism is the
belief that racism is in the past, yet Blacks are pushing too hard for equality. Ideological
refinement refers to the discrepancy between White‟s support for the idea of having
equality but low support for active governmental intervention to reduce racial inequality.
Laissez-fare racism deals with beliefs in anti-black stereotypes that blame minorities for
inequality and resist active policies to reduce inequality (Quillian, 2006). To further the
laissez-fare perspective, one could posit that social control is used more often against
Blacks and Hispanics because they are more prone to criminal behavior.
Existing research has shown that Blacks are arrested more often because of their
demeanor and negative attitude toward authority, which could legitimate formal law
enforcement reactions (Klinger, 1996; Bridges and Steen, 1998, Mastrofski et al., 2002).
Professional assessments also show some criminal justice agents perceive Black youth as
violent and deserving of harsher treatment because of their negative internal attributes
(Bridges and Steen, 1998). Since police officers cannot read minds to determine who
will commit crimes, their decisions to stop must be based on crude information that
results in statistical discrimination (Kent and Jacobs, 2005). If these claims are real, it
does not alleviate the possibility that discrimination occurs due to individual officer
stereotypes and racism. Whichever type of racism exists, as Quillian (2006) proposes,
Blalock (1967) suggests that personality variables which produce motives to discriminate
against minorities might bring similarly motivated individuals of the dominant group
together to bring about concerted efforts to discriminate against minorities as their
populations increase. Given the difficulties in making assumptions about individual
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motivations, other problems, such as analytical strategies, unit of analysis, time period,
statistical controls, and relative size of the Black population as the only measurement of
racial threat confound the minority group threat hypothesis as well (Blalock, 1969;
Jackson, 1989; Parker et al., 2004). Because these methodological concerns are real,
support for this theory is mixed (Parker et al., 2004). However, criminologists and
sociologists must continue to attempt to find theoretical connections between minority
populations and social control. While the data in this study do not allow for addressing
all the methodological problems such as time period and regional effects, the research
will attempt to focus on a strategy that will show patterns that connect minority
population size to social conditions that engender more social control by the police.

WHEN THE RELATIVE SIZE OF THE MINORITY POPULATION BECOMES A
THREAT
While some studies overwhelmingly claim that there is a strong association between
percentage of minorities and fear of crime, which compels more social control (Myers,
1990; Eitle et al., 2002; Earl et al., 2005; King, 2007), other studies contend that this
reaction only occurs in desegregated locations (Kent and Jacobs, 2005). As mentioned
previously, some even maintain that as the minority population increases, elements of
social control actually decrease (Jackson, 1989; Parker et al., 2004). It begs the question
of at what point does the percentage of the minority population pose a threat to Whites?
According to Marlee Taylor, White opinions on racial policy become more negative as
the Black population increases but only up to the point when Blacks represent about 40
percent of the population (1998). Sampson and Morenoff (2006) show that population
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change increase once the Black population reaches 40 percent in a given neighborhood.
Liska et al. (1985) and Taylor (1998) show that threat become evident when the Black
population reaches 20 to 30 percent, which results in more social control. The
implications are that fear of crime becomes a concern which induces residents to move
out of areas or request more social control as the minority threat becomes prevalent.
Furthermore, once Blacks make up 75 percent of the population, neighborhoods become
concentrated in poverty, which multiplies the crime rates and furthers minority threat
(Sampson and Morenoff, 2006).
On the other hand, some contend that once the population reaches a particular
threshold, social control actually decreases due to the benign neglect hypothesis, which
explains, as indicated earlier, that when the minority population is considerably high,
police are not as proactive or do not sufficiently react when it comes to minority victims.
At that point there is less pressure on police to control crime (Jackson, 1989; Parker et al.,
2004). While the preceding research attempts to pinpoint when fear or threat begins to
exist, it remains unclear at what minority population threshold actually produces fear that
subsequently fosters what some consider unfair treatment of minorities. This disparity in
treatment is not minor in nature and could be fatal in some circumstances as explained
earlier in chapter 1. With that being said, it is appropriate to now explain how this
dissertation will contribute to the literature on traffic stops and allegations of minority
mistreatment by the police.
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CHAPTER 3
PREDICTING PRETEXTUAL STOPS AND TRAFFIC STOP OUTCOMES

MINORITY POPULATIONS EXPLAIN DISPROPORTIONATE STOPS
The preceding chapter reflects disparities in how police treat minorities as compared
to Whites. The reasons for these disparities are complex. Most studies that attempt to
explain racial differences in outcomes find difficulty identifying race as the motivation
for these distinctions. While some studies lean toward race as an explanation, others
challenge this notion and explain that racial differences are a result of offending patterns
and contextual conditions that call for more police intervention (Weitzer, 1999; Weitzer
and Tuch, 1999; Weitzer, 2000; Walker et al., 2004). As much of the research shows that
minorities (particularly Blacks and Hispanics) participate in violent crime at higher rates
than Whites, it is plausible that minorities will be scrutinized by law enforcement
officials at higher rates than Whites. This situation might even explain why minorities
fair worse than Whites on the back end of the criminal justice system. Violent crime
justifies longer and harsher prison sentences although economic status, lack of competent
representation, and other legal and extralegal factors may contribute (Walker et al.,
2004). However, on the front end, which includes initial contacts with the police, there
has yet to be research that gives a clear justification for the reason or reasons police stop
minorities at higher rates than Whites for traffic violations. While studies show that
traffic stops make up the largest portion of a citizen‟s first contact with the police
(Langan et al., 2001; Durose et al., 2005), much of the research simply displays
disparities in stop rates, and few studies give solid explanations for these differences.
Racial discrimination merely appears to be inferred.
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There are opposing academic views of racial/ethnic differences in police stops. Robin
Engel (2008) reports that researchers guide their studies from four viewpoints: the
legalistic, criminological, normative, or economic perspectives. The legalistic
perspective is concerned with analyzing how police processes and procedures vary
among racial and ethnic groups. This perspective argues that law enforcement should be
equally distributed across racial and ethnic groups and assumes that there are no
significant differences in criminal behavior across racial/ethnic groups. Therefore, there
should be very few differences in stop and search rates. Otherwise, police discrimination
is present. The criminological perspective is more concerned with understanding why
police behave differently toward some racial/ethnic groups. It claims that law
enforcement should be proportional across groups based on the criminal activity groups
are involved in. While the criminological perspective embraces the benchmark technique
for analyzing police stops, it also uses multivariate statistical modeling to assess the
effects of race on officers‟ decisions during stops. The normative perspective is
concerned with substantive along with procedural equality across groups. It argues that
although one ethnic or racial group may be more prone to criminal activity, it does not
justify unequal treatment of members of that group who are law-abiding. In other words,
if innocent minorities are being stopped or scrutinized merely because other minorities
are more likely to violate the law, statistical discrimination is in and of itself not a
legitimate excuse for racial disparities in stop or search rates. Lastly, the economic
perspective embraces equality of outcomes. It also argues that law enforcement should
be proportional across racial/ethnic groups depending on their crime involvement. While
it welcomes the belief that racial/ethnic groups do behave differently, police behavior,
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due to racial differences in offending patterns, may be legitimate and cannot be ignored.
Therefore, the economic perspective supports the unfortunate circumstances of statistical
discrimination as outcome tests are a major technique used in this perspective (Engel,
2008). While there are problems with each of the preceding perspectives, which will be
addressed later, this dissertation incorporated the criminological and economic
perspectives. The findings could subsequently lead toward determining or understanding
organizational or individual motives that drive discriminatory practices by the police.
Prior research has indicated that minority population is an important variable to
consider when social policies are implemented, social controls are mobilized, and
neighborhood compositional changes are made (Liska et al., 1998; Sampson and
Morenoff, 2006). If the first police contact is considered a gateway to more serious
encounters with the criminal justice system and with evidence that the more contact
citizens have with police (traffic or non-traffic) the higher the likelihood that criminal
careers will develop (Shannon, 1978), then it must be determined why or what social
conditions of minority populations become a relevant factor in the higher likelihood of
being stopped.
Using the minority group threat hypothesis as the explicitly stated theory, this research
more specifically analyzes the relationship between minority population and the
likelihood that minorities (particularly Blacks) experience pretextual stops at higher rates
than Whites. Additionally, this research examines how Black population size affects five
traffic stop outcome ratios. The outcomes are the Black-to-White ratio for 1) search
rates; 2) outstanding warrant arrests; 3) drug arrests; 4) traffic violation arrests; and 5)
traffic citations issued. The question is to what extent Black drivers experience these
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outcomes at higher rates than White drivers when the Black population increases relative
to the White population from 1990 to 2000 across selected Missouri municipalities.
Although Hispanics have become a larger portion of the minority population in the
United States, most of the racial profiling research compares White and Black drivers.
Hispanics represented too small a proportion of the data being used in this study to permit
any meaningful conclusions. Likewise, those that fit in the category of other race were
also too small to extricate valid results. Therefore, this study also uses Black and White
drivers as its central focus. If minority population is correlated with the likelihood of
experiencing a pretextual stop and the five outcomes, it does not necessarily reveal
discrimination as a result of a perceived threat. Paradoxically, the lack of a correlation
does not prove the non-existence of discrimination. In fact, given the many
circumstances that may be operating, other factors are examined. While this writing is
not sufficient to address every issue, it does attempt to unfold some of the key problems
that complicate racial profiling studies.

MISSOURI BACKGROUND
In the State of Missouri racial profiling continues to be a concern. The various studies
that have reported on this phenomenon conclude that Black motorists are considerably
more likely than White motorists to be stopped by police (Hernandez and Knowles, 2004;
Rojek et al., 2004). Additionally, Blacks have an even greater chance than Whites of
being subjected to searches after the stop. More importantly, there have been consistent
findings that show Blacks are less likely than Whites to possess contraband during the
stop (Hernandez and Knowles, 2004; Rojek et al., 2004).
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Some criminal justice administrators have challenged the various techniques used to
analyze racial profiling data in Missouri. Nevertheless, there were some municipalities in
the State that had significantly large traffic stop disparities between races (Hernandez and
Knowles, 2004; Rojek et al., 2004). Since police have been required to record each stop
in Missouri, data indicate that Black motorists have been consistently at risk of being
stopped and searched at higher rates than Whites (Koster, 2008). Little is known about
Black population increases and how they affect the outcomes of traffic stops. Using the
minority group threat hypothesis in the State of Missouri, the following hypotheses are
explored.

THE IMPORTANTCE OF EXAMINING PRETEXUAL STOPS
Recall the disputes concerning the denominator problem that continues to plague
racial profiling studies. Opponents argue that using the number of Black residents as the
denominator is not appropriate when calculating stop rates. Studies should focus on the
actual driving population (Rojek et al., 2004; Durose et al., 2005; Engel et al., 2006).
Also recall that some have learned that a better examination of racial profiling is through
inspection of stop dispositions (Engel and Johnson, 2006; Ridgeway, 2006; Persico and
Todd, 2008; Rosenfeld et al., forthcoming). In other words, a closer look at the
circumstances behind officers issuing warnings and citations, arresting motorists,
conducting vehicle searches, and perhaps using force might allow for a better explanation
regarding the existence of racial profiling. Because extralegal and legal factors that
contribute to an officer‟s decisions after the stop can be statistically controlled,
researchers can be more confident in interpreting the results as an explanation of racial
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profiling (Engel and Johnson, 2006). To that extent, much of what occurs after a stop
might depend on why the initial stop was made. Therefore, the pretextual stop could play
an important role in the citizen/officer post-stop encounter. However, this study must
avoid the denominator issue that becomes problematic in many racial profiling studies.
While studies argue whether the proper benchmark to analyze over-representation of
minority drivers should be the total residential population, driving age population within
a location, or driving population based on spatial weighting procedures (Rojek et al.,
2004), this study attempts to eliminate that problem by using the actual number of stops
recorded for a given racial group as the denominator. This population represents a
concrete number that can only be adjusted by reporting agencies wishing to amend
previously reported data. The numerator in this study will be pretextual stops, which
include an aggregation of minor traffic violations, including faulty equipment, license
violations, following too closely, failing to signal, and lane violations. At this point, the
proportion of pretextual stops accounted for by a given group divided by that group‟s
proportion of total stops in a given municipality will represent that group‟s overrepresentation in pretextual stops. A more comprehensive explanation of this method is
presented in chapter 5.
In their comprehensive study of vehicle stops in San Diego, California, Cordiner et al.
(2002) found that approximately 25% of all traffic stops in 2001 were pretextual stops
made to investigate non-traffic violations such as drugs, gangs or crime suspicion.
Officers report that they would observe a car suspected of non-traffic related activity and
wait until the driver commits a traffic violation to develop probable cause to stop. This
technique is legal as long as officers are truthful that the stop did not take place until an
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official traffic violation occurred (Harris, 1997; Crawford, 2000; Cordner et al., 2002).
Some have argued that police routinely use the pretextual stop to detain minority drivers.
In fact, the Supreme Court‟s decision in Whren v. United States sanctioned the practice of
racial profiling according to Birzer and Birzer (2006). This practice has created problems
with researchers attempting to uncover racial bias in traffic stops because an officer‟s
racial motives may be easily hidden behind the Whren decision.
There are formalized drug interdiction training seminars that teach officers the clues to
look for when investigating drug carriers. For starters, the type of vehicle driven is a key
sign that draws an officer‟s attention. For example, large SUV‟s, which can carry large
quantities, and rental vehicles, which may hide identities, are hints that prompt officers to
further investigate at minimum. Luxury vehicles driven in poor neighborhoods may also
tip police (Engel and Johnson, 2006). While on the surface these clues appear race
neutral, some suggest that one should be cautious not to underestimate the role race may
play in these so-called leads. Social psychologists have studied consumer behavior and
have found that Blacks are more likely to purchase large SUV‟s and luxury cars no
matter where they may reside. Blacks are also more likely, because of economic reasons,
to rent vehicles while traveling (Engel and Johnson, 2008). Thus, race does have serious
implications when officers are using these clues to decide which vehicles appear
suspicious to stop. With that in mind, it is more probable that a police officer will act on
the aforementioned clues in locations where there is a perceived need to make such stops.
The minority group threat hypothesis would suggest that White residents will feel it is
necessary for police to scrutinize Black citizens more often when Black populations
increase relative to White populations. Larger Black populations are perceived
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threatening to the quality of life for the community and create fear (Blalock, 1967). As a
result, this study examined the impact of this perceived threat, indexed by the relative
size of the local Black population, on police actions toward Black motorists.

Research Question 1: Pretexual Stop
Research question 1 examines the minority group threat hypothesis by inspecting the
relationship between Black population increases relative to White population increases
over time and the likelihood that Black motorists will experience pretextual stops at
disproportionately higher rates than White motorists. In other words, as the gap between
the population percentages of Black-to-White residents narrows, Whites will feel fearful
and threatened by the relative Black population increases to the extent that White
residents will pressure police to control this perceived threat. Thus, the likelihood that
Black motorists will experience pretextual stops at rates higher than White motorists will
significantly increase in municipalities where Black-to-White populations increased from
year 1990 to 2000.
Recall in chapter 2 that punishment power is the source of power this dissertation
focuses on. For punishment power to work as Blalock (1967) explained, White residents
must have the ability and resources to mobilize the police to address the perceived threat.
Therefore, it was important to consider the relative size of the Black population before
and after the populations increased over time. For instance, in cities where Blacks
already made up a large portion of the population in 1990, the perceived threat of a rising
Black population may not have elevated to a level of concern for White residents to
pressure the police to monitor Blacks. Studies show that as Black populations reach
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certain levels, White flight becomes more prevalent (Walker et al., 2004). When White
residents begin to leave neighborhoods, as the community accountability hypothesis
would suggest, larger Black populations create the ability for more elected Black
representation in city government, including law enforcement (Smith and Holmes, 2003).
In fact, it is only in the absence of influential minorities in the community and police
organizations that White residents have the ability to dictate police action toward
minorities. Moreover, White officers will not be sensitive to minority issues and are,
therefore, not held accountable for their actions against minority citizens in the absence
of minority representation (Smith and Holmes, 2003; see Appendix A for a more detailed
discussion of the community accountability hypothesis). That said, relative increases in
the Black population from 1990 to 2000 (referred in the hypotheses as growth) in selected
Missouri municipalities should increase Black-to-White pretextual stops (pretextual stop
ratio), and the effect of relative Black population growth on pretextual stops of Black
motorists should weaken once the relative Black population, as recorded for year 2000
(current population), reaches a critical threshold. Additionally, total municipal
population sizes for year 2000 (referred to as total population) were controlled because
police activity and the extent that Whites feel threatened by an increasing or large
minority population vary with size of the location (Jackson, 1989; Rojek et al., 2004).
All subsequent hypotheses were conducted across selected Missouri municipalities.
Hypothesis 1 explores the following:

H1: When the total population is controlled across the targeted Missouri municipalities, the following was
expected. As the Black-to-White population percentage change from 1990 to 2000 (growth)
increases, the Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio significantly increases in 2002, but this effect
diminishes as the Black-to-White population ratio for year 2000 (current population) increases.
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As earlier stated, finding such an association is important to understanding what
occurs after a traffic stop, particularly during pretextual stops. The following section
examined the role searches played in arguably controversial traffic stops.

THE IMPORTANCE OF EXAMINING SEARCH RATES
Generally, most of the criminological research shows that Blacks are subjected to
vehicle searches at much higher rates than Whites. 13 The reasons behind these searches
may vary from mandatory, when departmental policy dictates the search, to discretionary,
when the officer‟s judgment prompts further investigation (Hernandez, 2004; Ridgeway,
2006; Engel et al., 2008; Perisco and Todd, 2008). As previously stated, what occurs
after a stop is important to racial profiling studies. In fact, search rate disparities are so
high that it would be negligent to disregard further investigation of such dissimilarities.

Research Question 2: Overall Searches
Similar to pretextual stops, the minority group threat hypothesis would suggest that
growing Black populations might play an important role in search rate differences. It
may not be enough to simply stop more Black motorists when Black populations increase
to a perceived threatening level. Additionally, it is expected that pretextual stops might
condition search rates. Therefore the following hypothesis is explored. Relative
increases in the Black population should increase 2002 Black-to-White overall search
ratios (overall searches), and the effect of Black population growth on overall searches
should weaken once the Black population reaches a critical threshold. However, if
13

(Lamberth, 1996; Knowles et al., 2001; Langan et al., 2001; Buerger, 2002; Buerger and Farrell, 2002;
Scmitt et al., 2002; Rojek et al., 2004; Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 2004; Durose et al., 2005; Steward and
Totman, 2005)
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relative Black population growth interacts with Black-to-White pretextual stops, the
effect of growth on overall search rates may become stronger.

H2: When total population size is controlled, the following is expected. As growth increases, the overall
search ratio significantly increases. The effects of the growth on the overall search ratio diminishes
with increases in the relative size of the Black population in 2000, but the effects become stronger at
higher levels of the Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio for 2002.

While types of searches vary, it is the discretionary search that comes into question.
Engel (2008) argues that not all discretionary searches have equal levels of an officer‟s
discretion. For instance, activities such as discovery of evidence in plain-view, canine
alerts, the smell of drug odors, and other physical evidence that trigger low-discretion
searches require less discretion than consent searches (Engel, 2008). In fact, Rosenfeld et
al. (forthcoming) acknowledge that racial bias is minimal under mandatory or lowdiscretion searches, which makes it necessary to separate types of searches.

Research Question 3: Discretionary Searches
If indeed there is little bias in low-discretion searches, as Rosenfeld et al.
(forthcoming) suggest, then Black population increases should have little effect on the
likelihood that Black motorists will undergo low-discretion searches at higher rates than
White motorists. In fact, given that many studies indicate that White motorists are found
with contraband at higher rates than Blacks (Zingraff et al., 2000; Knowles et al., 2001;
Buerger, 2002; Engel et al., 2002; Rojek et al., 2004; Walker et al., 2004), White motorist
should be subjected to low-discretion searches at higher rates than Blacks. However,
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because discretion is involved, which potentially opens opportunities for discrimination
(Johnson, 2003), Black population increases might even affect low-discretion searches
and the effect may become greater at higher levels of pretextual stops of Blacks
compared to Whites. In other words, keeping with the minority group threat hypothesis,
the following is expected:

H3: When total municipal size is controlled, the following is expected. As relative Black population
growth increases, the Black-to-White low-discretionary search ratio for year 2002 (LD search)
significantly increases. The effects of growth on LD search ratio diminishes at higher levels of the
2000 Black-to-White population ratio, but the effects become stronger at higher levels of the 2002
Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio.

Researchers explain that the discretionary search is a more accurate assessment of
racial profiling (Engel and Johnson, 2006; Persico and Todd, 2008). Some discretionary
searches require less discretion than consent searches (Rosenfeld et al., forthcoming),
which may explain Steward and Totman‟s (2005) contention that consent searches are
based on non-legal factors and appear to contribute considerably to the search disparities.

Research Question 4: Consent Searches
The data in this study does not readily make available the outcomes of consent
searches. Absent any reasonable suspicion or probable cause after an officer makes a
pretextual stop, a driver must give permission for police to legally conduct a vehicle
search. While some studies show that Blacks are only slightly less likely than Whites to
give consent to search (Smith and Petrocelli, 2001; Novak, 2004; Durose et al., 2005),
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under some circumstances White motorists are significantly more likely to consent to
searches (Smith and Petrocelli, 2001; Engel, 2006). Obviously, something motivates an
officer to request authorization to search. If officers claim that generally minorities are
stopped for minor traffic violations more often because they engage in infractions at
higher rates than Whites, then the motives behind an officer‟s request to search should be
similar to search requests of motorists stopped for major traffic violations such as
speeding. In the event that pretextual stops are highly correlated to Black population
increases, an argument can be made that extra-legal factors, particularly race, indirectly
drive officer discretion toward consent search requests. In fact, Steward and Totman
(2005) argue that when search rates for minorities are high, the consent search, which
cannot be explained by outside factors such as probable cause or outstanding warrants, is
evident.
Although the data in this study cannot determine if consent was solicited by the officer
or volunteered by the driver, it does show if a permitted search was executed. While it
may be accurate in some studies that Black motorists refuse to consent to a search at
higher rates than Whites (Smith and Petrocelli, 2001; Engel, 2006), this study supposes
that most drivers, regardless of race, will grant the search upon request. Drivers believe
that cooperation with police could be a major factor that determines the traffic stop
outcome, or they simply are not aware that they have the right to refuse a search request
(Steward and Totman, 2005). To that extent, if there are disparities in officers requesting
a search, the actual consent search index should expose such differences.
As stated earlier, officers are trained to observe clues that indicate when a person
warrants further scrutiny. Inconsistencies between the driver‟s clothing and the type of
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vehicle driven, socioeconomic status and jewelry worn, and any occupant‟s past drug
record could be clues that the vehicle stop might yield a successful drug hit and
subsequent arrest (Engel and Johnson, 2006). Other non-verbal clues might be the
driver‟s nervousness, excessive smiling, vibrant hand gestures, eye contact avoidance,
profuse sweating, and speech disruptions (Engel and Johnson, 2006). It is argued that
these interpersonal cues are sometimes inaccurately interpreted by officers as deception.
There is further argument that these cues are not necessarily race-neutral, which Engel
(2008) describes as the subgroup validity problem. Engel explains that the utilization of
the outcome test, when studying search rates across racial/ethnic groups, assumes that all
drivers behave similarly, which would flaw many studies because some activities are
more prevalent in some groups than in others. For instance, social psychology and crosscultural communication research suggests that Black motorists are more likely to exhibit
the previously described normal non-verbal behaviors more often than White motorists
during a traffic stop. Furthermore, racial/ethnic differences in the style of dress, patterns
of residency, vehicle ownership, and types of vehicles purchased are social realities that
researchers need to be aware of (Engel and Johnson, 2006). While Engel (2008) argues
that the subgroup validity problem makes research on group differences in searches
useless without controlling for these behaviors, some of this conduct, such as hand
gestures and profuse sweating, might be difficult to control for. Perisico and Todd (2008)
counter Engel by saying that drivers adjust their behaviors, having knowledge that these
are the types of clues officers look for. Either way, something triggers an officer‟s
intuition to request a search. If indeed officers are misinterpreting this behavior as
deception, then this study suspects that threat becomes heightened with growth in the
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Black population, which will increase an officer‟s desire to request a consensual search.
Again, there could be stronger effects if growth interacts with pretextual stops. The
following hypothesis is explored.

H4: When total population is controlled, the following is expected. As Black population growth
increases, the Black-to-White consent search ratio for year 2002 (consent search) significantly
increases. The effects of growth on consent search ratio diminishes at higher levels of the 2000
Black-to-White population ratio, but the effects become stronger at higher levels of the Black-toWhite pretextual stop ratio for 2002.

Even though the discretionary search might be a more useful tool to detect racial
profiling (Engel and Johnson, 2006; Persico and Todd, 2008), to discard a comprehensive
analysis on mandatory searches potentially eliminates the possibility that mandatory
searches could be based on race. It is plausible that when police perceive a threat, arrest
chances increase which incite mandatory searches.

Research Question 5: Mandatory Searches
Without additional information regarding the stop, this study assumes that a
mandatory search accompanies an arrest although some searches might have triggered the
arrest. Thus, it is difficult to determine when officers truly use discretion to search
(Ridgeway, 2006). However, mandatory searches, which include inventory searches and
searches incident to an arrest should eliminate much of the discretion that officers use in
other searches. This study expects to find that Black population increases still have an
effect on mandatory searches although not as large as what would be found with consent
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and low-discretion searches. The effects on mandatory searches may increase with
interactions between relative Black population growth and Black-to-White pretextual
stops. Hypothesis 5 explores the following:

H5: When total population is controlled, the following is expected. As growth increases, the Black-toWhite mandatory search ratio for year 2002 (mandatory search) significantly increases. The effects
of growth on mandatory search diminishes at higher levels of the 2000 Black-to-White population
ratio, but the effects become stronger at higher levels of the 2002 Black-to-White pretextual stop
ratio.

With evidence that Black motorists are arrested at higher rates than White motorists
after traffic stops (Crawford, 2000; Engel, 2003; Rojek et al., 2004; Engel, 2006; Smith et
al., 2006) it will not be surprising that Black population increases will significantly affect
mandatory search ratios. The question now becomes whether or not there are justifiable
reasons to arrest Black motorist at such higher rates.

IMPORTANCE OF EXAMINING OUTSTANDING WARRANT ARRESTS
As mentioned previously, most criminological studies show that Blacks are more
likely than Whites to be arrested as a result of a traffic stop (Crawford, 2000; Engel,
2003; Rojek et al., 2004; Engel, 2006; Smith et al., 2006). Recall that officers are aware
that police efficiency is measured by number of arrests (Fisk, 1974; Walsh, 1986; Gaines
and Miller, 2006). Officers are also aware that Black motorists are more likely than
White motorists to be wanted on warrants (Langan et al., 2001; Durose et al., 2005).
When recording traffic stop data, officers are provided the opportunity to indicate
whether or not a given driver had outstanding warrants. Given the scrutiny an officer
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might encounter with superiors, it is doubtful that when officers submit racial profiling
forms they will check the outstanding warrant box without making an arrest.

Research Question 6: Outstanding Warrant Arrests
In the event that Black-to-White population increases create fear, as the minority
group threat hypothesis suggests, officers might be more likely to arrest Black motorists
at higher rates than White motorists when outstanding warrants are discovered. Although
officers are likely to make an arrest when outstanding warrants are determined
(Hernandez and Knowles, 2004; Rojek et al., 2004; Durose et al., 2005), it was difficult
for this study to measure when officers decided not to arrest for outstanding warrants
because the data did not separate each stop. Thus, this dissertation assumes, perhaps
wrongly, that an arrest accompanies any reported outstanding warrant.
While a strong and positive correlation between the Black-to-White population
increase and the Black-to-White outstanding warrant arrest ratio would support minority
group threat, this study acknowledges that the relationship might have more to do with
legal factors. Because Blacks are more likely than Whites to be wanted (Langan et al.,
2001; Durose et al., 2005), it makes sense that Blacks will be more likely than Whites
arrested on warrants. While Black motorists are responsible for making sure they are not
wanted, which weakens debates on officer discrimination, an argument can be made that
officers consciously target Black motorists for the purpose to make an easy arrest. This
study suspects that the pretextual stop also plays an important role with regard to Black
population increases and warrant arrests.
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There are ways in which officers might target individuals who appear less financially
stable to pay traffic fines. The condition of the vehicle and other license registration
violations might be the major indicators that trigger an officer‟s suspicion that a
potentially wanted person is occupying a given vehicle. While the current United States
economic structure would suggest that Blacks will be more likely than Whites to be
unable to pay traffic fines, Black motorists will be also more often wanted on warrants
when officers make random stops. A case can be made that White motorists in lower
class areas may be just as likely to drive vehicles with defects and are, therefore, just as
unable to pay traffic fines that result in outstanding warrants. The potential for police to
target lower class citizens in lower class neighborhoods might be similar for Whites and
Blacks. On the other hand, economic inequality is so pronounced (Walker et al., 2004)
even low income White motorists may still have the ability to pay traffic fines at higher
rates than Black motorists. In fact, White motorists might be more willing to pay fines.
Because the tendency is higher for Blacks to distrust the criminal justice system (Walker
et al., 2004), Blacks are less likely to show deference to authority (Klinger, 1996; Walker
et al., 2004) which may include rebellion to the extent that Blacks refuse to pay traffic
fines.
While some argue that the pretextual stop exhibits good police work, as wanted
individuals are being taken off the street (Walsh, 1986), others may argue that this
practice is still racially driven. Interestingly, there is research on officer use of mobile
data terminals that reveals that minorities are queried by police at higher rates than
Whites (Meehan and Ponder, 2002). These data imply that while police are in the
privacy of patrol vehicles equipped with computers, without any provocation, they
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randomly run record checks on license plates of vehicles driven by Blacks and Hispanics.
As a result, the computers display expired license plates, improper registrations, and
wanted persons, which seemingly give police probable cause to make a pretextual traffic
stop.
This study contends that the pretexual stop interacts with Black population increases
to the extent that Black drivers will have a higher likelihood than White drivers of being
arrested on outstanding warrants. Consistent with minority group threat, when Black
populations present a perceived threat, officers might consciously make questionable
stops confident that the potential results will justify and mitigate allegations of racial
discrimination. Therefore, the following hypothesis represents how Black population
increases relative to White population increases might intersect with pretextual stops to
the extent that Black motorists are more likely than White motorists arrested on
outstanding warrants.

H6: When total population is controlled, the following is expected. As Black population growth
increases, the Black-to-White outstanding warrant arrest ratio for year 2002 (warrant ratio)
significantly increases. The effects of growth on warrant ratio diminishes at higher levels of the 2000
population ratio, but become stronger at higher levels of the Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio.

While officers will likely arrest an individual for outstanding warrants, officers will
also likely arrest individuals found in possession of contraband (Hernandez and Knowles,
2004; Rojek et al., 2004; Durose et al., 2005). If officers perceive Black motorists as the
common drug carrier, officers may feel justified making questionable stops to further
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investigate for drug violations when Black populations perceptually reach threatening
levels.

IMPORTANCE OF EXAMINING DRUG ARRESTS
According to Perisico and Todd (2008) officers are aware of who might more likely
possess contraband. However, the research is mixed on who is actually more likely
found with drugs as a result of traffic stop vehicle searches. Most studies, as previously
explained, acknowledge that officers are less likely to find unlawful substances on
Blacks.14 A report that analyzed the Maryland State Police found that close to two-thirds
of all drivers searched were not carrying any illegal drugs. In fact, Black drivers who had
no drugs were far more likely to be stopped and searched than drug-free White drivers.
Also, as stated earlier, while few in number, substantial quantities of illegal drugs were
found on Black drivers (Gross and Barnes, 2002). So if an officer‟s objective in
discretionary searches is to detect the transport of drugs (potentially large amounts),
according to Hernandez (2004), at least in Missouri, a large share of the excess burden
that Blacks face seems to be unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives. In other
words, innocent Black motorists are being penalized for actions of a few law violators.
Engel and Johnson (2006) say that there is very little known about the reasons why
there are such disparate patterns in police behavior when it comes to treatment of Blacks
and Whites in search and seizure rates. Much of the research speculates that the

14

(Zingraff et al., 2000; Knowles et al., 2001; Buerger, 2002; Engel et al., 2002; Gross and Barnes, 2002;
Geiger and Phillips, 2003; Institute on Race and Poverty, 2003; Engel and Calnon, 2004; Steward and
Totman, 2005; Engel and Johnson, 2006; Smith et al., 2006)
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disparities are due to racism and biases potentially ingrained in the police subculture
(Engel and Johnson, 2006). However, this supposition has been deluged with challenges.

Research Question 7: Drug Arrests
If it is more probable that officers believe Black motorists are more likely to carry or
possess larger quantities of drugs, and if these assessments are accurate, there should be a
strong association between Black population increases and arrests for possessing large
quantities of drugs. Since racial profiling forms do not indicate the amount of drugs
found, possession can only be measured by the dichotomous yes or no indicator on the
forms. Again, this study assumes that when contraband is recorded in the data used for
this research, an arrest is presumed to have occurred. Similar to outstanding warrants but
to a greater degree, drivers make their own conscious decision to possess drugs. Unless
officers plant evidence, complaints against officers for unreasonable drug arrests should
be limited. Research question 7 addresses the relationship between Black populations
and arrests for contraband, particularly drugs. A weak association between relative Black
population percentage increases and arrests for possession of drugs might indeed cause
some to be suspicious of stops and searches of Black drivers, particularly if Blacks are
less likely to possess contraband. Although self report surveys indicate differently, there
remains a public perception that Blacks are more likely to use drugs (Walker et al., 2004).
Therefore, this dissertation asserts that Black population growth will increase the
likelihood that Black motorists will be arrested for drugs at higher rates than White
motorists. To the degree that pretextual stops are conducted to detect other violations,
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officers might be more likely to search Black drivers and find contraband, which leads to
more drug arrests. The following hypothesis is presented:

H7: When total population is controlled, as relative Black population growth increases, the Black-to-White
drug arrest ratio for year 2002 (drug ratio) significantly increases. The effects of growth on drug ratio
diminishes at higher levels of the 2000 Black-to-White population ratio, but become stronger at
higher levels of the 2002 Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio.

So far arguments can be made that police motives to utilize the pretextual stop could
be based on factors that involve legitimate law enforcement concerns, potentially Black
population growth, or a combination of both. There is still difficultly drawing concrete
conclusions about unequal treatment of minority drivers. Yet, there are other options that
might develop a clearer picture of what occurs after the stop which could facilitate
conclusions that race is indeed a large factor behind police profiling.

IMPORTANCE OF EXAMINING TRAFFIC VIOLATION ARRESTS
An arrest for the actual traffic violation can be a questionable practice. After an
officer makes a traffic stop, it is rare that the driver will be arrested for that offense. In
1981, the United States Supreme Court ruled that police officers are allowed to search the
passenger compartment of vehicles when the occupant has been lawfully arrested (Justia,
1981). This gave officers the incentive to arrest for the traffic violation and make further
searches in cases when consent was refused or other probable cause was absent.
Additionally, because officers and Black motorists are suspicious of each other before an
encounter (Rosenfeld et al., forthcoming; Weitzer, 1999), altercations between police and
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Black motorists may lead to traffic violation arrests. While Black citizens perceive police
to be more disrespectful than what White citizens perceive (Walker et al., 2004; Durose
et al., 2005), this implies that police potentially antagonize Black drivers in ways that
leads to a reluctance to cooperate during the stop. On the other hand, as Mastrofski et al.
notes, police are actually more likely to be disrespectful toward White subjects, but only
when disrespect is initiated by that person (2002). Furthermore, officers have found
ways to broaden the scope of their searches beyond the passenger compartment. Once an
arrest is made, it was common practice for police to search a vehicle incident to the arrest
(Ginsburg, 1968; Justia, 1981). By departmental policy in many cases, officers are
generally required to conduct a more thorough inventory search of all contents within the
vehicle to protect the owner‟s property (Reamey, 1983). Anything illegal found during
this lawful search can be used as evidence against the driver. Particularly during
pretextual stops, when officers are likely looking for other criminal activity, the custom
of arresting a driver for a minor traffic violation could be great tool for drug interdiction.

Research Question 8: Traffic Violation Arrests
The question becomes what patterns are found when officer suspicion becomes more
intense when the threat of an increasing Black population is more widespread. Therefore,
research question 8 pertains to the likelihood that Blacks more than Whites will be
arrested for traffic violations when the relative Black population increases over time.
Again, this study expects to find that relative Black population increases become less
threatening based on the size of the Black population which will affect traffic violation
arrest ratios; as follows:
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H8: When total population is controlled, the following is expected. As relative Black population growth
increases, the Black-to-White traffic violation arrest ratio for year 2002 (TVA ratio) significantly
increases. The effects of growth on TVA ratio diminishes at higher levels of the 2000 Black-to-White
population ratio, but become stronger at higher levels of the 2002 Black-to-White pretextual stop
ratio.

The arguments in this research concern how Black population growth influences
pretextual stops which, in turn, influence traffic stop outcomes. The implications are that
pretextual stops are seemingly unjustified or questionable. To avoid blatant allegations
of discrimination, there are unwritten practices that warrant further exploration.

IMPORTANCE OF EXAMINING CITATIONS ISSUED DURING TRAFFIC STOPS
Recall that the research is mixed about Black drivers being more likely than White
drivers to receive traffic citations (Engel, 2006; Engel and Calnon, 2004; Mosher et al.,
2008; Ridgeway, 2006). In fact, an officer‟s decision to issue a traffic citation might
depend on neighborhood characteristics, situational factors, and individual characteristics
(Ingram, 2007; Mosher et al., 2008). Anecdotally speaking, this study argues that some
officers have been taught that after making a lawful arrest after a questionable
(pretextual) traffic stop, it is prudent that the officer issue a citation for the original stop
violation. While this practice is not mandatory, it may prevent defendants from
attempting to argue that failure to issue a citation questions the validity of the stop
(Minnesota Court of Appeals, 2004). A written policy that requires officers to issue
tickets for the original stop undermines an officer‟s use of discretion that is a corner stone
to police operations. That said, officers might be less likely to fuel the fire and issue
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traffic citations when questionable stops do not result in arrests. Unfortunately, there is
very little, if any, scholarly literature that addresses the phenomenon of officers being
required or trained to issue citations for the original stop when arresting a subject on a
separate charge.

Research Question 9: Citations
While the minority group threat hypothesis would suggest that Black drivers will be
more likely to receive traffic citations when the relative Black population increases, this
study contends that an opposite effect will occur when pretextual stops and arrests are
considered. It also expects to find that as the Black-to-White population increases over
time, Black drivers will be more likely than White drivers to receive traffic citations, but
only to a point when 2000 Black-to-White populations reach a certain level.
Additionally, as Black-to-White pretextual stops increase and the likelihood that Blacks
will be arrested at higher rates than Whites decreases, the effects of Black population
growth will diminish.

H9: When total population is controlled, the following is expected. As relative Black population growth
increases, the Black-to-White traffic citation ratio for year 2002 (citation ratio) significantly increases.
The effects of growth on the citation ratio diminishes at higher levels of 2000 Black-to-White
population ratio and when higher levels of Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio interacts with lower
levels of Black-to-White arrest ratio.

This dissertation has proposed various relationships that might present patterns that
deserve further examination. Pretextual stops have been an important variable to this
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point and might be alarmingly associated with traffic stop outcomes when relative Black
populations are taken into consideration. One must be cautious not to overstate the
effects of minority populations on the likelihood to be stopped pretextually and traffic
stop outcomes. As stated earlier, the presence or absence of a significant correlation does
not necessarily indicate discrimination or non-discrimination. While there could be a
correlation between populations and traffic stop outcomes, there might be other
legitimate legal factors, such as an association between violent crime rates and minority
presence, which condition effects on traffic stops and outcomes. In some cases, a
relationship between these legal factors and the likelihood of being stopped or searched
may allow police racial motives to become hidden. Nevertheless, this study addresses
this potential connection. In other words, it could be discovered that Black population
growth is only relevant in certain circumstances.

61

CHAPTER 4
COUNFOUNDING ISSUES IN RACIAL PROFILING STUDIES

OFFENDING PATTERNS MOTIVATE POLICE BEHAVIOR
To test the preceding hypotheses, alternative explanations that may account for Blacks
being disproportionately stopped, searched, arrested, and/or cited are examined. There
are studies that explain violent behavior from cultural and social structural perspectives.
The cultural perspectives generally explain that minorities who experience historical
atrocities adopt alternative values that are conducive to violent behavior. Structural
explanations emphasize inequality in socioeconomic conditions that causes violent
behavior and pushes various institutions to reproduce inequality toward minorities
(Peterson and Krivo, 2005). Regardless of the perspective, there are overwhelming
reports that minorities, particularly Blacks and Hispanics, commit violent crime at much
higher rates than Whites. In fact, much of the criminological research finds that there is
some correlation between minority population increases and violent crime rate increases
(Neapolitan, 1992; Sloan, 1994; Hannon and Defronzo, 1998; Liska et al., 1998; Logan
and Stults, 1999; Petrocelli et al., 2003; Siegel, 2005; Walker et al., 2005). With violence
being a major source of citizen fear, it appears logical that citizens might push for
punitive police actions against minorities.
Law enforcement policies develop from the perception that proactive and aggressive
police activity, which includes more traffic stops, could indirectly decrease overall crime
rates (Sampson and Cohen, 1988; Smith and Holmes, 2003). In this respect, there are
studies that examine the correlation between crime rates and traffic stops (Weitzer, 1999;
Petrocelli et al., 2003).
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Research Question 10: Violent Crime
This dissertation attempts to put crime rates in a context that might explain the
association between violence and pretextual stops along with traffic stop outcomes. The
study further attempts to disentangle violent crime rates with the percentage of the Black
population‟s influence on traffic stop outcomes and the likelihood that Blacks experience
pretextual stops at higher rates than Whites. It is plausible that police officers will more
likely attempt to jail individuals considered a threat to society. Having knowledge that
Blacks are more likely to commit violent crime, officers might feel it necessary to
become more intrusive on traffic stops, conduct more searches, and arrest Black motorists
at higher rates. It is also likely that higher Black populations might drive police toward
creating these outcomes. Therefore it was necessary to control for violent crime rates in
the models previously presented to address to what extent Black populations influence
traffic stop outcomes.
While violent crime might have some direct or indirect role in an officer‟s motive to
carry out a pretextual stop or further an investigation that will lead to other traffic stop
outcomes, there are other non-legal factors that potentially drive pretextual stops and
traffic stop results.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE MOTIVATES POLICE BEHAVIOR
Having difficulty assessing individual officer motivations, some research began to
focus on how citizens perceive being treated by the police.15 While most of these studies
contend that Blacks have a more negative perception than Whites toward the police, a
15

(Jacob, 1971; Peek et al., 1981; Hagan and Albonetti, 1982; Polivka, 1983; Welch, 1989; Murty et al.,
1990; Oramas, 1994; Frank et al., 1996; Priest and Carter, 1999; Henderson et al., 1997; Chandek, 1999;
Son et al., 1998; Hurst et al., 2000; Brunson and Miller, 2006)
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small group of studies claim that Blacks perceive police more positively than Whites
(Frank et al., 1996; Hurst et al., 2000; Murty et al., 1990). The later studies acknowledge
that the positive perceptions Blacks have of police are partly due to the predominant
Black representation in local police forces and governments. In fact, the race of the
police departments has a significant effect on citizen attitudes (Frank et al., 1996; Murty
et al., 1990). The question becomes, as stated earlier, whether citizen perceptions are true
assessments of how minorities are treated differently than Whites.
Other studies claim that race is not the determining factor that shapes citizen
perceptions of police. While race remains important, age is found to be just as vital in
some cases (Decker, 1981) and even stronger in others (Peek et al., 1981). While there
are many criminological studies that explain perceptions of the police from an individual
perspective, macro-level studies have begun to make headway (Reisig and Parks, 2003;
Sampson and Bartusch, 1998). Macro-level studies explore police treatment as it relates
to neighborhood characteristics, disadvantages, crime rates, suspect demeanor, and even
social class.16 As a result, conclusions on police perceptions are confounded between
individual factors (particularly race) and neighborhood contextual factors (Weitzer, 1999;
2000).
Ronald Weitzer (1999, 2000) made an explicit attempt to unravel these perplexing
issues by comparing race and neighborhood context from a qualitative perspective. After
finding that race was a significant predictor of how individuals felt they were treated by
the police in Washington, D.C., Weitzer also found that social class position of
neighborhoods also conditioned resident‟s attitudes toward police. In other words,
16

(Jacob, 1971; Decker, 1981; Dunham and Alpert ,1988; Davis, 1990; Alba et al., 1994; Cao et al., 1996;
Klinger, 1996, 1997; Sampson and Bartuch, 1998; Logan and Stults, 1999; Wilson and Dunham, 2001,
Mastrofski et al., 2002)
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Blacks that lived in lower-class predominantly Black neighborhoods felt they were
treated worse than how Whites in middle-class predominantly White neighborhoods felt
they were treated. On the other hand, Blacks who lived in middle-class predominantly
Black neighborhoods felt they were treated about the same as how Whites felt they were
treated in predominantly White middle-class neighborhoods. In spite of those
perceptions, Weitzer did discover that middle-class Blacks who encountered police
outside their neighborhoods felt they were treated differently than how middle-class
Whites felt they were treated when they traveled outside their own neighborhoods.
Unfortunately, Weitzer was not able to locate a lower-class predominantly White
neighborhood in Washington, D.C., to compare to the lower-class Black neighborhood.
Therefore, his study was limited in completely extricating the perplexing issues between
race and neighborhood context. Weitzer expresses being able to corroborate his findings
with other urban neighborhood studies which lends support to Wilson‟s (1978) argument
that class inequality and not racial discrimination is a more decisive factor that structures
the Black experiences with social institutions (Weitzer, 2000). Acknowledging Wilson‟s
contention, this study further examines how class inequality is imbedded in
institutionalized racism and not the dichotomy as Wilson suggested. In other words
finding that minorities are stopped at higher rates than Whites might be functioning
simultaneously with social class conditions and individual officer motives.
Part of Blalock‟s minority threat hypothesis explains that discrimination might stem
from the need for economic elites to preserve their status over the less fortunate (1967).
With that being said, socioeconomic status could affect police actions depending on the
minority population size. Assuming that police are subconsciously aware of assisting in
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the preservation of the elite status that those with higher financial standing possess, the
effects of relative Black population growth on traffic stop outcomes might be working
through social structure such as median household income, unemployment and poverty
rates, as well as municipal property values. The models presented in this study and
summarized earlier will control for each of the social variables to obtain a stronger
assessment of the confounding issues that attempt to explain racial profiling.

Median Household Income (MHI)
Median household income is important to control for because Blalock would argue
that relative Black population increases might be functioning through relative MHI to the
extent that rising Black incomes might reach levels that Blacks may afford to compete for
what Blalock calls scarce resources that translate into power (1967). Police might find
reason to target Black motorists who appear financially threatening to the White
establishment. From this economic standpoint, Black population growth would affect
police behavior only when Black incomes close the gap with White incomes. However,
income status may also be working in another direction. Some studies argue that social
unrest may be prevalent in places where income inequality is high (Smith and Holmes,
2003), which may lead to police targeting more Black drivers. Regardless of the
motivations that lead police toward focusing more on Black drivers, relative MHI needs
to be controlled in each of the models presented in chapter 3.
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Unemployment and Poverty
Rising poverty and unemployment rates generally have similar effects on other
phenomena. Crime rates increase, police are called and patrol more often, property
values decrease and so on (Siegel, 2005; Walker et al., 2004). It is plausible therefore,
that police will look at citizens in these areas with more caution than in other areas. It is
also logical that vehicles in these areas will have more equipment violations as well due
to the inability of drivers to afford appropriate repairs. Indeed these conditions could
lead to more pretextual stops and produce more arrests for outstanding warrants and
drugs. Additionally, the validity of equipment violation stops might increase the
opportunity for negative police/citizen encounters, which might lead to more traffic
violation arrests.
Sampson and Morenoff (2006) found that in Chicago poverty is generally
concentrated and isolated within locations that are surrounded by predominantly White
neighborhoods. These neighborhoods are generally occupied by minorities and are
riddled with high crime rates. As Weitzer (1999, 2000) contends and this dissertation
stated earlier, middle class Blacks who live in middle class neighborhoods feel they are
treated differently once they leave their neighborhoods. This perception could be a
function of the population of minorities that live in neighborhoods that are concentrated
with poverty and high violent crime rates. Blacks who travel out of their middle class
neighborhoods and enter surrounding neighborhoods within the municipality cannot be
distinguished from residents in the lower class law violating neighborhoods and may be
targeted by police (Terrill and Reisig, 2003). Concentrated poverty might explain why
minority drivers in municipalities with very small minority populations still experience
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disproportionate stop and search rates. Moreover, the condensed poverty could also
explain why municipalities with low crime rates as a whole experience disproportionate
minority stops and searches. High violent crime rates in small minority neighborhoods
may not be salient at the municipal level, but they might still present a perceived threat to
the larger municipal population (Weitzer, 1999; Weitzer and Tuch, 1999; Weitzer, 2000).
That said, unemployment and poverty are also controlled in the models to ascertain the
effects of relative Black population growth on pretextual stops and other traffic stop
outcomes.

Property Values
A logical conclusion one could make is that property values are related to median
household income and can also be factored into an officer‟s motivation to stop Black
drivers. Rojek et al. (2004) found municipalities in Missouri where Blacks were stopped
at considerably higher rates than Whites. Upon further examination, it happens that,
according to the 2000 Missouri Census, these municipalities had very high property
values and very small Black populations (United States Census, 2000). It could be
discovered that in areas where property values are relatively high, the elitist attitude is
further exacerbated to the extent that citizens become fearful and are motivated to
pressure police to protect property from perceived threats. Furthermore, research reveals
that as the Black population increases, property values decrease (Rent and Lord, 1978;
Flippen, 2004). Therefore, the mere presence of minorities might trigger old biases that
represent such threats that may put minorities at risk of being stopped at much higher
rates than Whites. This condition assumes that police consciously or subconsciously stop
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Blacks at higher rates to discourage them from traveling through or moving into an area.
Similar to previous problems with racial profiling studies, it would be nearly impossible
to prove officer motivations. Nevertheless, finding a pattern that connects property
values with the likelihood of Blacks stopped at higher rates than Whites should not be
ignored.
When analyzing the 2000 census, there is no racial breakdown comparing property
values. Particularly, for the more affluent cities, the municipal rankings essentially
mirror the overall median household income rankings. In other words, the cities that
have the highest property values also had the highest MHI‟s. Although one may assume
that Black drivers in these municipalities are more likely than Black drivers in less
affluent cities to be able to pay fines and operate vehicles with proper equipment, it
remains difficult to pinpoint the extent that Black residents contribute to high property
values. The proximity of small minority populations within cities with high property
values may be threatening. It is therefore also important to control for property values to
make confident conclusions about the extent that relative Black population growth affects
pretextual stops and traffic stop outcomes.

MAJOR HYPOTHESES
This study has pointed out some of the difficulties in precisely concluding that racial
profiling is in full operation when there are significant disparities in traffic stop outcomes
of Black and White motorists. The confounding issues of violent crime and
socioeconomic factors that might condition traffic stop results are addressed. However, if
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the minority group threat hypothesis is a major explanatory factor with respect to racial
profiling, socioeconomic status and violent crime rates should be less relevant.

Research Question 11: Confounding Factors
Research question 11 expects to find that when violent crime and the socioeconomic
variables (which are MHI, Black-to-White poverty and unemployment, and municipal
property values) are controlled along with the total municipal population size, Black-toWhite population ratio increases over time will significantly affect pretextual stops and
traffic stop outcomes.

H10: When total population, and the social economic variables for census year 2000 (sociological
variables) along with violent crime are controlled, the following is expected. As growth increases,
the pretextual stop ratio and traffic stop outcomes significantly increase. The effects of growth on
pretext stop ratios and the traffic stop outcomes diminish at higher levels of the 2000 Black-toWhite population ratio. Growth becomes stronger at higher levels of the 2002 Black-to-White
pretextual stop ratio in the other outcome models.
.

Research Question 12: Outcome Influences on Pretextual Stops
While this study used pretextual stops as a control variable in the traffic stop outcome
models, other potentially relevant control variables were not included in the models that
used pretextual stops as the dependent variable. The argument is that the more likely
Blacks experience pretextual stops at higher rates than Whites, the more likely Blacks
will be at risk of being arrested for outstanding warrants, drugs, and traffic violations.
This study has also made the argument that an officer‟s belief that Black motorists are
more likely to be wanted or carry drugs might be the motivation behind the pretextual
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stop. Officers may also be prepared and potentially willing to arrest for a traffic
violation, if the officer‟s authority is questioned by the driver. Because causal time
ordering affects the validity of this reasoning (Maxfield and Babbie, 1997), this study
was reluctant to use the traffic stop outcomes as controls for pretextual stops. The logic
is that the outcomes cannot explain the stop before hand. However, the difficulty in
assessing officer motivations is already abstract to the extent that researchers may never
provide accurate results without an officer‟s admission. Therefore, this study defied logic
by using the outcomes as controls to bring forth discussion about potential motivations
that create the cycle that keeps racial profiling near the forefront of criminological
literature. Research question 12 addresses the following hypothesis.

H11: When total population and the social economic variables along with violent crime rate, warrant ratio,
drug ratio, and TVA ratio are controlled, the following is expected. As growth increases, the
2002 Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio significantly increases. The effect of growth diminishes
at higher levels of the 2000 Black-to-White population ratio.

MINORITY THREAT, RACIAL PROFILING, AND GOVERNMENT TYPE
There are speculations that police practices may vary in small, medium, and large
municipalities (Rojek et al., 2004). With this being the case, this study previously added
a control variable to account for population size. It seemed necessary to address
population size when examining minority threat. Although Missouri does not classify
municipalities by size but by the type of government rule (MML, 2004), the type of
government rule has population implications. Generally, larger populated municipalities
are flexible in choosing the form of government leadership while smaller municipalities

71

are limited. For instance, a municipality classified as a village can only use an elected
board of trustees as the form of government rule. Only five trustees are elected in cities
with populations below 2,500. If the population is larger, nine trustees may be elected.
Municipalities with populations between 500 and 2,999 may choose a mayor/ board of
aldermen or mayor/city administrator/aldermen form of government and are considered
4th class cities. Cities where there are between 3,000 and 29,999 residents, are considered
3rd class cities, and the mayor/council or the mayor/city administrator/council/manager
commission form of government may be used (Dohm, 1995; MML, 2004). The
legislative or special charter form of government has no population requirement and the
form of government is set forth by individual legislative charter (Dohm, 1995; MML,
2004). The constitutional/home rule charter classification is based on populations of
more than 5,000 and may use the form of government chosen by the people as approved
in the charter (Dohm, 1995; MML, 2004). Although there is overlap when looking at the
required population sizes for each category, the type of government rule or municipal
classification is based in part on the population size (Dohm, 1995, MML, 2004).
There are roughly 760 municipalities in the State of Missouri that use the
mayor/council form of government, which includes villages with a chairman and a board
of trustees (MML, 2004). There are two types of the mayor/council form. The weak
mayor/council form of government has a mayor with very little appointive power because
voters elect most administrative officials. This leaves the mayor with very little authority
over administrators who are responsible to their electorate (MML, 2004). On the other
hand, the strong mayor/council form of government enables the mayor to appoint
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administrators who are usually later approved by the council. The mayor and council
may hold the officials accountable since they are not elected by the voters (MML, 2004).
There are 132 municipalities that use the mayor/city administrator/council form of
government. This form of government allows the mayor and council to delegate specific
duties to a city administrator who is accountable to the mayor and council. The city
administrator is essentially responsible for appointing and discharging all other city
officials, other than those elected (MML, 2004).
The council/manager form of government is used in thirty-six municipalities while
two municipalities use the commission form of government (MML, 2004). Under the
council/manager form of government, the council is responsible for setting municipal
policy. The council will appoint a city manager to handle administrative matters for the
city government. The council may fire the city manager at will. The mayor under this
rule is simply a political figure who presides over council meetings but has no
administrative authority or veto power (MML, 2004). The council is, of course, made up
of elected officials. In some respects, municipal government should have similar checks
and balances as our federal government to prevent hasty, unwise, and unjust actions by
one government body and curb arbitrary and ill-advised acts of public officials (Durand,
1900; Ryan, 1911). That is, legislative and executive responsibilities should be clearly
separated to prevent centralized power that may lead to corruption (Durand, 1900; Ryan,
1911).
With evidence that local government corruption tends to operate in larger
municipalities more often than smaller cities (Rahn and Thomas, 2005), this study
examines the various forms of government operated in each targeted municipality in this
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study. Larger cities require more government officials including the police, and it
becomes more difficult to monitor activities (Rahn and Thomas, 2005). It could be that
the type of government rule is associated with the inability to hold department heads
accountable for improprieties committed by their subordinates as a whole. As a result,
police practices may include instances of racial profiling or, at minimum some form of
improper police tactics. A note should be made that some municipalities with relatively
smaller populations may still have governmental classifications similar to larger
municipalities. In addition, there are economic characteristics that distinguish the types
of government rule which could influence the outcomes in this study. For instance, in
large cities that operate under the constitutional charter/home rule government, property
values are lower than property values in the legislative or special charter government
structure. White household incomes are relatively higher than Black incomes in class 3
cities compared to what is found in cities that operate under the mayor/board of aldermen
or mayor/city administrator/aldermen form of government.

Research Question 13: Government Rule
To assess the effect on pretextual stops and traffic stop outcomes, the type of
government rule was added as a control variable in the major hypotheses. It is expected
that traveling through cities that operate under the constitutional charter rule, which have
larger populations, will significantly increase the disparities in the traffic outcomes.

H12: When the conditions in hypothesis 11 are met, the disparities between Black and White pretextual
stop ratios will increase when drivers travel through cities that operate under the constitutional/home
charter rule.
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H13: When the conditions in hypothesis 10 are met, the disparities between Black and White drivers will
increase on the outcomes when drivers travel through cities that operate under the
constitutional/home charter rule.

Without an officer‟s admission that the motivation to stop was indeed based in part on
some combination of Black population increases and the desire to make an easy arrest,
this study compared speed stops to pretextual stops. There is considerably less
controversy over the speed stops than the pretextual stops. In fact, many Black drivers
indicate that when they are stopped for speeding, they feel the stop is justified (Langan et
al., 2001; Durose et al., 2005). The implications are that the motivating factor for the
stop is the actual traffic violation and officers are not necessarily looking for other
criminal activity. On the other hand, the pretextual stop allows for more officer
discretion and potentially results in extra-legal factors driving an officer‟s decision to
stop. Because of the questionable nature of the pretextual stop, this study tested and
compared speed and pretextual stops by substituting speed stop ratio with pretextual stop
ratio. The following hypothesis is expected.

H14: When the Black-to-White speed stop ratio replaces Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio in the
models presented in hypotheses 12 and 13, relative Black population growth will have no effect on
the relative speed stop ratio or the traffic stop outcome ratios. Additionally, the relative speed stop
ratio will have no effect on the traffic stop outcome ratios.
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THRESHHOLD POINT OF THREAT AND FEAR

Research Question 14: When Does Black Population Matter?
As stated earlier, in many circumstances poverty is concentrated within areas
surrounded by predominantly White neighborhoods. These impoverished areas are
generally occupied by minorities and are riddled with high crime rates especially but
mostly, according to Sampson and Morenoff, once the minority population reaches more
than seventy-five percent (2006). Other studies claim that once the minority population
reaches twenty to thirty percent, threat becomes a factor and more law enforcement
intervention becomes mobilized (Liska et al., 1985; Taylor, 1998) regardless of the
degree of racial segregation. If Blalock‟s proposal is accurate, it is likely that Whites
may equate large Black populations with high poverty and crime rates. Relative Black
population increases will exacerbate the fear and perceived threat Whites have. Research
question 14 asks at what percentage point does relative Black population growth creates
fear that translates to pressure on authorities to control the perceived threat to the extent
that it pushes police to initiate more contact with Black residents.
Concentrating on the relative Black population growth from 1990 to 2000 within a
municipality, this study tested Liska et al‟s. (1998) twenty percentage point threshold.
For instance, it is expected that once relative Black population growth in the targeted
Missouri municipalities reach twenty percent or above, fear sets in. Black motorists are
then significantly more likely than White motorists to experience pretextual stops, and
the traffic outcomes in 2002 than what Black motorists experience in cities where they
make up less than twenty percent of the population (see hypothesis 12).
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H15: Black-to-White Pretextual Stop, Search, Outstanding Warrant Arrest, Drug Arrest, Traffic Violation Arrest
rates, and Citations Issued in municipalities in 2002 with 20% or more Black residents in 2000 will be
significantly higher than the Black-to-White outcomes in municipalities where Blacks make up less than 20% of
the population in 2000.

Additionally, this study conducted analyses with respect to other Black population
percentage points to assess how the effects on the outcomes diminish or ascend at
significant levels. It also looked for a percentage point that triggered the likelihood that
White motorists became over-represented in the outcomes.
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CHAPTER 5
DATA AND METHODS

DESCRIPTION OF THE MISSOURI TRAFFIC STOP DATA
The traffic stop data in this study is the result of §590.650 of the Missouri Revised
Statues, which mandates collection of traffic stop information. The purpose is to monitor
and assess the extent of racial profiling. Over 86 percent of the 720 law enforcement
agencies in Missouri reported traffic stop data to the Missouri Attorney General‟s office
in 2002. Of these agencies, 495 were municipal police departments. To obtain a
meaningful analysis, this dissertation presented data from municipalities with ninety or
more Black residents in Missouri. Similar to the study conducted by Rojek et al. (2004),
this population threshold was used to insure reliability for the number of traffic
encounters and the circumstances surrounding the stops that were recorded in 2002.
Because other races constituted a very small percentage of the population and because
prior research has focused mostly on Blacks and Whites (Rojek et al., 2004), only Blacks
and Whites were examined in this study. Using this criterion, one hundred and thirteen
municipalities were included in this study.

LIKELIHOOD OF EXPERIENCING PRETEXTUAL STOPS
To determine a valid stop rate or the degree to which members of a particular group
were over or under-represented in stops by the police, Rojek et al. (2004) developed a
disproportionality index (DI). The DI was computed by dividing the proportion of stops
accounted for by a given group by that group‟s proportion of the driving age population.
Similar to the Rojek study, this research used a disproportionality index to examine
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pretextual stops. The proportion of pretextual stops accounted for by a given group
divided by that group‟s proportion of total stops in a given municipality represented that
group‟s pretextual stop DI index. A disproportionality index value of 1 indicates no over
or under-representation of a given group. A DI value less than 1 indicates underrepresentation, and a DI value greater than 1 indicates over-representation. To the extent
that one group has a higher DI rate than the other, the following method was used. If the
DI for Blacks was 1.21 and .95 for Whites in a given municipality, then Blacks were 27%
(1.21/0.95 = 1.27) more likely than Whites to be stopped. This method was used to
calculate the pretextual stop DI for Blacks and Whites in each municipality.
Pretextual stops were derived from data on minor traffic violations recorded in the
2002 racial profiling files. These included stops for faulty equipment, license violations,
following too closely, failing to signal, and lane violations. The violations were
aggregated for a total number of pretextual stops and separated by race.

LIKELIHOOD OF BEING SEARCHED AND OTHER SEARCH FACTORS
To obtain a disproportionality index for searches, the proportion of a given racial
group represented in searches was divided by that racial group‟s proportion of stops in
each municipality. The likelihood of Blacks being searched more than Whites was then
assessed, as measured in the pretextual stop data, by dividing each Black search DI by the
White search DI.
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Discretionary Search Methods and Data
The data did not explicitly distinguish discretionary from mandatory searches. If an
officer indicated a search was conducted, he/she checked all boxes that applied. The
options included 1) consent; 2) inventory; 3) drug/alcohol odor; 4) incident to arrest; 5)
plain view contraband; 6) drug dog alert; 7) reasonable suspicion-weapon [Terry Search];
and 8) probable cause/other searches. While there is certainly overlap in the type of
search an officer selects, for instance, officers may check the inventory box which is
more likely a mandatory search and the drug/alcohol odor box which is more likely a
discretionary search, attempts are still needed to separate types of searches. This study
uses drug/alcohol odor, plain view contraband, drug dog alert, reasonable suspicion, and
probable cause/other variables to account for discretionary searches. As officers are
likely to decide to search individuals under these circumstances, it remains the officer‟s
discretion. These variables were aggregated to create one total discretionary search item.
A DI was then created to determine the extent that Black motorists were searched under
discretionary conditions at higher rates than White motorists. This was accomplished by
dividing the proportion of Black motorists that experienced a discretionary search by the
proportion of Black motorists searched. The Black discretionary search DI was then
divided by the White discretionary search DI to obtain the Black-to-White discretionary
search ratio.
It should be noted that, although the consent search could have been included as a
discretionary search, the consent search provides implications in respect to driver
cooperation. Additionally, because the level of discretion used for consent searches is
higher than other so called low-discretion searches, and because some research argue that
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the consent search contributes considerably to racial disparities in searches, it seems
imperative to separate it from other discretionary searches.

Mandatory Search Methods and Data
Inventory and incident to arrest variables were aggregated to achieve one mandatory
search category. The methods used with discretionary searches to obtain the DI and
Black-to-White mandatory search ratio were used for this search measure.

Consent Search Methods and Data
The consent search is clearly distinguished as a category in the 2002 racial profiling
data. Once again a DI was created for Black and White motorists who reportedly
consented to a search by taking the proportion of a given group‟s consent searches
divided by that group‟s proportion of total stops. The likelihood that Blacks will consent
to a search at higher rates than Whites was then assessed by dividing the Black DI by the
White DI.
This study acknowledges that perhaps the total proportion searched should have been
used rather than the total proportion stopped as the denominator to determine the DI rates
for the various types of searches. However, this research uses the latter because, the
pretextual stop is key to this study. Using the proportion searched does not capture all
drivers stopped and could potentially eliminate those stopped pretextually. Unfortunately
the data does not distinguish whether drivers stopped pretexutally are searched; therefore,
it is best to use stops to capture all drivers at risk of encountering one of the types of
searches, which possibly provides a better picture of differential treatment. Nevertheless,
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analyses that incorporated the proportion searched as the denominator is still examined
and reported in chapter 7.

Outcome Test for Contraband
To supplement the search data, this study used outcome tests to examine the success
rate that police officers had in discovering contraband during the stop. The 2002 racial
profiling data provides a total number of times a traffic stop resulted in the discovery of
contraband. Contraband is described as drugs/alcohol paraphernalia, currency, weapon,
stolen property, and other. The number of searches that resulted in the discovery of
contraband found in vehicles driven by Blacks was divided by the total number of Blacks
searched and compared to contraband found in vehicles driven by Whites. The quotient
was then multiplied by 1,000 to simplify the interpretation of the results.

LIKELIHOOD OF BEING ARRESTED
The racial profiling data presented a single variable that clearly referenced the total
number of drivers arrested in each municipality. The types of arrests included
outstanding warrant, resisting arrest, property crime, offenses against a person, drug
violation, traffic violation, DWI/BAC, and other. To obtain the DI, the proportion of a
given racial group‟s representation in the total number of arrests divided by that group‟s
proportion of drivers stopped was computed. The arrest DI for Black drivers was divided
by the arrest DI for White drivers to obtain the likelihood that Blacks were
disproportionately arrested after the traffic stop compared to Whites.
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Data and Methods for Various Types of Arrests
This study proposed to focus on certain types of arrests. To create a DI for Black
motorists arrested for outstanding warrants, the proportion of Black drivers arrested on
warrants was divided by the proportion of Black drivers represented in the total number
stopped in each municipality. After doing the same for White drivers, the Black arrest
for outstanding warrant DI was divided by the White arrest for outstanding warrant DI. It
was then determined to what extent Black drivers are more or less likely than White
drivers arrested for outstanding warrants. The same analyses were conducted for drug
and traffic violation arrests. Again, it may have been prudent to use the total number
arrested as the denominator rather than the total number stopped. As stated earlier, this
method could potentially eliminate those stopped pretextually.

Outcome Test for Traffic Citations Issued
Similar to the outcome test method used for the previous variables, outcome tests were
used for citations issued. The proportion of Black drivers issued traffic citations was
divided by the proportion of Black drivers stopped and compared to the proportion of
White drivers that received citations divided by the proportion of White drivers stopped.
The Black-to-White citation ratio was derived by dividing the Black citation DI by the
White citation DI.

CRIME RATE DATA
To assess violent crime rates, this research examines index crimes compiled in the
Missouri Highway Patrol‟s (MSHP) 2002 Uniform Crime Report. The Missouri
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Highway Patrol develops crime rates by examining total crime per 1,000 residents. Total
crimes in the MSHP‟s 2002 index crime report include homicide, manslaughter, forcible
rape, attempted rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft,
and arson. Violent crime is separated from property crime to further examine any
confounding relationships. Homicide, manslaughter, forcible rape, attempted rape,
robbery, and aggravated assault are the violent crimes listed by the MSHP. Burglary,
larceny, motor vehicle theft, and arson are listed as property crime. Each total number of
violent crimes reported in year 2002 for a particular municipality was divided by that
city‟s total population. That value was then multiplied by 1,000 to obtain the crime rate.
This study uses only violent crime because it is more likely to raise citizen fear.

POPULATION AND OTHER SOCIOLOGICAL DATA

Population Data
This study uses Missouri Census data for years 1990 and 2000 to calculate the Black
and the White residential populations in each of the targeted municipalities and uses year
2000 Black-to-White population ratios to compare population sizes across municipalities.
To obtain population ratios among Blacks and Whites in each municipality, the total
percentage of the Black population in each city was be divided by the total percentage of
the White population within each municipality. For instance, in a municipality where
there are 100 Black residents and 200 White residents, the Black-to-White population
percentage ratio is 33 to 66 or .5. See the example in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1. Example Calculating Black-to-White Population Percentage Ratio
Black population percentage equals (100/300 = .33 X 100 = 33)
White population percentage equals (200/300 = .66 X 100 = 66)
Black-to-White population percentage equals (33/66 = .5)

The example indicates that for every White citizen, there are .5 Black citizens in a
given municipality. An increase in this value indicates that the Black population is
closing the gap on the White population.
To obtain population ratio increases over time, the differences in the 1990 to 2000
Black-to-White population ratios were divided by the 1990 Black-to-White population
ratio to create the percentage change over time. The change decreased if the 2000 Blackto-White population ratio was smaller than the 1990 Black-to-White population ratio.
Minority threat was measured by observing the Black-to-White population ratio
percentage increase from 1990 to 2000 in each city and the 2000 Black-to-White
population ratio across municipalities. Black population increases alone were not used in
this study because in locations where Blacks made up a very large portion of the
population, Black population increases were useless in assessing White fear and
perceived threat. White population increases alone were not used because minority group
threat specifies the increase in the minority population and not the majority.

Sociological Data
Missouri Census data for year 2000 is used to analyze Black-to-White median
household income, poverty level, and unemployment. It was also used to examine
municipal property values. The total Black median household income was divided by the
White median household income in each municipality to obtain a ratio. Smaller ratios
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represent wider gaps between Black and White incomes. For poverty, the total number of
Black residents that lived below the poverty level was divided by the total number of
Black residents within a city to obtain a poverty rate. This measurement was also
conducted for White residents. The Black poverty rate was then divided by the White
poverty rate to obtain the Black-to-White poverty ratio. The method used for poverty
was duplicated for analyzing unemployment. Increases in the poverty and unemployment
ratios indicate that the proportion of Black residents living below the poverty level or
unemployed is larger than the proportion of White residents living below the poverty
level or unemployed. To analyze differences in property values across municipalities,
this study examined the average property value reported by the census for each
municipality.

Population Percentage Threat Threshold/Tipping Point
This study created a dummy variable for municipalities where Blacks made up twenty
percent or more of the municipal population. Regressing Black-to-White pretextual stop
rates on one dummy variable is the same as performing a two sample t test (Hamilton,
1998) for whether the mean Black-to-White pretextual stop rate is the same across
municipalities where Blacks made up twenty percent or more of the population compared
to municipalities in which they made up less than twenty percent of the population. If the
pretextual stop rate was significantly higher in places where Blacks made up twenty
percent or more of the population, then an argument can be made that threat of the Black
population becomes prevalent at this percentage point. This process was conducted for
various Black population percentage points to compare when significant differences in
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pretextual stop, search, outstanding warrant arrest, drug arrest, traffic violation arrest
rates, and traffic citation rates occurred.

GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE
To account for differences depending on the type of government structure in the
targeted 113 municipalities, this study compared municipal classification type. This
research uses data from the Missouri Municipal League (MML), which records
information about Missouri cities to promote welfare, interest, and closer relations among
municipalities to improve municipal government and administration in the state (Dohm,
1995). In doing so, the MML keeps records on the exact type of government each
municipality uses in its daily operations. For purposes of this writing, each type of
government rule was assigned a classification number. Municipalities classified by the
MML as constitutional charter/home rule governments were assigned as class 1
municipalities. Legislative or special charter government classified cities were assigned
as class 2 cities. Third and fourth class cities, as described by MML, were assigned class
3 and class 4 categories respectively, and villages were assigned class 5 municipalities.
With the class 1 category considered the highest classification and the class 5 category
being the lowest in terms of professional government structure and resources, the MML‟s
classification system generally appears to show higher classified cities with larger
populations than the other municipalities, although as previously mentioned, there is
some overlap. While the MML does not classify by size of population, this dissertation
made the following distinctions between large, medium, and small municipalities.
Municipalities with 40,000 or more residents were categorized as large cities, 10,000 to
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39,999 were medium, and fewer than 10,000 were considered small. There was variation
in the city size and classification type which is illustrated in Table 5.2.

Table 5.2. Missouri Municipal Classifications and Size
Class 1

Class 2

Class 3

Class 4

Class 5

Small

5

1

17

28

4

Medium

16

1

15

12

0

Large

11

0

1

2

0

Total

32

2

33

42

4

N = 113 Municipalities

Having reason to believe that government classification influences Black-to-White
pretextual stop rates and the other traffic stop outcomes, this study created five dummy
variables from the municipal classification categories. The dummies were named class 1,
class 2, class 3, class 4 and class 5. These categorical variables were added one at a time
to the major regression equations to control for the type of government structure.

Regression Analysis
Bivariate and multivariate regression was used to examine associations between the
various legal, extra-legal, and sociological variables presented in each hypothesis. The
items were tested for multicollinearity. Additionally, outliers were examined and
equations were transformed with proper log methods to obtain better fits when needed.
Few equations were skewed to the extent that they needed transformation; therefore, the
original equations were used in the results.
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CHAPTER 6
DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN TRAFFIC STOPS AND OUTCOMES

DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF RACIAL PROFILING DATA FOR YEAR 2002
Before examining the stated hypotheses, this study provides a description of the major
variables and compares overall rates in disparities in treatment between Black and White
motorists in the 2002 Missouri racial profiling data. Although this research was not
overly concerned with total stops, the total stop data did provide a reference to other
outcomes. Table 6.1 indicates that the rate at which Black motorists were stopped was
higher than the rate for White motorists in the targeted municipalities. For every 1,000
Blacks in the driving age population of the targeted municipalities, 385.8 Black motorists
were stopped by the police in 2002. The rate for Whites was 291.5. On average Blacks
made up only 17 percent while Whites comprised close to 77 percent of the driving age
population amongst the 113 cities analyzed. However, Blacks accounted for 22 percent
of all stops while Whites accounted for 74 percent. This indicates that Blacks are
disproportionately overrepresented in traffic stops (.22/.17=1.29) and Whites are
underrepresented (.74/.77=.96). More importantly, Blacks are approximately 34 percent
(1.29/.96=1.34) more likely than Whites to be stopped by the police in the targeted
Missouri municipalities.

89

Table 6.1. Municipal Stop Disproportionality Index (DI) for Blacks and Whites for Year 2002 and Stop
Rates per 1,000 Driving Age Population (Proportions in Parentheses)
Driving Age (prop)
Stopped (prop)
Stop Rate
DI
Population
Blacks

(.17)

139,374 (.22)

385.8

1.29

1,618,945 (.77)

471,949 (.74)

291.5

.96

Other

125,538 (.06)

25,711 (.04)

204.8

.66

Total

2,105,748 (1.00)

637034 (1.00)

Whites

N= 113 Municipalities

361,265

Black-to-White Stop Disproportionality Index = 1.34

Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data

Not surprisingly, the stop rates in this study are consistent with other racial profiling
research. The descriptive results on rates for pretextual stops, speed stops, and searches
(see Table 6.2) are also consistent with much of the previous research. After breaking
down the other traffic stop outcome variables, which is also presented in Table 6.2, this
study finds that the highest disparity between Black and White motorists is for
outstanding warrant arrest rates. For every 100 Black motorists stopped in the targeted
cities, 5.51 were arrested for having an outstanding warrant. Only 1.67 White motorists
were arrested on this charge for every 100 White motorists stopped. The Black rate was
over 200 percent of the White rate. The smallest disparity was found in the consent
search rate although Black motorists were more likely than White motorists to consent to
a search. In fact, all the rates for Blacks were higher except for speeding. See Table 6.2
for these results. It should be noted that each of the rates were derived by dividing by a
given race‟s total number stopped.
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Table 6.2. Comparison of Black and White Pretextual Stop, Speed Stop, Search, Arrest and Citation Rates
Per 100 Black and White Motorists Stopped in the Targeted Municipalities
Traffic Stop
Outcome
Black Rate
White Rate

Pretextual Stop

45.38

31.66

Speed Stop

36.41

49.36

Search

12.74

7.16

Discretionary Search

2.08

1.35

Mandatory Search

9.58

4.90

Consent Search

3.28

2.61

10.11

4.98

5.51

1.67

.86

.62

Traffic Violation Arrests

4.08

1.50

Citations

74.97

63.89

Arrests
Outstanding Warrant Arrests
Drug Arrests

N= 113 Municipalities
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data

What this study finds to be interesting are the rate of arrests and the rate that drug
contraband is found. It is certainly plausible to believe that Black arrest rates are higher
than White arrest rates mostly because Blacks have higher outstanding warrant arrest
rates. However, the question becomes the discrepancy between lower Black contraband
hit rates (shown in Table 6.3) and higher Black drug arrest rates (previously shown in
Table 6.2). Figure 6.1 shows both Black and White types of arrests by percentage.
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Figure 6.1. Pie Chart Representing Percentages of Black and White Arrest Categories
White Drivers
Black Drivers
27% warrant
10% drugs
1% resists
1% person
27% DWI
1% property
24% traffi c
9% other arrest

42% warrant
7% drugs
1% resists
1% person
7% DWI
1% property
31% traffi c
9% other arrest

N = 113 Municipalities
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data

While the Black drug arrest rate is certainly higher for Black drivers, a smaller
percentage of Black arrests involve drugs compared to the percentage of White drug
arrests. After conducting outcome tests for contraband discovered, this research finds
that the hit rate for White drivers is higher than the hit rate for Black drivers (see Table
6.3). Before assuming that White drivers are found with contraband but not necessarily
arrested, recall that contraband discovered emanates from drugs/alcohol paraphernalia,
currency, weapon, stolen property, and other. Having knowledge that White motorists
are more likely to be arrested on alcohol related charges (Novak, 2004; Rojek et al.,
2004; Walker et al., 2004), the force behind White contraband hit rates might stem from
the drugs/alcohol paraphernalia variable. This study divided drugs/alcohol paraphernalia
by total searches to obtain a separate hit rate for each racial group. Similar to the total
overall contraband found, White drivers had higher hit rates than Blacks in the
drugs/alcohol paraphernalia category. In fact, Figure 1 indicates that the percentage of
Whites arrested for DWI is much higher than the percentage of Blacks arrested for DWI.
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Unfortunately, the data does not separate drug contraband from alcohol. Therefore, this
study attempts to disengage the two by further examining the types of searches. By
virtue of the various types of provisions that justify a search, drug dog alert is the only
variable that exclusively isolates drugs from alcohol. Also recall that the contraband hit
rate was derived from contraband found divided by searches conducted for each racial
category. An outcome test was conducted to determine a hit rate for drug dog alert that
potentially resulted in an arrest. This rate was established by dividing drug dog alert
accounted for by each race into the number of that race‟s drug arrests. This research
acknowledges that drug dog alert does not necessarily signify a drug arrest, given that
officers have the discretion to arrest and there may be errors in detection. However, such
errors are normally due to the dog handler‟s misinterpretation of the dog‟s responses
(Gordon, 2004). In fact, many dogs are nearly perfect in detecting narcotics; moreover,
the United States Supreme Court declares them highly reliable (Bird, 1996). Coupled
with the idea that officers are likely to arrest when drugs are found (Hernandez and
Knowles, 2004; Durose et al., 2005), this study concludes that most dog alert searches
result in an arrest. That said, Table 6.3 also displays various outcome tests that pertain to
contraband found and drug dog alert searches. It shows that the drug dog alert hit rate is
higher for White drivers. In other words, of the population of White drivers arrested for
drugs, they had a higher rate of undergoing a dog alert search than Black drivers arrested
for drugs in conjunction with dog alert searches. On the other hand, of the Black drivers
stopped by the police, they experienced a higher rate of drug dog alert searches than
White drivers stopped by the police. Yet, Black drivers still had a higher rate of total
drug arrests. It appears that Black drivers are more often arrested for drugs under
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circumstances other than canine dogs alerting the police. One option could be that Black
drivers arrested for outstanding warrants likely constitute mandatory searches which
potentially reveal illegal substances and prompt officers to additionally check the drug
arrest box on the racial profiling form. The same could be true for Black drivers arrested
for traffic violations. The data does not provide individual information that shows
specific circumstances surrounding each stop.
Table 6.3. Contraband Hit Rates, Drug/Alcohol Hit Rates, Drug Dog Alert Arrest Rate, and Drug Dog
Alert Search Rate per 1,000 Black Drivers and 1,000 White Drivers
______________________________________________________________________________________
Black

White

Contraband Found

149.2

175.7

Drug/Alcohol Contraband Found

107.6

154.1

Drug Dog Alert Search Divided by Arrests

103.2

126.7

.88

.79

Drug Dog Alert Search Divided by Stops
N = 113 Municipalities

Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data

This study also constructed a descriptive table for the median disproportionality
indices to determine to what extent Black motorists were more likely than Whites to be
treated differently. Once again, as Table 6.4 indicates, only in the speeding category
were Blacks less likely than Whites to be stopped. Not surprisingly, Black motorists
were 204 percent more likely than White motorists arrested for an outstanding warrant.
The only variable that indicates near parity between the races is the citation indices.
Black motorists were actually overrepresented in all categories except consent searches,
citations issued, and stops for speeding. As the overall Black-to-White disproportionality
index on searches showed that Blacks were more likely to be searched by police, there
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was more disparity when it came to mandatory searches. This incongruity could be a
direct result of outstanding warrant and traffic violation arrests.
Table 6.4. Disproportionality Index for Black-to-White Pretextual Stop, Speed Stop, Search, Low-Discretionary
Search, Mandatory Search, Consent Search, Arrests, Outstanding Warrant Arrest, Drug Arrest, Traffic
Violation Arrest Rates, and Rate of Citations Issued
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Black DI
Pretextual Stop

White DI

B/W DI

1.34

.91

1.47

Speed

.37

.49

.76

Search

1.68

.89

1.89

Discretionary Search

1.77

.85

2.08

Mandatory Search

1.78

.80

2.23

.32

.21

1.52

Arrests

1.71

.82

2.09

Outstanding Warrant Arrests

2.13

.7

3.04

Drug Arrests

1.51

.88

1.72

Traffic Violation Arrests

1.52

.72

2.11

.99

.97

1.01

Consent Search

Citations

N = 113 Municipalities
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data

The preceding descriptions provide an examination of stop disparities and
circumstances that occurred after the stop. One could conclude that the differences might
be justified and not necessarily driven by an officer‟s biases. However, some activity is
still left un-explained. We now turn to results related to the minority group threat
hypothesis.
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EXPLAINING STOPS THROUGH THEORY
The descriptive analyses informed that as a whole, Blacks were stopped, searched, and
arrested at higher rates than Whites in the 113 targeted municipalities. This is consistent
with most research. As previously indicated, an explicit theory should accompany
explanations on traffic stops. Thus, a simple regression equation (y=a+bx+e) using
ordinary least squares (OLS) is used to assess the minority group threat hypothesis as a
possible explanation for Black overrepresentation in stops, searches, and other traffic stop
outcomes in Missouri. Using the 2002 Black-to-White stop rate as the dependent
variable in a bivariate regression analysis, it is discovered that the minority group threat
hypothesis cannot explain the likelihood that Blacks would be stopped at higher rates
than Whites across municipalities in year 2002. The study found that after examining the
Black-to-White population percentage increase from 1990 to 2000, there is no significant
relationship as Table 6.5 indicates. The analysis also reveals that the Black-to-White
population percentage ratio across municipalities is not significantly related to stop rates
across municipalities.

Table 6.5. Bivariate Regression: The Effect of Black-to-White Population Percentage Change from 1990 to 2000 (B/W Growth) and
Year 2000 Black-to-White Population Increase Across Municipalities (B/W 2000) on the 2002 Black-to-White (B/W) Stop
Index (N = 113)a
B/W Stop Index
b
Beta
R2
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
B/W Growth
.002
.157
.02
(.001)
B/W 2000

-.081
(.044)

-.171

.03

a

Standard error in parentheses.
**p < .01 *p < .05
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data; 1990 and 2000 Missouri Census Bureau
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The preceding regression models were used to set the foundation for this research‟s
major hypotheses. While there is no intent to ignore overall stop rates, this study is more
concerned with pretextual stops which have become central when analyzing racial
profiling data.
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CHAPTER 7
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR MAJOR STOP VARIABLES AND OUTCOMES

PRETEXTUAL STOPS AND MINORITY GROUP THREAT
There could be simple and justifiable reasons why Blacks are stopped more often than
Whites. This study compared Black and White motorists stopped for serious and nonserious traffic violations. Figure 7.1 shows the mean stop rate for Blacks and Whites
stopped for serious traffic offenses (speed stops) and Blacks and Whites stopped for nonserious traffic offenses (pretextual stops). As indicated in the previous chapter, roughly
49 percent of the White drivers stopped in the targeted Missouri cities were stopped for
speeding while approximately 37 percent of Black drivers were stopped for this reason.
However, 45 percent of Black and 32 percent of White drivers were stopped for faulty
equipment, license violations, following too closely, failing to signal, or lane violations.
This is consistent with most research that indicates that Black motorists are more likely
than Whites to be detained as a result of a pretextual stop. With evidence that the legality
of the pretextual stop has been challenged in court but ruled constitutional, the question
becomes whether or not an association can be drawn between these types of stops and the
minority group threat hypothesis. Police might use the pretextual stop as a legal disguise
to hide race-based motives to stop minorities. In fact, the pretextual stop might be an
important variable that predicts differential treatment of minorities after the stop.
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Figure 7.1. Mean White and Black Stop Rates for Speeding and Pretextual Stops
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________

white speed stop rate rate
white pretext stop rate

black speed stop rate
black pretext stop rate

55

0

White Speed

Black Speed

White Pretext

Black Pretext

Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data

Simple Bivariate Regression Analyses: Black Populations and Traffic Stop Outcomes
Using bivariate regression (none shown), this study finds that there were generally no
significant relationships between relative Black population growth and any of the
dependent variables used as outcomes. Relative Black population growth also has no
significant effect on the confounding violent crime or socio-economic variables. On the
other hand, Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio is significantly and positively associated
with Black-to-White outstanding warrant arrests, drug arrests, traffic violation arrests,
municipal violent crime, and municipal property values. While Black-to-White median
household income is also significantly related to pretextual stops, a negative relationship
is found. However, it is premature to make reliable conclusions with the bivariate
analyses.
99

Regressing Population Growth and Pretextual Stops
To answer research question 1, the following was discovered using multivariate
regression. Table 7.1 shows that when the total municipal population and the Black-toWhite population for year 2000 was controlled, the relative Black population growth
from 1990 to 2000 across the targeted Missouri municipalities had no significant effect
on the 2002 Black-to-White pretextual stop ratios in these cities. However, the analysis
did find a significant main effect between relative size of the Black population for year
2000 and Black-to-White pretextual stop ratios. Hypothesis 1 also stated that the effect
of Black population growth on the ratio of Black-to-White pretextual stops should
weaken in areas with relatively large Black populations. The results were consistent with
that expectation. The analysis observed a significant negative effect of the interaction
variable (B/W Growth X B/W2000) on pretextual stops of Blacks relative to Whites
(bB/W Growth X B/W2000 = -.000151, p < .001).
Table 7.1. Multivariate Regression: The Effect of Relative Black Population Growth from 1990 to 2000
on 2002 Black-to-White Pretextual Stop Ratios When Total Municipal Population is Controlled.
Also B/W Growth is Interacting with Black-to-White Population Ratio (N = 113)a
B/W Pretext
b
Beta
Independent Variable

_

B/W Growth

.0001
(.0002)

.050

B/W 2000

.035 *
(.014)

.366

TotPop

2.74e-06
(7.80e-07)

B/W Growth X B/W2000

-.000151 ** -.537
(.00004)

R2

.19

.306

Notes: B/W Pretext = Black-to-White pretextual stops for year 2002
TotPop = Total municipal population for year 2000
B/W Growth = Black-to-White population ratio from 1990 -2000
B/W 2000 = Year 2000 Black-to-White population ratio
B/W Growth X B/W2000 = B/W Growth interacting with B/W 2000
a
Standard error in parentheses.
**p < .01 *p < .05
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data; 2000 Missouri Census
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So the minority group threat hypothesis is certainly relevant with the interaction term
in the model. Community accountability theory also may be important. In other words,
the results imply that Black population increases produce fear that pushes police toward
more contact with Black motorists. However, where Blacks make up a larger fraction of
the population, and presumably exert more political power, the police are less likely to
stop Black motorists on minor traffic violations.

Regressing Population Growth on Overall, Low-Discretionary, Consent, and Mandatory
Searches
Hypotheses 2, 3, 4, and 5 are all rejected as Table 7.2 shows that relative Black
population growth has no effect on overall search ratios or search ratios separated by
type. Likewise, the interaction terms have no effect. However, the analysis does show
that the Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio has a significant main effect on overall
Black-to-White search ratio (bB/W pretext = .465, p < .05).
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Table 7.2. Multivariate Regression: The Effect of Relative Black Population Growth from 1990 to 2000
on 2002 Black-to-White Overall, Low-Discretionary, Consent, and Mandatory Search Ratios
When Total Municipal Population for Year 2000 is Controlled. Also Year 2000 Black-to-White
Population Ratio and Year 2002 Black-to-White Pretextual Stop Ratios are Interacting and with
B/W Growth (N = 113)
Dependent Variables
B/W Searches
b
Beta

B/WLow-Descr
b
Beta

B/W Consent
b
Beta

B/W Mandatory
b
Beta

Independent Variables

_

B/W Growth

-.001
(.0009)

- .220

-.002
(.003)

-.156

-.0003
(.0009)

-.071

-.001
(.001)

-.140

B/W 2000

-.063 *
(.030)

-.333

-.011
(.096)

-.019

-.015
(.028)

-.091

-.084
(.045)

-.276

TotPop

3.58e-06 *
(1.65e-06)

.203

4.760e-06
(5.39e-06)

.091

1.62e-06
(1.58e-06)

.105

-9.68e-07
(2.50e-06)

-.034

B/W Pretext

.465 *
(.200)

.236

-.277
(.649)

-.047

-.108
(.191)

-.062

1.637 **
(.303)

.517

.0001
(.00009)

.250

-.00004
(.0003)

-.022

9.51e-06
(.00009)

.020

.0002
(.0001)

.225

.0004
(.0006)

.118

.0005
(.002)

.047

-.00006
(.0006)

-.020

-.00002
(.001)

-.003

B/W Growth X
B/W2000

B/W Pretext X
B/W Growth
R2

. 19

.03

Notes: B/W Pretext = Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio for year 2002
B/W 2000
= Year 2000 Black-to-White population ratio
B/W Searches = Black-to-White search ratio for year 2002
B/W Consent = Consent search ratio for year 2002
B/W Pretext X B/W Growth = B/W pretext interacting with B/W Growth
B/WGrowth X B/W2000 = B/W Growth interacting with B/W 2000

.03

.28

B/W Growth = Black-to-White population ratio from 1990 to 2000
TotPop
= Total municipal population for year 2000
B/WLow-Descr = Low discretionary search ratio for year 2002
B/W Mandatory = Mandatory search ratio for year 2002

a

Standard error in parentheses.
**p < .01 *p < .05
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data; 2000 Missouri Census

The pretextual stop ratio is also significantly and positively associated with mandatory
searches (bB/W pretext = 1.637, p < .001). Although the minority group threat hypothesis
cannot explain the likelihood that Black motorists are searched at higher rates than White
motorists, future research should examine the pretextual stop as it relates to searches.
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Regressing Population Growth on Outstanding Warrant, Drug, and Traffic Violation
Arrests Along with Traffic Citations Issued
Similar to the search results, relative Black population growth has no significant effect
on arrest outcomes or traffic citations. Considering the lack of a significant association
with population growth and the interaction variables, hypotheses 6, 7, 8 and 9 are
rejected. Again, there are significant associations between certain arrests and pretextual
stops. Table 7.3 indicates that as the Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio increases, the
Black-to-White outstanding warrant and traffic violation arrest ratios significantly
increase (bB/W pretext = 5.905, p < .001) and (bB/W pretext = 1.411, p < .001) respectively.
Table 7.3. Multivariate Regression: The Effect of Relative Black Population Growth from 1990 to 2000
on 2002 Black-to-White Outstanding Warrant, Drug, Traffic Arrests Ratios when Total
Municipal Population for Year 2000 is Controlled. Also Year 2000 Black-to-White Population
Ratio and Year 2002 Black-to-White Pretextual Stop Ratios are Interacting with B/W Growth
(N = 113)
Dependent Variables
_B/W Warrant Arrest_
Independent Variables_

b

Beta______

_B/W Drug Arrest

_

_b__

Beta____

B/W Traffic Arrest
__b______

Beta______________

B/W Growth

-.002
(.004)

-.098

-.001
(.002)

-.142

-.0007
(.002)

-.079

B/W 2000

-.168
(.140)

-.173

-.057
(.055)

-.173

-.070
(.056)

-.201

TotPop

-.00001
(7.84e-06)

-.153

1.90e06
(3.05e-06)

.062

-7.03e.07
(3.11e-06)

-.022

B/W Pretext

5.905**
(.950)

.589

.692
(.369)

1.411**
(.377)

.391

.0007
(.0004)

.235

.0001
(.001)

.0002
(.0002)

.240

.0005
(.003)

.030

-.00001
(.001)

B/WGrowth X
B/W2000

B/W Pretext X
B/W Growth
R2

.29

.202

.102

.002

.09

Notes: B/W pretext = Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio for year 2002
B/W 2000
= Year 2000 Black-to-White population ratio
B/WGrowth X B/W2000 = B/W Growth interacting with B/W 2000
B/W Drug arrest = Drug arrest ratio for year 2002
Pretext X B/W Growth = B/W pretext interacting with B/W Growth

.0002
(.001)

_____

.029

.14
B/W Growth = Black-to-White population ratio from 1990 to 2000
TotPop
= Total municipal population for year 2000
B/W Warrant arrest = warrant arrest ratio for year 2002
B/W Traffic arrest = traffic arrest ratio for year 2002

a

Standard error in parentheses.
**p < .01 *p < .05
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data; 2000 Missouri Census
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Interestingly, while interactions between pretextual stop and arrest ratios were
insignificant, Table 7.4 shows the following. As Blacks are more likely than Whites to
be arrested after a traffic stop, Blacks are significantly more likely to receive a traffic
citation (bB/W arrest = .195, p < .001). This appears consistent with this study‟s
anticipation that police might unofficially be trained to issue citations for the original stop
violation once a lawful arrest is made during a questionable stop.
Table 7.4. Multivariate Regression: The Effect of Relative Black Population Growth from 1990 to 2000
on 2002 Black-to-White Traffic Citation Ratio when Total Municipal Population for Year 2000
is Controlled. Also Year 2000 Black-to-White Population Ratio is Interacting with B/W
Growth While Year 2002 Black-to-White Pretextual Stop Ratio is Interacting with Black-toWhite Arrest Ratio (N = 113)
Dependent Variables

Independent Variables
B/W Growth

B/W Citation
b
Beta
.00004
.029
(.0001)

B/W 2000

.004
(.009)

TotPop

-2.39e-09
(4.83e-7)

B/W Pretext

.120
(.126)

.218

B/W Arrest

.195 **
(072)

.807

-.00001
(.00003)

-.081

-.066
(.042)

-.672

B/W Growth X
B/W2000

B/W Pretext X
B/W Arrest
R2

_

.079

-.0005

.13

Notes: B/W Pretext = Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio for year 2002
B/W 2000
= Year 2000 Black-to-White population ratio
B/W Growth X B/W2000 = B/W Growth interacting with B/W 2000
B/WPretext X B/WArrest = B/W pretext interacting with B/W arrest

B/W Growth = Black-to-White population ratio from 1990 to 2000
TotPop
= Total municipal population for year 2000
B/W Arrest = Overall arrest ratio for year 2002
B/W Citation = Ratio of citations issued for year 2002

a

Standard error in parentheses.
**p < .01 *p < .05
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data; 2000 Missouri Census

At this point, Table 7.1 seems to indicate that relative Black population growth at
certain levels of Black-to-White population size does possibly explain why Black
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motorists are more likely than White motorists to experience pretextual stops. In turn,
Table 7.2 implies that the pretextual stop positions police to negotiate further general
searches or, more specifically, find other illegal activity that require a mandatory search.
Moreover, Table 7.3 provides speculative reasons to believe that law enforcement
officials are aware that by making this type of stop there is a significant chance that an
outstanding warrant arrest is possible, and that, if Black drivers become un-cooperative in
the absence of other legal justifications to make an arrest, police might be inclined to
arrest Black drivers for the original traffic violation. And finally, Table 7.4 implies that
when the likelihood to make an arrest decreases, perhaps due to the driver‟s cooperation
or the lack of other illegal activity, the likelihood that Black drivers are issued traffic
citations decreases. Unfortunately, there remains too much speculation to make concrete
conclusions without analyzing other potential effects.

105

CHAPTER 8
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR CONFOUNDING VARIABLES

VIOLENT CRIME REGRESSION
Violent crime, which is associated with Black population increases and potentially
produces citizen fear, might give officers an added incentive to make questionable, albeit
lawful pretextual stops of Black motorists at higher rates than White motorists. Model 1
in Table 8.1 is taken from the results in Table 7.1 to show sequential changes after violent
crime is introduced (shown in Model 2 of Table 8.1). It shows that when violent crime
for year 2002, Black-to-White population ratio, and total population for year 2000 are
controlled, the effect of the relative Black population growth on the Black-to-White
pretextual stop ratio continues to significantly depend on the relative size of the Black
population for year 2000 (bB/WGrowth X B/W2000 = -.0001, p < .001). Again, the results
consistently show that growth weakens on pretextual stops when Black populations are
relatively high.
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8.1. Multivariate Regression: The Effect of Relative Black Population Growth from 1990 to 2000 on 2002
Black-to-White Pretextual Stop Ratio when Total Municipal Population for Year 2000 and Violent
Crime are Controlled. Also Year 2000 Black-to-White Population Ratio is Interacting with B/W
Growth (N = 113)
B/W Pretext
Model 1
Independent Variables

Model 2

b

Beta

b

B/W Growth

.0001
(.0002)

.050

.00008
(.0002)

.033

B/W 2000

.035 *
(.014)

.366

.028
(.016)

.291

TotPop

2.74e-06
(7.80e-07)

.306

2.56e-06 ** .286
(8.03e-06)

Violcrime

B/W Growth X
B/W2000
R2

.007
(.008)

-.000151 ** -.537
(.00004)

-.0001 **
(.0004)

. 19

.20

Notes: B/W Pretext = Black-to-White pretextual stops for year 2002
B/W 2000
= Year 2000 Black-to-White population ratio
B/W Growth X B/W2000 = B/W Growth interacting with B/W 2000

Beta

_

.094

-.483

B/W Growth = Black-to-White population ratio from 1990 to 2000
TotPop
= Total municipal population for year 2000
Violcrime
= Municipal violent crime recorded for year 2002

a
Standard error in parentheses.
**p < .01 *p < .05
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data; 2002 Missouri Highway Patrol‟s UCR

When the municipal violent crime rate was controlled to determine the extent that
relative Black population growth affected relative overall searches, warrant, drug, and
traffic violation arrests, there were no significant effects on Black-to-White pretextual
stops. However, the Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio significantly and positively had
a main effect on overall Black-to-White searches (bB/W pretext = .481, p < .05), Black-toWhite warrant arrests (bB/W pretext = 5.908, p < .001), and Black-to-White traffic violation
arrests (bB/W pretext = 1.406, p < .001) see Table 8.2.
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Table 8.2. Multivariate Regression: The Effect of Relative Black Population Growth from 1990 to 2000
on 2002 Black-to-White Overall Search Ratio, Outstanding Warrant, Drug, and Traffic Arrests
Ratios when Total Municipal Population for Year 2000 and Municipal Violent Crime Rate are
Controlled. Also Year 2000 Black-to-White Population Ratio and Year 2002 Black-to-White
Pretextual Stop Ratios are Interacting with B/W Growth (N = 113)
Dependent Variables
B/W Searches
Independent Variables

b

Beta

B/W Warrant Arrest
b

B/W Drug Arrest

B/W Traffic Arrest

Beta

b

Beta

b

Beta

B/W Growth

-.001
(.0009)

-.224

-.002
(.004)

-.098

-.001
(.002)

-.141

-.0007
(.002)

-.078

B/W 2000

-.039
(.033)

-.205

-.164
(.158)

-.169

-.067
(.062)

-.201

-.077
(.063)

-.222

TotPop

4.15e-06 * .235
(1.68e-06)

-.00001
-.152
(8.06e-06)

1.68e.06
(3.13e-06)

.055

-8.74e-07 -.027
(3.20e-06)

B/W Pretext

.481*
(.199)

.244

5.908 **
(.956)

Violcrime

-.025
(.016)

-.168

.00009
(.0001)

.0005
(0006)

B/W Growth X
B/W2000

B/WPretext X
B/WGrowth
R2

.21

.589

.686
(.371)

.200

1.406 **
(.379)

.389

-.004
(.075)

-.004

.010
(.029)

.037

.008
(.030)

.027

.166

.0007
(.0005)

.233

.0001
(.0002)

.121

.0003
(.0002)

.254

.056

.0005
(.003)

.031

-.00006
(.001)

-.010

.0001
(.001)

.022

.29

Notes: B/W Pretext = Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio for year 2002
B/W 2000
= Year 2000 Black-to-White population ratio
B/WGrowth X B/W2000 = B/W Growth interacting with B/W 2000
B/W Drug Arrest = Drug arrest ratio for year 2002
B/W Searches = Black-to-White search ratio for year 2002
Violcrime
= Municipal violent crime recorded for year 2002

.10

.14

B/W Growth = Black-to-White population ratio from 1990 to 2000
TotPop
= Total municipal population for year 2000
B/W Warrant Arrest = warrant arrest ratio for year 2002
B/W Traffic Arrest = traffic arrest ratio for year 2002
B/WPretext X B/WGrowth = B/W pretext interacting with B/W Growth

a

Standard error in parentheses.
**p < .01 *p < .05
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data; 2002 Missouri Highway Patrol‟s UCR

Table 8.3 shows that controlling for violent crime rates also makes no difference with
respect to the effect of relative Black population on Black-to-White citations issued. It
does indicate that the arrest ratio continues to have a significant main effect on the
citation ratio (bB/W arrest = .196, p < .001). While violent crime makes no discernable
differences in the models, it cannot be ignored until other variables that might explain
traffic stop outcomes are examined.
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Table 8.3. Table 8.3. Multivariate Regression: The Effect of Relative Black Population Growth from 1990
to 2000 on 2002 Black-to-White Traffic Citation Ratio when Total Municipal Population for
Year 2000 and Municipal Violent Crime Rate are Controlled. Also Year 2000 Black-to-White
Population Ratio is Interacting with B/W Growth while Year 2002 Black-to-White Pretextual
Stop Ratio is Interacting with Black-to-White Arrest Ratio (N = 113)
Dependent Variable
B/W Citation
Independent Variables

b

Beta

B/W Growth

.00002
(.0001)

.011

B/W 2000

.00008
(.010)

.002

TotPop

-1.00e-07
(4.93e-07)

B/W Pretext

.107
(.127)

.196

B/W Arrest

.196 **
(.072)

.812

Violcrime

.005
(.005)

B/W Growth X
B/W2000

B/W Pretext X
B/WArrest
R2

_

-.020

.109

-4.60e-06
(.00003)

-.030

-.064
(.042)

-.660

.14

Notes: B/W Pretext = Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio for year 2002
B/W 2000
= Year 2000 Black-to-White population ratio
B/W Growth X B/W2000 = B/W Growth interacting with B/W 2000
B/WPretext X B/WArrest = B/W pretext interacting with B/W arrest

Violcrime

B/W Growth = Black-to-White population ratio from 1990 to 2000
TotPop
= Total municipal population for year 2000
B/W Arrest = Overall arrest ratio for year 2002
B/W Citation = Ratio of citations issued for year 2002

= Municipal violent crime recorded for year 2002

a

Standard error in parentheses.
**p < .01 *p < .05
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data; 2002 Missouri Highway Patrol‟s UCR

SOCIAL FACTORS THAT EXPLAIN PRETEXTUAL STOPS AND TRAFFIC STOP
OUTCOMES
With economic inequality embedded in institutionalized discrimination, Table 8.4
describes the economic breakdown using the sociological variables to be analyzed.
Consistent with most sociological research, the median household income for Blacks was
lower than that of Whites. On average, Blacks had higher unemployment rates and were
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two times more likely than Whites to live below the poverty level. Before the regression
analyses were conducted, this researcher checked and found the following. It was
discovered that Black-to-White unemployment and poverty ratio variables were highly
correlated. Therefore this study used Black-to-White poverty and not unemployment
because previous research cited in this dissertation used poverty to reference the
percentage point that Black population causes fear. Multicollinearity was not a problem
with the other chosen variables (see correlation matrix in Appendix D).

Table 8.4. Municipal Level Black and White Median Household Income, Black and White Unemployment
Rate Percentage and Black and White Poverty Rate Percentage Per 1,000 Residents
Median Household Income

Unemployment

Poverty

Blacks

$32,063

4

21

Whites

$42,111

3

10

N= 113 Municipalities

Black/White Med Income = .76
Black/White Poverty Rate = 2.09
Source: 2000 Missouri Census

Black/White Unemployment rate = 1.67

Hypothesis 10 was partially accepted. After adding Black-to-White median household
income, poverty, and municipal property values (socio-economic variables) to the models
as controls, model 3 in Table 8.5 indicates that the interaction between relative Black
population growth and the Black-to-White population ratio continues to affect the Blackto-White pretextual stop ratio as previously observed (bB/WGrowth X B/W2000 = -.0001, p <
.001).
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Table 8.5. Multivariate Regression: The Effect of Relative Black Population Growth from 1990 to 2000 on
2002 Black-to-White Pretextual stop Ratio when Total Municipal Population for Year 2000,
Violent Crime, Black-to-White Income and Poverty, and Municipal Property Values are
Controlled. Also Year 2000 Black-to-White Population Ratio is Interacting with B/W Growth
(N = 113)
Dependent
Variable

B/W Pretext______________________________________________________
Model 1

Independent Variables

b

Model 2
Beta

b

Model 3
Beta

b

Beta

B/W Growth

.0001
(.0002)

.050

.00008
(.0002)

.033

.0002
(.0002)

.067

B/W 2000

.035 *
(.014)

.366

.028
(.016)

.291

.031
(.016)

.319

TotPop

2.74e-06
(7.80e-07)

.306

2.56e-06 **
(8.03e-06)

.286

2.43e-06 **
(7.71e-07)

.271

.094

.012
(.007)

.158

B/W Income

-.170
(.088)

-.165

B/W Poverty

.012
(.015)

.068

Propval

1.37e-06
(5.73e-07)

.211

Violcrime

.007
(.008)

B/WGrowth X B/W2000

-.000151 **
(.00004)

R2

.20

-.537

-.0001 **
(.0004)
.20

Notes: B/W Pretext = Black-to-White pretextual stops for year 2002
B/W 2000
= Year 2000 Black-to-White population ratio
B/WGrowth X B/W2000 = B/W Growth interacting with B/W 2000
B/W Income = Black-to-White MHI ratio for year 2000
Propval
= Municipal property value

-.483

-.0001 **
(.00004)

________

-.479

.29
B/W Growth = Black-to-White population ratio from 1990 to 2000
TotPop
= Total municipal population for year 2000
Violcrime
= Municipal violent crime recorded for year 2002
B/W Poverty = Black-to-White Poverty ratio for year 2000

a

Standard error in parentheses.
**p < .01 *p < .05
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data; 2002 Missouri Highway Patrol‟s UCR; 2000 Missouri Census

Black population growth had no effect on Black-to-White warrant, drug, or traffic
violation arrests when the sociological variables were controlled even after the interaction
measures were added. However, as presented in Table 8.6, Black-to-White pretextual
stop ratios continued to significantly affect the likelihood that Black motorists were
arrested on warrants (bB/W pretext = 5.600, p < .001) or for traffic violations (bB/W pretext =
1.244, p < .001) at higher rates than White motorists. Only the total municipal population
size had a significant and positive association to Black-to-White searches when the
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sociological variables were added and controlled in the model (bTotPop = 4.21e-06, p <
.05).

8.6. Multivariate Regression: The Effect of Relative Black Population Growth from 1990 to 2000 on 2002
Black-to-White Overall Search Ratio, Outstanding Warrant, Drug, and Traffic Arrests Ratios when
Total Municipal Population for Year 2000, Municipal Violent Crime Rate, Black-to-White Income
and Poverty, and Municipal Property Values are Controlled. Also Year 2000 Black-to-White
Population Ratio and Year 2002 Black-to-White Pretextual Stop Ratios are Interacting with B/W
Growth (N = 113)
Dependent Variables
B/W Searches
Independent Variables

b

B/W Warrant Arrest

B/W Drug Arrest

B/W Traffic Arrest

Beta

b

Beta

b

Beta

b

Beta

B/W Growth

-.001
(.0009)

-.234

-.002
(.004)

-.090

-.001
(.002)

-.146

-.0006
(.002)

-.074

B/W 2000

-.032
(.033)

-.169

-.164
(.159)

-.169

-.050
(.061)

-.150

-.072
(.064)

-.206

TotPop

4.21e-06 *
(1.68e-06)

.238

-.00001
(8.03e-06)

-.147

2.03e.06
(3.11e-06)

.066

-6.47e-07 -.020
(3.22e-06)

B/W Pretext

.388
(.211)

.197

5.600 **
(1.008)

.558

.412
(.390)

.120

1.244 **
(.404)

.345

Violcrime

-.024
(.016)

-.159

.031
(.077)

.041

.019
(.030)

.074

.019
(.031)

.069

B/W Income

-.333
(.186)

-.164

.158
(.890)

.015

-.560
(.345)

-.158

-.145
(.356)

-.139

B/W Poverty

-.0007
(.032)

- .002

-.142
(.152)

-.079

.048
(.059)

.077

-.022
(.061)

-.034

Propval

1.03e-07
(1.22e-06)

.008

.0001
(5.82e-06)

.165

2.10e-06
(2.25e-06)

.094

3.29e-06
(2.33e-06)

.140

.00007
(.00009)

.134

.0006
(.0004)

.230

.00008
(.0002)

.084

.0002
(.0002)

.241

.0006
(.0006)

.187

.0005
(.003)

.029

.0002
(.001)

.027

.0002
(.001)

.032

B/W Growth X
B/W2000

B/W Pretext X
B/W Growth
R2

.23

.32

.13

.16

Notes: B/W Pretext = Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio for year 2002
B/W Growth = Black-to-White population ratio from 19990 to 2000
B/W 2000
= Year 2000 Black-to-White population ratio
TotPop
= Total municipal population for year 2000
B/W Growth X B/W 2000 = B/W Growth interacting with B/W 2000 B/W Warrant Arrest = warrant arrest ratio for year 2002
B/W Drug Arrest = Drug arrest ratio for year 2002
B/W Traffic Arrest = traffic arrest ratio for year 2002
B/W Searches = Black-to-White search ratio for year 2002
B/W Pretext X B/W Growth = B/W pretext interacting with B/W Growth
Violcrime
= Municipal violent crime recorded for year 2002
B/W Income = Black-to-White MHI ratio for year 2000
B/W Poverty = Black-to-White Poverty ratio for year 2000
Propval
= Municipal property value
a

Standard error in parentheses.
**p < .01 *p < .05
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data; 2002 Missouri Highway Patrol‟s UCR; 2000 Missouri Census
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While population growth has no effect on Black-to-White citation ratios, the
sociological variables did make a difference. Table 8.7 shows that in areas where the
Black-to-White median household income ratio increases, the likelihood that Black
motorists receive traffic citations significantly more than White motorists decreases (bB/W
income

= -.157, p < .001). When Black poverty decreases relative to White poverty,

Blacks are more likely than Whites to receive traffic citations (bB/W poverty = -.026, p <
.001). The interaction variables in this model were insignificant.
8.7. Table 8.3. Multivariate Regression: The Effect of Relative Black Population Growth from 1990 to 2000
on 2002 Black-to-White Traffic Citation Ratio when Total Municipal Population for Year 2000,
Municipal Violent Crime Rate, Black-to-White Income and Poverty, and Municipal Property Values are
Controlled. Also Year 2000 Black-to-White Population Ratio is Interacting with B/W Growth while
Year 2002 Black-to-White Pretextual Stop Ratio is Interacting with Black-to-White Arrest Ratio
(N = 113)
Dependent Variable
B/W Citation
Independent Variables

b

Beta

B/W Growth

.00003
(.0001)

.021

B/W 2000

.003
(.009)

.059

TotPop

-2.85e-07
(4.62e-07)

-.058

B/W Pretext

-.00002
(.00003)

- .117

B/W Arrest

.140
(.075)

Violcrime

.003
(.004)

.069

B/W Income

-.157**
(.057)

-.278

B/W Poverty

-.026**
(.009)

-.263

Propval

-6.47e-07
(3.33e-07)

-.182

-4.60e-06
(.00003)

-.030

-.020
(.044)

-.205

B/WGrowth X
B/W2000

B/W Pretext X
B/W Arrest
R2

_

.581

.27

Notes: B/W Pretext = Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio for year 2002
B/W 2000
= Year 2000 Black-to-White population ratio
B/WGrowth X B/W2000 = B/W Growth interacting with B/W 2000
B/W Pretext X B/W Arrest= B/W pretext interacting with B/W arrest
Violcrime
= Municipal violent crime recorded for year 2002
B/W Poverty = Black-to-White Poverty ratio for year 2000

B/W Growth = Black-to-White population ratio from 1990 to 2000
TotPop
= Total municipal population for year 2000
B/W Arrest = Overall arrest ratio for year 2002
B/W Citation = Ratio of citations issued for year 2002
B/W Income = Black-to-White MHI ratio for year 2000
Propval
= Municipal property value

a

Standard error in parentheses.
**p < .01 *p < .05
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data; 2002 Missouri Highway Patrol‟s UCR; 2000 Missouri Census
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Controlling for Warrant, Drug, and Traffic Violation Arrests
Again acknowledging the fallacy that accompanies attempts to use traffic stop
outcomes (warrant, drug, and traffic violation arrests) to explain pretextual stops, model 4
in Table 8.8 shows that when these outcome variables are controlled, along with the
sociological variables, municipal violent crime rate, and total population, hypothesis 11 is
partially accepted. Black population growth does have a significant effect on the
likelihood that Black motorists experience pretextual stops at higher rates than White
motorists. As expected, the effect of relative Black population growth on the Black-toWhite pretextual stop ratio weakens at higher levels of the 2000 Black-to-White
population ratio when all other variables are constant (bB/WGrowth X B/W2000 = -.0001, p <
.001). However, this effect does not predict pretextual stops alone. Total municipal
population size, Black-to-White warrant and traffic violation arrests also affect the
likelihood that Black motorists are more likely than White motorists stopped pretextually.
A note should be made that the search and citation outcome variables were not used as
controls because logic does not present these as major motivating factors. While the
motivation behind pretextual stops might be to search for other illegal activity, this study
argues that officers are looking for the end result to be an arrest. In fact, if officers are
looking to make an easy arrest for an outstanding traffic warrant, there is no motivation to
search until the arrest is made. The same holds true with citations. The purpose for the
pretextual stop is arguably to subsequently make an arrest. This study previously argued
and found that there was no significant association between the likelihood of
experiencing a pretextual stop and receiving a traffic citation. Citations were only
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significantly related to the likelihood of being arrested on any charge as Table 8.3
indicates.

8.8. Multivariate Regression: The Effect of Relative Black Population Growth from 1990 to 2000 on 2002
Black-to-White Pretextual Stop Ratio when Total Municipal Population for Year 2000, Violent Crime,
Black-to-White Income and Poverty, Municipal Property Values, and Traffic Stop Outcomes are
Controlled. Also Year 2000 Black-to-White Population Ratio is Interacting with B/W Growth
(N = 113)
Dependent
Variable

B/W Pretext______________________________________________________
Model 1

Independent Variables

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

b

Beta

b

Beta

b

Beta

B/W Growth

.0001
(.0002)

.050

.00008
(.0002)

.033

.0002
(.0002)

.067

.0001
(.0002)

.079

B/W 2000

.035 *
(.014)

.366

.028
(.016)

.291

.031
(.016)

.319

.032 *
(.014)

.329

TotPop

2.74e-06
(7.80e-07)

.306

2.56e-06 **
(8.03e-06)

.286

2.43e-06 **
(7.71e-07)

.271

2.32e-06 ** .259
(6.69e-07)

.007
(.008)

.094

.012
(.007)

.158

.007
(.007)

.086

B/W Income

-.170
(.088)

-.165

-.126
(.077)

-.123

B/W Poverty

.012
(.015)

.068

.016
(.013)

.087

.211

4.20e-06
(5.17e-07)

.065

B/W Warrant Arrest

.040 **
(.008)

.403

B/W Drug Arrest

-.005
(.023)

-.020

B/W Traffic Arrest

.045 *
(.021)

.163

-.0001 **
(.00004)

-.473

Violcrime

Propval

B/WGrowth X
B/W2000
R2

1.37e-06
(5.73e-07)

-.000151 **
(.00004)
.20

-.537

-.0001 **
(.0004)
.20

Notes: B/W Pretext = Black-to-White pretextual stops for year 2002
B/W 2000 = Year 2000 Black-to-White population ratio
B/W Growth X B/W2000 = B/W Growth interacting with B/W 2000
B/W Income = Black-to-White MHI ratio for year 2000
Propval
= Municipal property value
B/W Drug Arrest = Drug arrest ratio for year 2002

-.483

-.0001 **
(.00004)
.29

-.479

b

Beta_

.49

B/W Growth = Black-to-White population ratio from 1990 to 2000
TotPop
= Total municipal population for year 2000
Violcrime
= Municipal violent crime recorded for year 2002
B/W Poverty = Black-to-White Poverty ratio for year 2000
B/W Warrant Arrest = warrant arrest ratio for year 2002
B/W Traffic Arrest = traffic arrest ratio for year 2002

a

Standard error in parentheses.
**p < .01 *p < .05
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data; 2002 Missouri Highway Patrol‟s UCR; 2000 Missouri Census
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An important finding is that neither Black population growth nor Black-to-White
pretextual stops is significantly related to the likelihood that Blacks are arrested at higher
rates than Whites for drug violations. Recall in chapter 6 that the descriptive analyses
show that Black motorists are arrested at higher rates than White motorists for drugs, but
Whites are found with contraband at higher rates than Blacks. These results certainly
raise questions concerning the inconsistencies with respect to drug arrests. Nevertheless,
this study has provided a better understanding of what drives police to make pretextual
stops of Black drivers at higher rates than White drivers which potentially leads to other
traffic stop outcomes. Finding that relative Black population differences are an important
variable to examine in racial profiling data, it is paramount to examine the extent to
which racial profiling operates beyond individual officer behavior or police organization
tolerance.
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CHAPTER 9
THE IMPORTANCE OF RACE AND GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE

MUNICIPAL CLASSIFICATION AND RACIAL PROFILING
This study previously discussed the effects that size of the municipal population may
have on how police and other government officials behave. Research question 13 is
informed by the notion that police will only behave in ways they are allowed to act. In
other words, if certain types of behaviors are covertly or even openly condoned, unequal
justice might play a major role in law enforcement daily operations. Moreover, if cities
are structured in ways that make negative police activity difficult to detect due to
complex organizational styles, the potential for corruption might also consume daily
operations. At minimum, this study argues that Black motorists are likely to experience
differential treatment by police when larger citizen populations necessitate larger police
organizations. These organizations become less manageable depending on how the city‟s
organizational structure holds police managers accountable for their officer‟s actions.
Recall that the municipal classifications, such as class 1, 2, and 3 cities generally
either required higher populations than class 4 and 5 municipalities, or they had no
population requirements. With that being the case, higher populations in this study‟s
targeted cities were indeed located in class 1, 2, and 3 cities. In the thirty-two class 1
cities, the mean population size was 58,120 and 28,763 when excluding the four cities
with more than 100,000 citizens which skewed the mean. In the two class 2 cities, the
mean population size was 17,474. In the thirty-three class 3 cities, the mean population
size was 11,339. In the forty-two class 4 cities the mean population size was 11,653.
And the mean population size in the four class 5 cities was 2,300.
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After controlling for government classification type by introducing each to the
regression models, this study tested hypotheses 12 and 13. The hypotheses stated that the
pretextual and traffic stop outcome ratios respectively will increase when motorists travel
through class 1 (constitutional charter rule) municipalities. However, the results in Table
9.1 show that hypothesis 12 must be rejected. The ratio of the pretextual stop only
significantly decreased in class 3 cities. After observing effects on the other traffic stop
outcomes, hypothesis 13 was also rejected. Class 2 municipalities showed a significant
increase in the outstanding warrant arrests ratio, while class 5 cities showed a significant
increase in the Black-to-White citation ratio. It should be noted that these two models are
not shown because the number of observations were too small to make valid conclusions.
There were only two class 2 and four class 5 municipalities in the data.
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9.1. Multivariate Regression: The Effect of Relative Black Population Growth from 1990 to 2000 on 2002
Black-to-White Pretextual Stop Ratio when Total Municipal Population for Year 2000, Violent Crime,
Black-to-White Income and Poverty, Municipal Property Values, Traffic Stop Outcomes and Municipal
Government Structure are Controlled. Also Year 2000 Black-to-White Population Ratio is Interacting
with B/W Growth (N = 113)
Dependent
Variable

B/W Pretext______
Model 1

Independent Variables

b

_

Model 2
Beta

b

Model 3
Beta

b

Model 4
Beta

b

Model 5
Beta

b

Beta_

B/W Growth

.0002
(.0001)

.082

.0001
(.0002)

.081

.0001
(.0002)

.048

.0001
(.0002)

.060

.0002
(.002)

.106

B/W 2000

.032 *
(.014)

.329

.032*
(.014)

.329

.030 *
(.013)

.310

.030 *
(.013)

.315

.032*
(.014)

.335

TotPop

2.17e-06 **
(7.24e-07)

.242

2.32e-06 ** .259
(6.72e-07)

1.97e-06 ** .220
(6.74e-07)

2.48e-06 **
(6.67e-07)

.277

2.30e-06**
(6.69e-07)

.257

Violcrime

.007
(.007)

.089

.007
(.007)

.087

.009
(.007)

.113

.007
(.007)

.091

.006
(.007)

.076

B/W Income

-.127
(.078)

-.123

-.127
(.078)

-.123

-.172 *
(.078)

-.167

-.160 *
(.079)

-.155

-.130
(.077)

-.126

B/W Poverty

.014
(.013)

.079

.016
(.013)

.087

.011
(.013)

.058

.016
(.013)

.090

.017
(.013)

.094

B/W Propval

4.09e-07
(5.19e-07)

.063

4.22e-07
(5.19e-07)

3.00e-07
(5.32e-07)

.046

B/W Warrant Arrest

.041 **
(.008)

.407

.040 **
(.008)

.404

.039 **
(.008)

.388

.045 **
(.010)

.457

B/W Drug Arrest

-.007
(.023)

-.023

-.005
(.023)

-.018

-.003
(.022)

-.012

-.004
(.023)

-.015

-.009
(.023)

-.029

B/W Traffic Arrest

.043
(.022)

.155

.045*
(.021)

.162

.043 *
(.021)

.157

.049 *
(.021)

.176

.042
(.022)

-.0001 **
(.0004)

-.473

-.0001 **
(.00004)

-.477

-.0001 **
(.00004)

-.486

-.0001**
(.00004)

-.486

.065
(.271)

.017

-.190 *
(085)

-.176

.145
(.081)

.143

-.233
(.245)

-.087

B/W Growth X
B/W2000

Class1

Class2

-.000132 ** -.471
(.00004)
.051
(.090)

.065

1.80e-07
(5.18e-07)

.028

1.89e-07
(5.27e-07)
.041**
(.008)

.029

.414

.153

.047

Class3

Class4

Class5
R2
.49
.49
Notes: B/W Pretext = Black-to-White pretextual stops for year 2002
B/W 2000
= Year 2000 Black-to-White population ratio
B/W Growth X B/W2000 = B/W Growth interacting with B/W 2000
B/W Income = Black-to-White MHI ratio for year 2000
Propval
= Municipal property value
B/W Drug Arrest = Drug arrest ratio for year 2002
Class 1 = Constitutional Charter Rule
Class 3 = Mayor/council; Mayor/City Administrator/council/manager
Class 5 = Villages (elected board of trustees)

.51
.50
.49
B/W Growth = Black-to-White population ratio from 1990 to 2000
TotPop
= Total municipal population for year 2000
Violcrime
= Municipal violent crime recorded for year 2002
B/W Poverty = Black-to-White Poverty ratio for year 2000
B/W Warrant Arrest = warrant arrest ratio for year 2002
B/W Traffic Arrest = traffic arrest ratio for year 2002
Class 2 = Legislative or Special Charter Government
Class 4 = Mayor/Board of Alderman or Mayor/City Administrator

a

Standard error in parentheses.
**p < .01 *p < .05
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data; 2002 Missouri Highway Patrol‟s UCR; Missouri Municipal League; 2000
Missouri Census
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At this point it is necessary to note that this study changed the disproportionality
indices to reflect search outcomes derived from search populations and arrest outcomes
derived from arrest populations. Recall the methods used for this dissertation were the
population of drivers stopped in each racial category. After conducting the analyses,
there were no significant changes to the results in respect to relative Black population
increases. However, the Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio became significantly
correlated to the Black-to-White mandatory search ratio. Additionally, when the overall
search ratio is used as the denominator to obtain the rates for the various types of
searches, Black motorists are less likely to be searched in all the categories. Recall that
Table 6.2 indicates that Whites are less likely searched in each search category. The
same is true when the total arrest ratio is used as the denominator to obtain the rates for
the different types of arrests except for outstanding warrants. Black motorists remain
more likely arrested for outstanding warrants regardless of the denominator used.
Readers must be reminded that this method potentially misses some drivers stopped
pretextually. Thus, the total number stopped remained the denominator for this writing.
The final hypothesis (14) substituted Black-to-White speed stop ratio (not shown) for
Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio. As expected, hypothesis 14 was accepted because
there were no significant associations in either model. In other words, when all other
variables remained the same, motorists stopped for speeding might have been more a
function of driving habits rather than police motivation. Officers have little incentive to
produce further traffic stop outcomes during stops for speeding because the initial reason
to stop is usually for the traffic violation and not for other underlying purposes.
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POINT OF FEAR
Recall in chapters 2 and 4 the research indicated a tipping point that triggered
reactions in response to Black population percentages. Testing Liska et al‟s. (1985) 20%
threshold, the final hypothesis stated the following. The statistical means for the Blackto-White pretextual stop and the other traffic stop outcome ratios will be significantly
higher in cities where Black residents accounted for 20% or more of the population than
in cities where Blacks made up less than 20% of the population. Hypothesis 16 was
partially accepted because a significant difference at this percentage point was only found
in the pretextual stop data and not the other traffic stop outcome data. In municipalities
where Blacks made up 20% or more of the population, the likelihood that Black motorists
experienced pretextual stops at higher rates than White motorists was significantly higher
than the Black-to-White pretextual stop ratios in cities where Blacks accounted for less
than 20% of the population. Although the 20% mark is significant, it was important to
find exactly when the difference occurred.
Further data analyses found that the actual population ratio tipping point was at .08
when Blacks made up approximately 7% and Whites made up approximately 91% of the
population. Of the 113 municipalities in the sample, Blacks made up 7% or more of the
population in 59 cities. After using two sample t tests, the results (not shown) reveal that
the mean Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio is significantly .187 points higher in these
municipalities than in the remaining 54 cities where Blacks make up less than 7% of the
residents. In fact, the mean pretextual stop ratio was 1.60 as indicated in Table 9.2 and
1.41 in municipalities with less than 7% of Black residents. These results suggest that
once the Black population reached 7% in a given municipality, Black citizen visibility
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raised citizen fear and police caution. However, once the relative Black population size
reached the .51 ratio point or higher, which had Blacks accounting for 31% or higher and
Whites accounting for 61% or lower of the population, the differences compared to the
relative Black population size in cities where Blacks accounted for less than 31% of the
population became insignificant. The study further discovered that in locations where
Blacks made up 80% or more of the population, Black motorists were less likely than
White motorists to experience a pretexual stop although the difference was not
significant.
Even though the 20% Black population mark shows no significant differences in
Black-to-White search rates, a significant difference is found at the 76% threshold. For
most municipalities in which Blacks do not make up 76% or more of the total population,
the Black-to-White search ratio does not vary significantly across those municipalities,
even though Blacks are searched at higher rates than Whites. The mean ratio for Blackto-White searches in cities where Black residents accounted for 76% or more of the
population was .761 points lower than in cities where Blacks made up less than 76% of
the population. In fact, as Table 9.2 indicates, the mean Black-to-White search rate was
.957 in the cities where Blacks represented 76% or more of the population. This meant
that Black motorists were less likely to be searched than White motorists. This difference
was also statistically significant. In some of these cities, Blacks represented more than
90% of the municipal population while Whites made up 20% or lower of these
populations. A note should be made that Black residents made up 76% or more of the
municipal population in 10 of the 113 cities analyzed, so these results must be taken with
caution.
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Table 9.2 Two Sample t test Showing Mean Traffic Stop Outcome Ratio Differences by Black Population
Percentage
Black Population
Percentage

Blk Pop = or >
7%

Mean Ratio
Category

mean

B/W Pretext

1.60*

B/W Searches

Black Pop = or >
76%

Black Pop <
76%

mean

s.d.

mean

s.d.

Mean

s.d.

.54

1.41

.40

1.58

.77

1.49

.46

1.78

1.07

1.80

.87

.96 *

.75

1.87

.96

B/W Warrant Arrests

4.36

6.38

3.16

2.57

6.48

14.26

3.54

2.88

B/W Drug Arrests

1.72

1.72

1.88

1.69

.97

.57

1.88

1.75

B/W Traffic Arrests

1.95

1.93

2.35

1.61

2.04

1.15

2.15

1.84

B/W Citations

1.02

.28

.99

.27

.99

.02

1.01

.28

Number of Cities

59

s.d.

Blk Pop <
7%

54

10
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N= 113 Municipalities
NOTE: * Group mean in targeted municipality with the listed percentage point is significantly different from the mean for other cities
at p < .01 **p < .01 *p < .05 difference
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data; 2000 Missouri Census

While the remainder of the outcome variables showed no significant differences when
Black population percentages reached a certain point, there were, although few, times
when Black motorists were less likely to experience a given traffic stop outcome. For
instance, in cities where Black residents accounted for 76% or more of the population,
Black drivers were significantly less likely than White drivers to be searched by the
police as indicated earlier. This was also the case, although not significantly, with Blackto-White drug arrests and citations issued. The table also shows that Blacks were less
likely than Whites to receive citations in cities where Black residents made up less than
7% of the municipal population. While minority group threat is limited in explaining
when fear becomes essential to police practices, there is evidence that relative Black
population increases are important factors to examine in racial profiling studies.
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION

DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
This study sought to explain differential treatment of Black motorists by the police
through the minority group threat hypothesis. Efforts were made to better understand the
dynamics behind the results to the extent that racial profiling played a major role in
police behavior and was apparent in various cities in Missouri. But before the theory was
tested, this study described the disparities that existed under certain circumstances
between Black and White drivers.

Descriptive and Outcome Tests Conclusion
Initially, the descriptive results were not surprisingly different from much of the racial
profiling research. Black motorists were certainly subjected to various police encounters
at higher rates than White motorists in most accounts. Through methods using outcome
tests, other than stops for speeding and contraband found, Blacks had higher rates for the
various overall stops, searches, and arrests.
While the outcome tests for most of the variables were straightforward, the contraband
variable was somewhat misleading. The recorded racial profiling data did not provide a
clear distinction on the type of contraband found. For instance, by White drivers having
a higher contraband hit rate, some would expect that White motorists should have been
arrested for drugs at higher rates than Blacks. With the opposite being the case, this
study adjusted by isolating variables that pertained to drugs alone. The contraband found
variable grouped alcohol and drug related offenses together which might have driven the
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White hit rate higher. After making these adjustments, it was discovered that when
examining the entire population of motorists stopped, Black motorists were searched by
police after a canine drug alert at a higher rate than White motorists. When taking the
population of drivers arrested for drugs in consideration, White drivers were searched
after a canine drug alert at higher rates than Black drivers. Again, assuming that arrests
followed the drug alert searches coupled with findings that Black drivers had higher drug
arrests rates, this study concludes that Black drivers are seemingly arrested for drugs at
higher rates than Whites under other conditions not related to the canine alert. Given the
high probability of Black drivers arrested for outstanding warrants and traffic violations,
it is plausible to believe that drugs were being found during the search incident to the
arrest. More importantly, to prevent researchers from having the urge to prematurely
conclude that Black motorists were unfairly targeted for drug violations when contraband
is found on White motorists at higher rates, there needs to be more clarity in the type of
contraband found. Having described the outcomes, regression analyses were conducted
to assess an explanation for such disparities.

Conclusions on Regression Analyses for Pretextual Stops and Traffic Outcomes
Bivariate regression made it difficult to conclude that minority group threat affected
any of the traffic stop outcomes or pretextual stops. Additionally, relative Black
population growth had no significant effect on violent crime rates or any of the
sociological variables. However, while violent crime and municipal property values
affected the pretextual stop variable, the pretextual stop variable was important in
explaining some of the traffic stop outcomes.

125

Once interaction terms were introduced with all relevant control variables, Model 3 in
Table 9.1 provided the best results. Minority group threat did become relevant depending
on the size of the Black population in year 2000. It made sense that relative growth had
no main effect on pretextual stops without taking relative Black population size into
account. By only taking into account relative Black growth from 1990 to 2000 it would
have implied that citizens and officers, in year 2000, were aware of the population
dynamics in year 1990 to the extent that they had a reference point to base their
perception of threat that would affect traffic stop outcomes in year 2002. Therefore,
minority group threat was not able to provide the sole explanation for pretextual stop
ratio increases. Because the effects on growth diminished once the relative size of the
Black population reached a particular point, community accountability theory also had
some explanatory power. Model 3 additionally showed that outstanding warrant and
traffic violation arrests were significantly associated with Black-to-White pretextual stop
ratios. Again, this study acknowledged the problem with time ordering because, as Table
8.6 illustrated, the pretextual stop ratio consistently affected the ratios for outstanding
warrant and traffic violation arrests. Statistically speaking, this fatal fallacy of circularity
presents serious problems and can be challenged by many scholars who strictly adhere to
the rules of statistical analyses. On the other hand, it may take this type of drastic
measure to provoke further discussion to pinpoint what motivates police action.
Finding that relative Black population growth and Black-to-White pretextual stop
increases do not significantly affect the rate that Blacks are more likely than Whites
arrested for drugs appears to indicate that other variables affect police decisions. Having
found that canine alert searches are used at higher rates on Black drivers than White
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drivers stopped, there could be speculation that White drug arrest rates might be higher if
police use dog alerts at similar rates used on Blacks. Particularly, since the overall
contraband hit rate indicates that Whites are found with contraband at higher rates than
Blacks. As the contraband hit rates are derived from using searches as the benchmark, it
is difficult to determine if drug arrests occur as a result of searches conducted during
pretextual stops. Nevertheless, Blacks are still arrested for drugs at higher rates, which
might indicate that police efforts to find drugs on Blacks result in drug arrests regardless
of the type of stop. In fact, since Blacks are more likely arrested on warrants and traffic
violations, mandatory searches might be the driving force behind higher Black drug arrest
rates. However, it remains difficult to exclude the possibility that police indeed make
pretextual stops because the potential to make outstanding warrant and traffic violation
arrests are high, even if drugs are not found. This study also noted, as predicted, that
racial profiling was imbedded in economic inequality. Model 3 in Table 9.1 furthermore
showed that lower Black household incomes compared to higher White household
incomes affected the pretextual stop ratio.
Bringing the study to the last point of regression, it was discovered that after
controlling for government structure, class 3 cities showed a negative effect on pretextual
stop ratios. When Black motorists traveled through class 3 cities, the likelihood that
Black drivers were subjected to pretextual stops at higher rates than White drivers
decreased. The form of government in class 3 cities ranged from the mayor/council or
the mayor/city administrator/council/manager commission. Within these options, the
Missouri Municipal League does not provide any further distinctions of the particular
type of government structure in class 3 municipalities. However, it could be that the
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strong mayor/council form of government dominates these types of cities. As indicated
in chapter 4, this form of government enables the mayor to appoint and hold
administrative officials accountable, since the officials are not elected by the voters
(MML, 2004).
Finally, the research found that Black population growth affected the pretextual stop
outcome when Black populations reached 7%. However, the significant effect
diminished as the Black population percentages increased. While there was a significant
difference in the Black-to-White pretextual stop rate between the two groups of
municipalities, a 7% percent threshold, subjectively speaking, does not seem to account
for much to make such a difference. This would assume that it does not take a large
portion of Black residents in the population to cause fear and push more police activity.
But as Quillian (2006) might suggest, the mere site of a Black person could
subconsciously trigger old stereotypes including fear of victimization. Not only could
one potentially fear for his/her own safety, but altruistic fear, that is fear for the safety of
others, could also play an important role in the fear factor (Warr, 2000). There are some
indications that altruistic fear could sometimes be stronger than self fear (Warr, 2000).
These subconscious thoughts might cause police to watch Black motorists more carefully.
The question is, are citizens fearful of such a small Black population, and are police
acting altruistically for what they perceive to be in the interest of the community?
Nevertheless, research must continue to attempt to explain these differences. The data
found that there were no other significant tipping points except that Blacks became less
likely than Whites to be searched in populations where Black residents accounted for
76% or more. Again, this seemed to point to the community accountability theory as an
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explanatory variable for searches as officers might be reluctant to detain Black drivers
further when Black representation in highly populated Black cities is evident.
The study set out to illustrate the complexities that make racial profiling accusations
difficult to prove. After analyzing various conditions that confound traffic stops, the
minority group threat hypotheses proved a valuable resource to making a determination
on whether or not police are conducting race based stops. Recall in chapter 3 that this
study would be guided by two viewpoints, the criminological and the economic
perspectives. Understanding police behavior toward certain groups was the major focus
of the criminological perspective. Its premise was that law enforcement should be
proportional across groups based on criminal behavior of a given group. The economic
perspective was concerned with the equality of outcomes. It also argued that law
enforcement should be proportional across racial/ethnic groups depending on their crime
involvement (Engel, 2008). To the extent that Blacks were more likely to experience
pretextual stops at higher rates than Whites, this study contends the following. With the
pretextual stop being a legal technique for officers, it is understandable, if police
efficiency is measured by the number of arrests made, that officers will maximize arrests
by stopping drivers whom they (police) believe are more likely to have outstanding
warrants. To the extent that Black motorists are more likely wanted than White
motorists, Black drivers place themselves in the position to be subjected to different
outcomes during traffic stops. Finding a correlation between Black-to-White pretextual
stops and traffic violation arrests potentially confirms that encounters between officers
and Black drivers become awry, and police are poised and ready to arrest when authority
is perceptually challenged. While population increases over time appeared consistent
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with the minority group threat hypothesis up to a certain population percentage point, it
may not necessarily have been fear that drove the pretextual stop. For citizens to pressure
political authorities, citizens have to be able to access authorities to push for mobilization
to stop perceived threats. That said, the consistent relationship found might have had
more to do with the officer‟s motivation to make arrests. This seemed apparent when
relative Black population size became large. The community accountability theory
appeared to explain the pretextual stop in these circumstances. Nevertheless, pretextual
stops appeared to be based on race and have allowed this research to conclude that racial
profiling is an active part of police behavior in the targeted municipalities. These
circumstances seemed to be less prevalent in class 3 cities where police chiefs are likely
held responsible for rank and file officers. Researchers are now provided the opportunity
to examine more closely the type of government rule in various municipalities and
determine to what extent police behavior is held accountable.

LIMITATIONS

The Data
While an explicit theory was used throughout this dissertation, there were limitations
to the data presented. Given that only Missouri traffic stop data for year 2002 was used,
this study cannot sufficiently determine the effect of populations over time as it related to
pretextual stop rates over time. The traffic stop data collection efforts were started fairly
recently. It would be better to analyze the growth of minority populations within each
municipality and the increase in pretextual stops and outcomes during this growth. Time
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series studies may show that one variable may act on a dependent variable differently at
different times when studying 1980, 1990, and 2000 data. Political climate changes,
which affect fear of crime, could also be a factor over time (Jacobs and Carmichael,
2001). Additionally, after the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centers in New York,
there are indications that racial profiling increased against Middle Eastern citizens.
Results from the 2002 traffic stop data could have been in response to the 9/11 attacks in
2001, as increased police patrols may have put Black motorists at further risk of being
targeted. In other words, a major event change during the period of relative Black
population growth might flaw the results.
Additionally, it would be better to analyze the circumstances surrounding each
pretextual stop within municipalities. For instance, the Missouri racial profiling data only
recorded aggregated information in each municipality. However, there is no way to cross
reference each stop and the outcomes of those stops without analyzing each racial
profiling data form within each city. Cross referencing would show specific details, such
as how many minorities did not have outstanding warrants and were not found in
possession of contraband but were still searched. It would also show a more valid
assessment of the connection between pretextual stops and the outcomes. This study had
to rely on several assumptions which limit the conclusions, for instance, assumptions
were made that arrests accompanied mandatory searches and drug dog alert searches.
Although the traffic stop data is official data, it comes from self reports by individual
police accounts of each stop. Given the nature of self report data (Maxfield and Babbie,
1997), there could be inconsistencies and possibly improper reporting by officers

131

attempting to hide information. Officers may report the least intrusive activity in case
racial profiling allegations are presented.
Although some studies report that minority officers are just as likely as White officers
to treat minority drivers more harshly than White drivers (Buerger and Farrell, 2002), the
Missouri data would better serve this study if it included the race of the officer on each
traffic stop. Having knowledge of the racial makeup of each police department within a
given municipality might also help, but it does not provide information specific to each
stop. On the other hand, White officers dominate the informal networks, which shape the
police subculture (us vs. them); therefore, the officer‟s race may not be much of a factor
(Feagin and Bolton, 2004). Nevertheless, having knowledge of the officer‟s race would
lend assistance to this study.
While this research finds patterns that might imply that racial profiling does exist in
some circumstances, it still does not definitively determine whether racial motives are the
driving forces surrounding pretextual stops and traffic outcomes. Nevertheless, this study
presents patterns that cannot be ignored by criminal justice practitioners, criminologists,
and sociologists.

The Methods
Outcome tests, particulary when analyzing search hit rates, have been challenged
because, as Engel (2008) argues, there are underlying assumptions made about police and
citizen behavior that are not consistent with what is known about decision making during
police and citizen encounters. For instance, the search hit rate assumes that police
discretion is similar across officers. It does not take into account how some
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circumstances, such as time of day, location, and the driver‟s behavior might influence an
officer‟s decision to stop and search a vehicle (Engel, 2008; Ridgeway, 2006). The same
can be said for the outcome tests developed in this writing for outstanding warrants, drug
arrests and traffic violation arrests. The appropriate numerators and denominators might
be too simplistic to conclude validly that disparities in outcomes are racially driven
without accounting for the variations in the behaviors of officers and citizens.
Nevertheless, outcome tests are gaining recognition and have been considered by some a
better measurement of racial profiling data than multivariate modeling (Engel, 2008;
Ridgeway, 2006).
This study recognizes the limitations in multivariate regression. It acknowledges that
omission of variables that may influence dependent variables is problematic and creates
specification error when attempting to explain the variances in each model (Engel et al.,
2006). For instance, neighborhood characteristics might have a significant effect on the
likelihood that Black motorists will encounter pretextual stops. However, the existing
racial profiling data does not provide neighborhood qualities. Furthermore, multivariate
regression, in this study, is not able to assess police and citizen attitudes which might
influence pretextual stops and outcomes (Ridgeway, 2006).

Generalizability
This study is certainly only applicable to the municipalities described. By testing the
minority group threat hypothesis, it was imperative that this study used municipalities
that had a sizable Black population. However, it recognizes that the Black population
growth within a municipality may not be the only driving force behind racial profiling.
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There are numerous cities that have very small, if any, minority populations. These cities
may account for a large portion of the racial profiling allegations. While including more
cities would provide for better statistical operations, it would diminish the ability to
validly test the minority threat hypothesis.

Circularity
As previously mentioned, this study acknowledges that attempting to explain
pretextual stops through warrant and traffic violation arrests is flawed when pretextual
stops explain warrant and traffic violation arrests. Nevertheless, it is extremely important
that researchers find methods to uncover the motives behind pretextual stops.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Change Racial Profiling Form
Some believe the pretextual stop should be banned. It has allowed racial profiling to
become more problematic as officers are given the ability to subjectively select drivers
for further scrutiny beyond the reason stopped (Crawford, 2000). This study
acknowledges that the pretextual stop is a valuable tool for police to expose and arrest
drug traffickers. However, the pretextual stop must be scrutinized more carefully. If
there is genuine concern to eliminate racial profiling, a category on the racial profiling
form should include whether the officer made the stop pretextually. With the pretexual
stop remaining legal, officers with integrity should not resist the opportunity to allow
their motives to be transparent when making a traffic stop. If minorities are made aware
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of an officer‟s intent, minorities could potentially have greater confidence in the police,
which should decrease racial profiling allegations. In fact, minority drivers might be
willing to accept better the consequences of their own actions.
As part of Missouri‟s racial profiling initiative, supervisors are required to counsel
officers who have questionable patterns of stopping minorities. It might be worth
reporting the number of times supervisors counsel officers in each agency that reports to
the Attorney General‟s office. In fact, the number of times officers are counseled can be
taken into account when racial profiling statistics indicate a given department has high
disproportionality indices. The department would certainly become accountable for their
officers‟ actions.
Another change to the racial profiling form should be to provide separate categories
that pertain to drugs and alcohol. Currently, drugs, alcohol, and paraphernalia are
grouped together in one variable under contraband found. Drugs and alcohol are also
grouped together under the category for reasons officers conduct searches. As previous
studies have shown that Whites are more likely to violate liquor laws and arguably
Blacks are more likely to be found with illicit drugs, it seems reasonable to separate the
two for racial profiling studies to provide more explicit conclusions behind police
behavior.

Changing the Ability to Arrest for Traffic Violations
While it remains legal for officers to arrest an individual for a traffic violation, this
practice gives officers the opportunity to circumvent the constitution when citizens
exercise their right to refuse a vehicle search. Additionally, when citizens question an
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officer‟s authority, particularly during questionable stops, officers are implicitly allowed
to retaliate by making an arrest for the traffic violation. Finding that Black motorists are
subjected to these practices at higher rates than White motorists, this practice does
nothing for race relations. This is certainly a great tool against drug carriers; however, as
the utilitarian approach would suggest, we must concentrate more on respecting the rights
of citizens in the absence of probable cause. In turn, citizens might be more willing to
assist with apprehending law violators.

Changing the Way Outstanding Warrants are Handled
Although traffic tickets accumulate revenue for cities, this would only be beneficial if
traffic violators pay their fines. This study has found that Blacks are more likely than
Whites to have outstanding warrants, which this study assumes comes in large part from
Blacks‟ failure to pay traffic fines. That said, it is reasonable to believe that a large
portion of Blacks who fill the jail cells are there as a result of being arrested for omitting
to pay traffic fines. Economic reasons might contribute to their failure to pay. Blacks,
who are generally unemployed at higher rates than Whites, might feel that they have
more time than money and might rather choose to spend time in jails. Furthermore,
Blacks might feel defiantly reluctant to contribute their limited finances toward what they
consider an unjust criminal justice system. The problem potentially exacerbates when
Black populations increase. Arrests for outstanding warrants deplete municipal budgets
while citizens‟ taxes continue to go toward housing these individuals.
By taking a financial approach, cities might save money by requiring individuals with
outstanding warrants to rid themselves of the warrants by working at various sites where
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paid employees would have been otherwise deployed. For instance, if municipalities pay
employees to clean parks, this could become the responsibility of those with outstanding
warrants, who should also be required to sign agreements that relieve cities from injury
liabilities. Paid employees can be assigned to other essential locations. By providing this
incentive, fewer individuals will spend time in jail, and tax funds may be used on other
services.
While some cities participate in amnesty programs that give citizens the opportunity to
wipe their slate clean of warrants, it can be taken a step further. Eliminate the ability for
officers to arrest for outstanding or “failure to appear” warrants after making a traffic
stop. Instead, with today‟s technology, issue a citation that restricts a person‟s driving
privileges until the warrant is removed by that driver‟s payment of the appropriate fines
or by that driver‟s work as previously explained. After an individual has been stopped a
third time and has not taken provisions to remove the warrant, police car computers or
dispatchers should indicate to officers that this is the third stop and that this driver has not
satisfied warrant removal obligations. At that point, officers should have the option to
make the arrest for the outstanding warrant.
With officers having knowledge that they cannot arrest on warrants until these
requirements are met, officers may be less likely to conduct pretextual stops in hopes to
make an arrest. In fact, the burden increases for officers to establish probable cause to
arrest an individual after a traffic stop. It will also shift more burdens on drivers to take
responsibility to avoid these types of arrests. Furthermore, it will provide racial profiling
researchers with the ability to make better conclusions about the prevalence of racial
profiling within communities.
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Appendix A
COMMUNITY ACCOUNTABILITY HYPOTHESIS: AN ALTERNATIVE
EXPLANATION

While this research focused on minority population growth as a potential explanation
of racial profiling, it was discovered that smaller minority populations were also
correlated to differential treatment of Black drivers. The community accountability
hypothesis states that the characteristics of a police department, i.e. racial, ethnic, and
gender make-up, “foster police-minority tensions and promote police violence” (Smith
and Holmes, 2003: p. 1037). It proposes that minority representation in police
departments helps break down barriers between White police and minority citizens. As
the street-level behavior of police entails a high degree of discretion and low visibility,
police are able to use extralegal factors in their decisions to handle whom they consider a
threat to their well being (Smith and Holmes, 2003). White police are not held
accountable for their actions against minorities when influential minorities are not present
in the community or police agencies (Smith and Holmes, 2003). The assumption is that
White officers are more sensitive to minority concerns and likely sensitive to the
perceptions other minority officers may have on White officer‟s actions (Smith and
Holmes, 2003).
Smith and Holmes (2003) note studies that examine individual level observational
data of police brutality. They generally showed that minority recruitment is not related to
Black‟s attitudes toward police. They also revealed that the race of an officer had no
effect on the use of excessive force (2003). However, they did acknowledge that there
were few instances of police brutality in the research they conducted. Several of the
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studies incorporated citizen observation methods when citizens would accompany police
on duty, observe police behavior, and record instances of police brutality to researchers
(Smith and Holmes, 2003). Officers having knowledge that observers are watching
might alter an officer‟s behavior, which might have otherwise been more forceful during
encounters with minority citizens. This certainly created a problem with the validity of
Smith‟s and Holmes‟ (2003) study.
Smith and Holmes also use structural level analysis to test community accountability
by relying on official citizen complaints of police brutality (2003). There is little
research that support or challenge the validity of the community accountability
hypothesis; however, Smith and Holmes did analyze previous structural level studies that
used variables similar to their research. They found that the structural studies
contradicted community accountability‟s proposition (2003). For instance, increased
numbers of minorities and females on police forces and the presence of citizen review
boards either had no effect or actually increased the likelihood of citizen excessive force
complaints (2003). The contradictions were explained by the likelihood that minorities,
particularly Blacks, patrolled more dangerous neighborhoods where there were large
portions of Black citizens and more violent behavior. Officers are then inclined to use
more coercive force which might foster greater numbers of complaints (Smith and
Holmes, 2003). Also, where citizen review boards exist, citizens are more confident in
the complaint system and therefore are more inclined to report instances of brutality
(Smith and Holmes, 2003). Because of these issues, and after juxtaposing community
accountability and minority group threat, Smith and Holmes (2003) leaned toward the
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latter as a better explanation for police excessive force while they acknowledged the
former‟s lesser explanatory capability.
While the community accountability hypothesis focuses on explaining police brutality,
it is quite likely that it also explains lower levels of police actions such as traffic stops
and other outcomes. In fact, disproportionate minority stops might be more pronounced
in areas where minority representation in the community and police agencies is nearly
non-existent. For instance, Dr. James Loewen (2006) reports on how “sundown towns”
still exist in mostly the Midwestern United States. A sundown town is a location where
Blacks are forbidden to travel or even exist. This unwritten rule disadvantages Blacks to
the extent that they would very likely be stopped and harassed by the police when
traveling these locations (Loewen, 2006).
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Appendix B:
Racial Profiling form B
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Appendix C
DATA FILES DECRIPTION

File by File Description
File Name: Missouri Minority Threat Data

File Structure
File Dimensions:

Number of Cases: 113
Number of Variables: 316

Type of File:

STATA

Variable Description
Variable List
Variable Name

Variable Label

agency

corresponding number assigned in attorney
general‟s report

agenname

Name of municipal police department

phone

police department‟s telephone number

census1

total residential driving age population

whpopulas

census 2000 total white population

whresdpop

total white residential driving age population

blpopulas

census 2000 total black population

blresdpop

total white residential driving age population
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bwpopratio

Black-to-White population ratio in corresponding
municipality

totstop

total number of stops

moving

total number of stops as a result of a moving
violation

equipment

total number of stops as a result of equipment
violations

license

total number of stops as a result of a license
violations

speed

total number of stops as a result of speeding

laneviol

total number of stops as a result of a lane violation

followclose

total number of stops as a result of following to
close

failtosig

total number of stops as a result of Filing to signal

cve

commercial vehicle enforcement

othervio

total number of stops as a result of other violations

citation

total number of stops resulting in a citation issued

warning

total number of stops resulting in a warning issued

whstops

total number of white drivers stopped

blstops

total number of black drivers stopped

under18

total number of drivers under age 18

age18to29

total number of drivers between ages 18 and 29

age30to39

total number of drivers between ages 30 and 39

age40pl

total number of drivers ages 40 and above

male

total number of male drivers

female

total number of female drivers
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interstate

total number of drivers stopped on the interstate

ushwy

total number of drivers stopped on United States
highways

statehwy

total number of drivers stopped on Missouri State
highways

countyrd

total number of drivers stopped on Missouri county
roads

citystreet

total number of drivers stopped on the
corresponding municipal street

location

total number of stops at other locations

stopsearch

total number of stops resulting in a search

searchdri

total number of stops resulting in search of driver

searchprop

total number of stops resulting in search of property

inventor

total number of searches as part of a vehicle
inventory

drugalch

total number of searches with drugs or alcohol
found

incident

total number of searches as part of the incident to
the arrest

plainview

total number of searches as result of illicit
contraband in reasonable suspicion weapon

reason

terry search drugdog

drugdog

drug dog alert search

probable

probable cause search

whitepoverty

total number of whites living in poverty divided by
whites in population

blackpoverty

total number of blacks living in poverty divided by
blacks in population
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whitesearch

total number of whites stopped that were searched

blacksearch

total number of blacks stopped that were searched

blsearind

number of blacks searched divided by blacks
stopped

whsearind

number of whites searched divided by whites
stopped

btowsearratio

blacks searched divided by whites searched

btowpoverty

black poverty rate divided by white poverty rate

violentcrime

violent crime over total population times 1000 (rate)

proptycrime

property crime over total population times 1000
(rate)

totcrime

violent and property crime over total population
times 1000 (rate)

popratchange

Black-to-White population rate change from 1990
to 2000

blpopchange

raw black population change from 1990 to 2000

blackwarrant

total number of blacks stopped who were wanted

whitewarrant

total number of whites stopped who were wanted

blackconsent

total number of blacks searched who consented

whiteconsent

total number of whites searched who consented

blconsind

black consent rate: total number of blacks that
consented to search over the number of blacks
searched

whconsind

white consent rate: total number of whites that
consented to search over the number of whites
searched

btowconratio

black consent rate divided by white consent rate
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blcontrab

total number of blacks searched who had
contraband

whcontrab

total number of whites searched who had
contraband

blcontraind

black contraband rate: total number of blacks with
contraband over the number of blacks searched

whcontrabind

white contraband rate: total number of whites with
contraband over the number of whites searched

bwcontratio

black consent rate divided by white consent rate

blunemployed

total number of blacks unemployed

whunemployed

total number of whites unemployed

bunemplind

black unemployment rate: total number of blacks
unemployed divided by the total number of blacks
in the population of a given municipality

wunemplind

white unemployment rate: total number of whites
unemployed divided by the total number of whites
in the pulation of a given municipality

bwunempratio

black unemployment rate divided by white
unemployment rate

blincidarr

number of blacks stopped who were taken into
custody incident to the arrest

whincidarr

number of whites stopped who were taken into
custody incident to the arrest

bincidarrind

black incident to arrest rate: total number of blacks
taken into custody incident to the arrest divided by
the total number of blacks stopped

wincidarrind

white incident to arrest rate: total number of whites
taken into custody incident to the arrest divided by
the total number of whites stopped

bwincarratio

black incident to arrest rate divided by white
incident to arrest
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blackincome

black median household income

whiteincome

white median household income

btowincome

Black-to-White median household income for year
1999

blpretext

total number of pretext stops: blacks stopped for
faulty equipment, license violation, following too
closely, failing to signal, and lane violations

whpretext

total number of pretext stops: whites stopped for
faulty equipment, license violation, following too
closely, failing to signal, and lane violations

blpretin

black pretext stop rate: black pretext stops divided
by black stops

whpretin

white pretext stop rate: black pretext stops divided
by black stops

btowpreratio

black pretext stop index divided by white pretext
stop index

blspeedind

total number of blacks stopped for speeding divided
by total number of blacks stopped

whspeedind

total number of blacks stopped for speeding divided
by total number of blacks stopped

btowspdratio

black speed index divided by white speed index

propvalue

median value for owner occupied housing units

TotPop

Total Population in each municipality size small,
median, or large municipal population size category

size1

dummy variable 1 = large population and 0 = other
size

size2

dummy variable 1 = medium population and 0 =
other size

size3

dummy variable 1 = small population and 0 = other
size
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class

municipal classification type

Wpropop

proportion of whites in total driving age population

Wpropstop

proportion of whites stopped from total stops

Wstopindex

proportion of white driving population divided by
proportion white stops

Bproppop

proportion of Blacks in total driving age population

Bpropstop

proportion of Blacks stopped from total stops

Wstopindex

proportion of Black driving population divided by
proportion white stops

BWstopratio

Black-to-White stop rate

bcontraind

Black contraband hit rate = Black contraband found
divided by black searches

wcontraind

White contraband hit rate = White contraband found
divided by black searches

percblack

percent of total population who is Black

percwhite

percent of total population who is White

bwpopperct

Black-to-White population percentage ratio

nintybpoperc

1990 Black population percentage

nintywpoperc

1990 White population percentage

ninetybwperc

1990 Black-to-White population percentage ratio

perchng1990

Black-to-White population percent ratio change
from 1990 to 2000

blperchnge

Black population percent change from 1990 to 2000

bpop40

Dummy variable: 1 = 40 percent or more Blacks
living in municipality

bpoptwen1

Dummy variabe1e: 1 = municipalities where Blacks
are less than 20 percent of the municipal population
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bpoptwen2

Dummy variable: 1 = municipalities where Blacks
are 20 percent or more of the population

bpopthrt1

Dummy variabe1e: 1 = municipalities where Blacks
are less than 30 percent of the municipal population

bpopthrt2

Dummy variable: 1 = municipalities where Blacks
are 30 percent or more of the population

bpop6

Dummy variable: 1 = 6 percent or more Blacks
living in municipality

bpopsix1

Dummy variabe1e: 1 = municipalities where Blacks
are less than 6 percent of the municipal population

bpopsix2

Dummy variable: 1 = municipalities where Blacks
are 6 percent or more of the population

bpop77

Dummy variable: 1 = 77 percent or more Blacks
living in municipality

bpop771

Dummy variabe1e: 1 = municipalities where Blacks
are less than 77 percent of the municipal population

bpop772

Dummy variable: 1 = municipalities where Blacks
are 77 percent or more of the population

bpop76

Dummy variable: 1 = 76 percent or more Blacks
living in municipality

bpop761

Dummy variabe1e: 1 = municipalities where Blacks
are less than 76 percent of the municipal population

bpop762

Dummy variable: 1 = municipalities where Blacks
are 76 percent or more of the population

bpop75

Dummy variable: 1 = 75 percent or more Blacks
living in municipality

bpop751

Dummy variabe1e: 1 = municipalities where Blacks
are less than 75 percent of the municipal population

bpop752

Dummy variable: 1 = municipalities where Blacks
are 75 percent or more of the population

totpretxt

total number of pretext stops for Whites and Blacks
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totsearch

Total number of Blacks and Whites searched

totarrest

Total number of Blacks and Whites arrested

blarrestprop

Number of Blacks arrested divided by number of
total arrests

bldrgarrind

Black drug arrest index: Black drug proportion
divided by Black arrest proportion

wharrestprop

Number of Whites arrested divided by number of
total arrests

whdrgarrind

White drug arrest index: Black drug proportion
divided by White arrest proportion

totdrugarr

Total drug arrest black and white drivers

whdrgarrprop

number of whites arrested for drugs divided by total
drug arrests

bldrgarrprop

number of blacks arrested for drugs divided by total
drug arrests

bwdrgarrindx

black drug arrest index divided by white drug
arrest index

blarrestindx

black arrest proportion divided by proportion
blacks stopped

wharrestindx

white arrest proportion divided by proportion
whites stopped

bwaresind

black arrest index divided by white arrest index

totoutwarr

total number of outstanding warrant arrests

bloutwprop

whoutwprop

blwarindex

number of blacks arrested for outstanding warrants
divided by total outstanding warrant arrests
number of whites arrested for outstanding warrants
divided by total outstanding warrant arrests
black warrant arrest proportion divided by
proportion blacks stopped
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whwarindex

white warrant arrest proportion divided by
proportion whites stopped

bwwarindex

black warrant arrest index divided by white warrant
arrest index

tottrafarr

total number of traffic violation arrests

bltrafarprop

number of blacks arrested for traffic violation
divided by total traffic violation arrests

bltrafarindx

black traffic violation arrest proportion divided by
proportion blacks stopped

whtrafarprop

number of whites arrested for traffic violation
divided by total traffic violation arrests

whtrafarindx

white traffic violation arrest proportion divided by
proportion whites stopped

bwtrafarindx

black traffic violation arrest index divided by white
traffic violation arrest index

mandsearch

total number of mandatory searches

consent

total number of consent searches

totcondis

total number of contraband found indicators but not
necessarily an arrest

drugcondis

drug/alcohol/paraphernia contraband discovered

bldiscsear

total number of black discretionary searches

whdiscsear

total number of white discretionary searches

blmandsear

total number of black mandatory searches

whmandsear

total number of white mandatory searches

bldisearprop

black discretionary search divided by total
discretionary searches

bldissearind

black discretionary search proportion divided by
proportion blacks stopped
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whdisearprop

white discretionary search divided by total
discretionary searches

whdissearind

white discretionary search proportion divided by
proportion whites stopped

blmansearprop

black mandatory search divided by total mandatory
searches

blmansearind

black mandatory search proportion divided by
proportion blacks stopped

whmanearprop

white mandatory search divided by total mandatory
searches

whmansearind

white mandatory search proportion divided by
proportion whites stopped

blspeed

total number of blacks stopped for speeding

class 1

dummy variable 1 = class 1 municipality

class 2

dummy variable 1 = class 2 municipality

class 3

dummy variable 1 = class 3 municipality

class 4

dummy variable 1 = class 4 municipality

class 5

dummy variable 1 = class 5 municipality

blcitation

total number of blacks issued a citation

blcitprop

black citations issued divided by total citations
issued

whcitation

total number of whites issued a citation

whcitprop

white citations issued divided by total citations
issued

whpropstop

total whites stopped divided by total stops

blpropstop

total blacks stopped divided by total stops

blcitind

black citations issued proportion divided by
proportion blacks stopped
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whcitind

white citations issued proportion divided by
proportion whites stopped

bwcitindex

black citation issued index divided by white citation
issued index

ratioXchang

year 2000 black to white population percentage
ratio times black to white percentage change from
1990 to 2000

prechng

black to white pretextual stop ratio times black to
white percentage change from 1990 to 2000

wharrind

white arrest proportion divided by proportion whites
stopped

blarrind

black arrest proportion divided by proportion blacks
stopped

bwarrind

black arrest index divided by white arrest index

arrpret

black to white arrest times black to white pretextual
stop index

bwararrest

total black warrant arrests

bdrgarrest

total black drug arrests

bresarst

total black arrest for resisting

bpersarst

total black arrest for crime against person

bdwi

total black arrest for DWI

bproperty

total black arrest for property crime

btraffic

total black arrest for traffic violation

botherarst

total black arrest for other crime

warrant

total white warrant arrests

drug

total white drug arrests

resists

total white arrest for resisting
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person

total white arrest for crime against person

dwi

total white arrest for DWI

property

total white arrest for property crime

traffic

total white arrest for traffic violation

other

total white arrest for other crime

spdchng

black to white speed stop ratio times black to white
percentage change from 1990 to 2000

bwpop20

generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with
20% or more black residents

bwpoptwen1

dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than
20% black residents

bwpoptwen2

dummy variable 1 = municipality with 20% or more
black residents

bwpop10

generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with
10% or more black residents

bwpopten1

dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than
10% black residents

bwpopten2

dummy variable 1 = municipality with 10% or more
black residents

bwpop8

generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with
8% or more black residents

bwpopeght1

dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than 8%
black residents

bwpopeght2

dummy variable 1 = municipality with 8% or more
black residents

bwpop7

generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with
7% or more black residents

bwpopsev1

dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than 7%
black residents
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bwpopsev2

dummy variable 1 = municipality with 7% or more
black residents

bwpop75

generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with
75% or more black residents

bwpop751

dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than
75% black residents

bwpop752

dummy variable 1 = municipality with 75% or more
black residents

bwpop50

generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with
50% or more black residents

bwpop501

dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than
50% black residents

bwpop502

dummy variable 1 = municipality with 50% or more
black residents

bwpop95

generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with
95% or more black residents

bwpop951

dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than
95% black residents

bwpop952

dummy variable 1 = municipality with 95% or more
black residents

bwpop80

generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with
80% or more black residents

bwpop801

dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than
80% black residents

bwpop802

dummy variable 1 = municipality with 80% or more
black residents

bwpopsxteen

generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with
16% or more black residents

bwpopsxteen1

dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than
16% black residents
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bwpopsxteen2

dummy variable 1 = municipality with 16% or more
black residents

bwpop30

generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with
30% or more black residents

bwpop301

dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than
30% black residents

bwpop302

dummy variable 1 = municipality with 30% or more
black residents

bwpop40

generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with
40% or more black residents

bwpop401

dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than
40% black residents

bwpop402

dummy variable 1 = municipality with 40% or more
black residents

bwpop39

generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with
39% or more black residents

bwpop391

dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than
39% black residents

bwpop392

dummy variable 1 = municipality with 39% or more
black residents

bwpop42

generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with
42% or more black residents

bwpop421

dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than
42% black residents

bwpop422

dummy variable 1 = municipality with 42% or more
black residents

bwpop47

generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with
47% or more black residents

bwpop471

dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than
47% black residents
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bwpop472

dummy variable 1 = municipality with 47% or more
black residents

bwpop48

generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with
48% or more black residents

bwpop481

dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than
48% black residents

bwpop482

dummy variable 1 = municipality with 48% or more
black residents

bwpop51

generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with
51% or more black residents

bwpop511

dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than
51% black residents

bwpop512

dummy variable 1 = municipality with 51% or more
black residents

bwpop76

generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with
76% or more black residents

bwpop761

dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than
76% black residents

bwpop762

dummy variable 1 = municipality with 76% or more
black residents

bwpop88

generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with
88% or more black residents

bwpop881

dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than
88% black residents

bwpop882

dummy variable 1 = municipality with 88% or more
black residents

bwpop92

generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with
92% or more black residents

bwpop921

dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than
92% black residents
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bwpop922

dummy variable 1 = municipality with 92% or more
black residents

bwpop5

generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with
5% or more black residents

bwpop51

dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than 5%
black residents

bwpop52

dummy variable 1 = municipality with 5% or more
black residents

bwpop69

generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with
69% or more black residents

bwpop691

dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than
69% black residents

bwpop692

dummy variable 1 = municipality with 69% or more
black residents

bwpop6

generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with
6% or more black residents

bwpop061

dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than 6%
black residents

bwpop062

dummy variable 1 = municipality with 6% or more
black residents

bwpop1

generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with
1% or more black residents

bwpop011

dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than 1%
black residents

bwpop012

dummy variable 1 = municipality with 1% or more
black residents

bwpop77

generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with
77% or more black residents

bwpop771

dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than
77% black residents
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bwpop772

dummy variable 1 = municipality with 77% or more
black residents

bwpop53

generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with
53% or more black residents

bwpop531

dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than
53% black residents

bwpop532

dummy variable 1 = municipality with 53% or more
black residents

bwpop61

generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with
61% or more black residents

bwpop611

dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than
61% black residents

bwpop612

dummy variable 1 = municipality with 61% or more
black residents

bwpop70

generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with
70% or more black residents

bwpop701

dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than
70% black residents

bwpop702

dummy variable 1 = municipality with 70% or more
black residents

blconprop

Black consent search divided by total consent
search

whconprop

White consent search divided by total consent
search

blsearprop

Black total search divided by total search

whsearprop

White total search divided by total search

newbconind

new Black consent search proportion divided by
Black search proportion

newwconind

new White consent search proportion divided by
White search proportion
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nwbwconind

new Black consent index divided by new White
consent index

newbdiscind

new Black low-discretion search proportion divided
by Black search proportion

newwdiscind

new White low-discretion search proportion divided
by White search proportion

nwbwdiscind

new Black low-discretion index divided by new
White low-discretion index

newbmanind

new Black mandatory search proportion divided
by Black search proportion

newwmanind

new White mandatory search proportion divided
by White search proportion

nwbwmanind

new Black mandatory index divided by new
White mandatory index

newbwarind

Black warrant arrest proportion divided by Black
arrest proportion

newwwarind

White warrant arrest proportion divided by White
arrest proportion

nwbwwarind

new Black warrant arrest index divided by new
White warrant arrest index

nwbdrugarind

Black drug arrest proportion divided by Black
arrest proportion

nwwdrugarind

White drug arrest proportion divided by White
arrest proportion

nwbwdrgarind

new Black drug arrest index divided by new
White drug arrest index

newbtrafind

Black traffic violation arrest proportion divided by
Black arrest proportion

newwtrafind

White traffic violation arrest proportion divided by
White arrest proportion

nwbwtrafind

new Black traffic violation arrest index divided by
179

new White traffic violation arrest index
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Appendix D
CORRELATION MATRIX
btowse~o btowpo~y violen~e btowin~e btowpr~o btowsp~o propva~e TotPop bwpopp~t per~1990 bwdrga~x bwwari~x bwtrfa~x bwcitindex bwarrindx
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------btowseratio| 1.0000
btowpoverty| 0.0714

1.0000

violentcrime| -0.1351

-0.0664 1.0000

btowincome| -0.2503

-0.1513 0.0715

1.0000

btowpreratio| 0.2953

0.1134 0.1948

-0.2093

1.0000

btowspdratio| -0.2139 -0.0418 -0.2162 0.0966

-0.5316 1.0000

propvalue|

0.1417

0.1958 -0.0277 1.0000

TotPop|

0.2972

0.1027 -0.2886 -0.1633
0.0042 0.1692

-0.0758

0.3126 -0.1218 -0.0101 1.0000

bwpopperct| -0.2028 -0.1226 0.3507

0.1069

-0.0848 -0.1476 -0.1762 -0.0814 1.0000

perchnge1990-0.1496 -0.0804 0.1467

0.1098

-0.0770 0.0263 -0.1382 -0.1031 0.2163

1.0000

bwdrgarrindx|0.2977 0.1386 0.0053 -0.2338

0.2211 -0.0257 0.1620 0.1458 -0.1434 -0.1702 1.0000

bwwarindex 0.2257

-0.0035 0.0425 -0.1122

0.5079 -0.1840 0.2621

bwtrfarindx| 0.1829

0.0226 0.0424 -0.1330

0.3504 -0.1800

bwcitindex| 0.2688

-0.1552 0.0645 -0.276

0.1168 -0.1097 -0.0959 0.0069

bwarrindx| 0.5796

0.2193 -0.0698 -0.1932

0.5279 -0.2379

0.0341 -0.0377 -0.0638 0.2823

0.2017 0.1037 -0.0514 -0.0476

0.2367

0.0007 0.0030

0.1740 -0.0987 -0.0802

1.0000

0.1994

0.3260

1.0000

0.1469

0.0619

0.0508

0.4620

0.4930

0.4214

1.0000
0.3137

1.0000
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Appendix E
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS COMMANDS FOR STATA SOFTWARE

Bivariate Regression
Command = reg dependent variable independent variable
Multiple Regression
Command = reg dependent variable independent variable independent variable
Bar graph
Command = graph variable variable variable variable, bar
Create Dummy Variable for Government Type
Command = tabulate variable (government type)
tabulate variable, generate (variable)
describe
list place variable variable1 – variable5
Create Dummy Variable to Check Differences in Municipal Population Size
Command = generate newvariable = 0 if variable < percent
Replace newvariable = 1 if variable > = percent & variable! =.
Tab newvariable, gen (newvariable)
Desc newvairable1-newvariable2
Two Sample t test
Command = reg newvariable variable
Test for Skewness
Command for table = sktest variable
Command for graph = graph variable, xlabel ylabel bin (8) norm
Command to transform skewed data = boxcox variable, nolog level (95) gen
(newvariable)
Command to graph skewed data = graph newvar, bin (8) ylabel xlabel norm t1
(transformed data)
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